Auteur :
Arnone
Marco,
Scalise
Diego
Type : Article
Thème : Commerce
Couverture :
Italie
This paper builds on the Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) model of deregulation. We concentrate on product market to construct a framework explaining in a more nuanced way the redistributive e¤ects of deregulation between sectors and within the same sector, and possible oppositions to this policy by .rms and workers. In a general equilibrium framework, we introduce two sectors (regulated and unregulated), heterogeneity in .rms.productivity, and a .xed cost of entry. In such a context e¤ects of deregulation policies can be ambiguous depending on some parametric restrictions, and sometime counterproductive. As a result, deregulation policies are not always welfare improving: a deregulation action will succeed in increasing competition and reducing mark up when the economy is already partially deregulated (su¢ ciently high level of competition), but may achieve the opposite outcome when it is highly regulated. Additionally, we study the choice of the best policy instrument and the optimal sequencing in the use of instruments.