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***HORIZONS DE SECURITE
EN MEDITERRANEE
ET AU MOYEN-ORIENT:
COMMUNAUTE D'INTERETS
ET DEFIS COMMUNS***

***LOOKING TO THE FUTURE:
COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS
AND CHALLENGES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
AND THE MIDDLE EAST***

**NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L'OTAN**

**Academic Research Branch
Branche recherche**

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MEDITERRANEE ET AU MOYEN-ORIENT:
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ET DEFIS COMMUNS**

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COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS AND CHALLENGES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

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INTRODUCTION

Organisé conjointement par le Collège de Défense de l'OTAN et des centres académiques israéliens, le séminaire conduit les 29 et 30 novembre à Rome marquait le 10^{ème} anniversaire du lancement du Dialogue méditerranéen de l'OTAN. C'était le septième et dernier d'un cycle organisé par le collège dans ce domaine depuis 1998. Les travaux, qui portaient sur les enjeux de sécurité en Méditerranée et au Moyen-Orient, sont partis de l'approche commune suivante: fin 2004, la Méditerranée n'est plus un terrain de confrontation Est/Ouest et le Moyen-Orient n'est plus la zone prospère étroitement contrôlée par des pouvoirs protégés par les Grands du monde bipolaire. Pour autant, stabilité et sécurité semblent régresser au Sud du continent européen.

Les facteurs de continuité géopolitique existent dans la région, en Méditerranée et au Moyen-Orient.

- 1- La mer Méditerranée reste cloisonnée par ses bassins aux caractéristiques stratégiques distinctes qui gèrent tant bien que mal leurs équilibres propres. Elle reste polarisée par ses deux grands axes perpendiculaires: l'axe Nord/Sud qui établit la corrélation de voisinage entre l'Europe du Sud et l'Afrique du Nord et l'axe Ouest/Est qui distribue les contacts entre l'Atlantique et les mers Noire et Rouge et permet l'accès au Moyen-Orient.
- 2- Le Moyen-Orient a gardé sa "centralité" religieuse et économique; il est toujours le gardien des lieux saints de l'Islam et le réservoir du pétrole d'accès facile. Mais il est aussi un espace de crise en raison de régimes dont l'instabilité met en cause la paix internationale.
- 3- Au cœur des troubles actuels qui préoccupent la communauté internationale, il y a la souffrance quotidienne de populations victimes d'actes de violence aveugle.
- 4- Au cœur des tensions, il y a des problèmes de modernité stratégique, l'avenir des communautés qui se partagent l'héritage religieux et stratégique du Prophète, la greffe de l'Etat hébreu en "Terre sainte" ou les frottements entre Europe, Afrique et Asie.

Il y a également des éléments conjoncturels très préoccupants en cette fin d'année 2004; trois dossiers sensibles constituent la "nouvelle question d'Orient" : le devenir de l'Etat palestinien après la disparition de Yasser Arafat, la situation dans un Iraq au bord du précipice de la guerre civile et la place de la Turquie dans le concert européen.

Dans vingt-cinq ans, en 2030, où en serons-nous? Nul ne le sait; en une génération tout peut changer radicalement. Mais dans vingt-cinq ans, où voudrions-nous être dans cette région? Cela dépend sans doute aussi de notre lucidité stratégique et de notre engagement politique et économique. De quelle OTAN aurons-nous besoin alors? Quelles pistes favoriser?

- 1- Sans doute la Méditerranée sera-t-elle plus intégrée politiquement, économiquement et stratégiquement, dans un Partenariat euro-méditerranéen plus ou moins structuré selon que des sous-ensembles plus solides auront pu se constituer. Une nouvelle forme de communauté de destin et d'intérêts se sera alors sans doute cristallisée.
- 2- Sans doute la Turquie, qui avoisinera comme l'Egypte et le Maghreb les 100 millions d'habitants, aura trouvé une place dans l'Union européenne et jouera un rôle régional accru de développement et de sécurité à l'extrémité orientale du continent européen.
- 3- Sans doute Palestine et Israël auront trouvé un accord, même minimal, sur leurs intérêts stratégiques communs, et développé une alliance mutuellement favorable.
- 4- Il est encore difficile d'imaginer comment le Moyen-Orient se recomposera, tant cette zone de contacts présente de facettes et subit d'influences. Il pourrait se présenter comme une zone de transition entre les grands pôles autour desquels s'organisera le monde: les pôles occidentaux, européen et américain, et les pôles asiatiques, indien et chinois.

Sur cette base de départ, les participants ont discuté avec passion mais aussi avec gravité des intérêts communs aux pays atlantiques et à leurs voisins du Sud, de la place et du rôle de l'OTAN. Les principales conclusions de leurs travaux sont rassemblées ci-dessous:

- 1- Parler d'intérêts communs, même à l'horizon lointain de 2030, reste difficile tant la pression des événements du Moyen-Orient pèse sur notre capacité à élaborer l'avenir. Bien sûr, tous sont opposés au

terrorisme, sous toutes ses formes, ce qui n'est pas vraiment surprenant, mais aller plus loin reste une gageure.

- 2- On ne peut ignorer la complexité du Sud. On ne doit jamais rejeter l'histoire, la géographie, les religions et les cultures pour analyser les perspectives stratégiques partagées entre les nations de l'OTAN et celles du Dialogue méditerranéen.
- 3- On ne peut échapper à la centralité de l'avenir de la Palestine et à l'ombre portée par le problème israélo-palestinien sur l'avenir du Dialogue méditerranéen et les perspectives de l'Initiative de Coopération d'Istanbul (ICI). Toute évolution en Palestine a un effet immédiat sur la stabilité du Sud même si la solution des deux Etats ne saurait résoudre tous les problèmes posés dans la région.
- 4- Il n'y a pas encore de place pour des systèmes de sécurité collective au Moyen-Orient ; en revanche, il y a un appel pour des coopérations sous-régionales renforcées en Méditerranée, mais l'OTAN n'est peut-être pas la meilleure structure pour les développer car elles restent de la responsabilité première des pays de la région.
- 5- La perception de l'OTAN dans la région du Moyen-Orient continue de ne pas être bonne et reste associée à l'action, contestée par certains, des Etats-Unis. En revanche, l'image de l'OTAN semble beaucoup plus positive en Méditerranée où une volonté de coopération pratique semble se manifester.
- 6- Il y a débat sur des déceptions, des inquiétudes et des désaccords persistants entre Nord et Sud; la capacité de l'OTAN à constituer un modèle et à offrir un processus viable aux pays de la Méditerranée et du Moyen-Orient; la façon d'organiser des instruments régionaux de sécurité vraiment efficaces entre des sociétés fragmentées; ce qu'est un partenariat entre des voisins ayant des conditions de sécurité différentes; le rôle régional des armes nucléaires (Israël, Iran et les autres puissances régionales).
- 7- Un certain pessimisme général a marqué un grand nombre d'interventions; et lorsqu'il ne s'agit pas de pessimisme, c'est une forme de désabusement qui s'instaure devant:
 - a) une forme de défaitisme voire de "nanisme" européen,
 - b) une sorte d'unilatéralisme voire de "colonialisme" américain,
 - c) une méfiance latente entre voisins en Méditerranée et au Moyen-Orient,
 - d) un scepticisme généralisé devant les actions multilatérales.

8- Le dialogue général entre les experts rassemblés a été intense. Tous les participants se sont largement exprimés et ont pris conscience de leurs différences mais aussi de leurs intérêts communs pour la sécurité et le développement qui ne s'accommode pas plus dans la région de l'instabilité que du statu quo; c'est de réforme et de modernité qu'il faut traiter selon les trois principes exposés par le Secrétaire général à Alger fin 2004: coresponsabilité, complémentarité et respect des spécificités nationales et régionales.

Fructueux dans ses développements concrets, ce séminaire a certainement été instructif pour les nombreux experts des nouveaux pays de l'Alliance qui y participaient, sans doute pour la première fois.

Convivial dans sa forme et ses échanges, il a également démontré la validité de cet exercice académique d'approfondissement des différences et de recherche des solutions concrètes auxquelles l'Alliance peut apporter sa caution politique et l'OTAN son expertise pratique.

La branche Recherche du Collège de Défense de l'OTAN cherchera la façon d'en conserver l'esprit et la pratique à la fin de l'actuel cycle de sept séminaires du Dialogue méditerranéen qu'elle a conduits depuis son lancement.

Les éditeurs
Rome, décembre 2004

INTRODUCTION

Co-organized by the NATO Defense College and Israeli research institutions, the Seminar that was conducted in Rome on 29 and 30 November, marked the tenth anniversary of the launching of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. It was the seventh and the last in a series of such seminars organized by the College since 1998. The proceedings, which focused on security challenges in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, were based on the following common approach: at the end of 2004, the Mediterranean is no longer a field of East-West confrontation and the Middle East is no longer a prosperous area under the tight control of regimes enjoying the protection of the super-powers of the former bipolar world. Consequently, stability and security seem to be deteriorating to the south of the European continent.

The following factors of geopolitical continuity exist in the region of the Mediterranean and the Middle East:

1. The Mediterranean Sea continues to be divided up into separate basins, all with their own distinct strategic characteristics and their own strategic balance that is managed as best as can be. The Mediterranean is still polarized by its two main perpendicular axes: the North-South axis that correlates neighbouring Southern Europe and North Africa, and the West-East axis that provides contacts between the Atlantic and the Black and the Red Seas and allows access to the Middle East.
2. The Middle East has retained its religious and economic 'centrality'; it is still the guardian of Islam's holy places and the source of readily accessible oil reserves. But it is an area of crisis due to the existence of unstable regimes that pose a threat to international peace.
3. The daily suffering inflicted on the populations by acts of blind violence is central to the current disturbances that are a source of concern for the international community.
4. Problems of strategic modernization, the future of the communities that share the Prophet's religious and strategic legacy, the superimposing of the Jewish State on a 'Holy Land' or friction

between Europe, Africa, and Asia are central to the tension that reigns in the region.

But we can also see a number of very worrying economic elements as we approach the end of 2004; the '*nouvelle question d'Orient*' is made up of three sensitive issues: the future of the Palestinian State that has now become urgent after the death of Yasser Arafat; the situation in Iraq that is on the brink of civil war; and the place of Turkey in Europe.

Where will we be in twenty-five years' time, in 2030? Nobody knows. Everything may change radically within the space of one generation. But where do we want to be in this region in twenty-five years' time? Undoubtedly, that also depends on our strategic lucidity and our political and economic engagement. What kind of a NATO will we need then? What particular avenues of approach should we be looking at?

1. Undoubtedly, in political, economic, and strategic terms, the Mediterranean will be increasingly integrated into a fairly well-structured Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, according to the creation of more concrete sub-groups. A new community of future interests will undoubtedly have crystallized by then.
2. Undoubtedly, Turkey, which, like Egypt and the Maghreb, will have a population of nearly 100 million, will have found its place within the European Union and will be playing a more important regional role in security and development at the eastern end of the European continent.
3. Undoubtedly, Palestine and Israel will at least have reached a minimal agreement regarding their common strategic interests and developed a mutually advantageous partnership.
4. It is still difficult to imagine what the Middle East will look like, because this area of contacts has so many different facets and is subject to so many different influences. It might look like an area of transition between the main poles around which the world will be organized: the Western, European and American, poles and the Asian, Indian and Chinese, poles.

On the basis of the above, the participants argued passionately but seriously about the common interests of the Atlantic countries and

their Southern neighbours, and the role and place of NATO. The main conclusions of their discussions are summarized below:

1. It is still difficult to discuss common interests, even in the distant 2030, because the pressure of events in the Middle East weighs so heavily on our ability to envisage the future. Of course, everyone was against all forms of terrorism, which did not really come as a surprise, although going beyond that still seemed to pose quite a challenge.
2. There is no getting away from the complexity of the South. We must never forget history, geography, religion, and culture when we come to analyze the common strategic outlook for the NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue nations.
3. There is no getting away from the centrality of Palestine's future and the shadow cast by the Israeli-Palestinian issue over the future of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the prospects for the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Any change in Palestine would have an immediate impact on stability in the South even though the two-State solution would not solve all the region's problems.
4. There is still no place for collective security systems in the Middle East; on the other hand, there are calls for strengthening sub-regional cooperation in the Mediterranean, although NATO may not be the best structure for developing such cooperation that remains the primary responsibility of the countries in the region.
5. Perceptions of NATO in the Middle East region have not improved and are still associated with Washington's intervention that is questioned by some countries. On the other hand, NATO seems to have a far more positive image in the Mediterranean, where a willingness to engage in practical cooperation seems to be emerging.
6. There is an ongoing debate over the persistent disappointment, concern, and disagreement between North and South; NATO's ability to provide a role model and to offer the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries a feasible process; ways of organizing really effective regional security tools between split societies; what constitutes a partnership between neighbours in different security situations; and the regional role of nuclear weapons (Israel, Iran, and the other regional powers).
7. Many of the interventions were marked by a degree of pessimism, and if it was not pessimism, then it was a kind of general disillusionment in the face of:

- a) a form of European defeatism or even ‘dwarfism’;
 - b) a sort of American unilateralism or even ‘colonialism’;
 - c) latent distrust between neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East;
 - d) widespread skepticism vis-à-vis multilateral action.
8. Overall, the dialogue between the experts was very intense. All participants expressed themselves very freely and were aware of their differences as well as their common interests with regard to security and development which is no longer able to adapt to either instability or status quo in the region; reform and modernization are now the order of the day, in accordance with the three principles outlined by the NATO Secretary General in Algiers: joint responsibility, complementarity, and respecting national and regional specificities.

This Seminar, which was very fruitful in terms of its concrete findings, was very instructive for all the experts from the Alliance’s new member countries who were probably attending for the first time.

The form of the Seminar and the exchanges were convivial and reflected the validity of this in-depth academic exercise that was aimed at identifying potential differences and concrete solutions to which the Alliance can bring its political guarantee and NATO its practical expertise.

The NATO Defense College’s Academic Research Branch will try to find ways of conserving the spirit and holding further seminars beyond the current series of seven Mediterranean Dialogue seminars it has conducted since the Dialogue was launched.

The Editors
Rome, December 2004

LA SECURITE AU MAGHREB A L'HORIZON 2030: INTERETS ET DEFIS COMMUNS

Khaled KADDOUR¹

Assurer la sécurité commune des pays du Maghreb permet d'établir une zone de prospérité partagée et de stabilité durable. Cet objectif offre la possibilité de préserver les intérêts des pays du Maghreb.

La sécurité à long terme du Maghreb dépend de la capacité des acteurs à bâtir un espace prospère apte à surmonter les tempêtes du XXI^e siècle car la mondialisation et la multiplication des menaces et des nouveaux défis imposent un agenda que le Maghreb n'est pas en mesure de gérer seul.

Dans un environnement aux multiples zones d'instabilité, le Maghreb constitue un partenaire indispensable pour la sécurité et la stabilité de la région méditerranéenne. D'un point de vue sécuritaire et selon la perception de l'Europe, le Maghreb constitue la frontière la moins sûre pour elle, ce qui donne à la coopération en matière de sécurité et de conflits toute sa signification. Dans ce cadre, l'Union européenne (UE) et l'OTAN traitent de façon structurée avec les pays du Maghreb.

En effet, l'instauration de la sécurité, de la paix et de la stabilité dans la région relève d'une responsabilité commune et commande une "nouvelle conscience" fondée sur la collaboration pour résoudre les problèmes régionaux.

Il est incontestable que l'analyse des défis auxquels est confronté le Maghreb sur le plan politique, sécuritaire, économique et culturel, incite à renforcer le dialogue du Maghreb avec ses partenaires régionaux afin de trouver des solutions adéquates aux problèmes qui se posent.

En matière sécuritaire, les principaux défis concernent la capacité du Maghreb à maintenir sa sécurité face aux transformations internes et

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face à un voisinage arabe, africain et européen en mutation après l'élargissement de l'Union européenne d'une part, et la tendance à l'américanisation du Proche-Orient et de la Méditerranée de l'autre.

Avant d'approfondir cette problématique, une brève présentation du Maghreb s'impose.

Le Maghreb constitue un vaste ensemble géopolitique qui se situe au Nord de l'Afrique. Il se compose de cinq Etats² et représente la partie occidentale de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée entièrement bordée par le Sahara tout au long de ses frontières africaines. En fait, on peut distinguer deux Maghreb: un Maghreb saharien et un Maghreb méditerranéen³.

Dans quelques années, les pays du Maghreb célébreront le cinquantième anniversaire de leur indépendance (en 2006 pour le Maroc et la Tunisie et en 2012 pour l'Algérie, etc.), un demi-siècle fait d'enthousiasme et de progrès mais aussi de déceptions et d'échecs.

L'Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA), créée en 1989, reste plongée dans un coma profond, les conflits régionaux ayant entravé à la fois l'intégration maghrébine et les relations avec les pays de la rive Nord. L'intégration économique n'a guère progressé malgré l'existence de complémentarités au niveau de la région maghrébine. Les échanges inter-maghrébins ne représentent qu'environ 1% des échanges extérieurs des pays.

Avec les mutations que connaît la scène internationale, le Maghreb connaît un nouveau voisinage géopolitique élargi, l'Union européenne. Mais il subit aussi les mutations que vit le Proche-Orient, le Monde arabe et l'Afrique subsaharienne. Le Maghreb affronte également des dangers toujours présents dans la région tels que l'émergence d'une islamisation radicale, le conflit du Sahara occidental, l'immigration clandestine et la déstabilisation de certains pays par le terrorisme.

² L'Algérie, la Libye, le Maroc, la Mauritanie et la Tunisie. L'Egypte ayant demandé son adhésion depuis quelques années, elle pourrait être intégrée à moyen terme.

³ Le Maroc, saharien, montagnard, méditerranéen et atlantique, la Libye charnière entre le Maghreb et le Machrek, le désert étant aux portes de Tripoli, la Mauritanie charnière entre le Maghreb et l'Afrique noire, un pays saharien et sahélien, habité par des Maures et des Négro-Africains.

Environnement sécuritaire: défis et principales menaces

Les défis

Les principaux défis que le Maghreb devra relever au cours du quart de siècle prochain sont à la fois de nature sécuritaire, politique, économique, sociale, culturelle et environnementale. Dans ce cadre, il s'agira surtout d'affronter trois défis majeurs, à savoir:

- 1- la transition vers une démocratie participative, caractérisée par une plus grande inclusion des modes de gouvernance modernes;
- 2- le risque d'extension et de multiplication des conflits internes et externes;
- 3- la transition vers une économie de marché basée sur l'intelligence et l'ouverture internationale.

Eu égard à ces trois défis, le Maghreb est donc tenu d'innover sa stratégie globale de développement.

Comme tous les pays en transition, les pays du Maghreb bénéficient d'un certain nombre d'outils et de moyens leur permettant de réussir dans le contexte actuel de la mondialisation. Cependant, ils ne les utilisent que très partiellement. En effet, la plupart des analyses consacrées au Maghreb s'accordent pour affirmer que beaucoup d'atouts sont réunis pour réaliser une convergence vers les pays développés mais que celle-ci tarde à se concrétiser.

C'est ainsi qu'entre 1950 et 2001, le PIB par habitant au Maghreb⁴ a été multiplié par seulement 2,3 (voir tableau 1), contre 19 pour la Corée du Sud et 17,6 pour Taiwan⁵. L'explication n'est pas évidente si l'on se limite aux grands indicateurs économiques; en revanche, elle peut cependant se trouver dans des phénomènes peu visibles aux non-initiés.

La population du Maghreb est passée de 24 millions d'habitants en 1950 à 82 millions en 2004 et elle sera de l'ordre de 125 millions en 2050. Si l'on intègre l'Égypte dans cet espace, la population passera de 155 millions en 2004 à 253 millions d'habitants en 2050 (voir tableau 2). Le taux de croissance de la population maghrébine sera à peu près identique à la moyenne mondiale (+1,2%).

⁴ En 2004, le PNB par habitant (en PPA USD) a atteint 5.700 en Tunisie, 4.840 en Algérie, 3.460 en Égypte et 3.450 au Maroc. Source: *Guide risque pays 2004*, Coface, Dunod.

⁵ *L'économie mondiale: statistiques historiques*, OCDE 2003.

La population demeure une population jeune, le pourcentage des moins de 24 ans passant de 57% en 2000 à 75% en 2050, ce qui a pour conséquence une pression continue sur le marché du travail avec toutes les implications sociales et sécuritaires qui en découlent. La croissance "modeste" est impuissante à réduire le taux de chômage qui s'élève à plus du tiers de la population jeune⁶.

Le développement des pays du Maghreb reste encore tributaire de facteurs exogènes (aléas climatiques, demande européenne, tourisme, prix du pétrole). De plus, la sécheresse et la désertification constituent un défi persistant: plus de 95% de la superficie totale est exposée, à long terme, au risque de désertification. Ainsi, les pays de la région auront beaucoup de difficultés à gérer les coûts sociaux, les conséquences d'une croissance lente et les contraintes environnementales.

Par ailleurs, on doit relever que la diversité des situations au Maghreb peut influencer le système de sécurité. Celui-ci est concerné par l'ouverture politique et les engagements économiques différenciés avec l'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis. Il se caractérise par une coopération à titre individuel avec l'OTAN, par une sécurisation différenciée des frontières et par une spécification du traitement de l'extrémisme religieux.

Enfin, il convient de rappeler que les pays du Maghreb ne disposent ni de forces militaires intégrées dans des structures multinationales ou régionales, ni de forces de réaction rapide capables de faire face à des crises ou menaces en Méditerranée et/ou en Afrique subsaharienne.

Les menaces

Les pays du Maghreb sont confrontés à des menaces variées, plus ou moins apparentes et plus ou moins probables. Certaines menaces sont prévisibles et pourraient avoir un impact sur les pays du Maghreb. Elles pourraient même favoriser les germes d'une éventuelle déstabilisation.

⁶ Le taux de chômage pour la population jeune est de 38% en Algérie et au Maroc et de 30% en Tunisie.

Parmi ces menaces, on peut citer:

- Les risques socio-économiques⁷;
- L'existence de systèmes politiques différents qui se caractérisent par une évolution divergente;
- L'émergence de conflits internes nourris par les difficultés d'intégration des nouveaux modes de gouvernance⁸, par la fracture identitaire et par la montée en puissance de l'islamisme et du terrorisme;
- Les conflits frontaliers et l'issue de l'affaire du Sahara occidental;
- La destruction ou la dégradation des infrastructures énergétiques⁹;
- L'immigration clandestine partant du Maghreb ou le traversant¹⁰;
- La criminalité organisée.

Il est apparu aussi que les pays d'Afrique sub-saharienne, et notamment ceux du Sahel, constituent la ceinture de sécurité du Maghreb. L'expérience de l'Algérie est édifiante à cet égard. N'a-t-elle pas subi les conséquences directes de l'instabilité que connaissent le Mali et le Niger en raison du problème Touareg? Par ailleurs, l'instabilité qu'ont connu le Niger et le Tchad a favorisé l'infiltration d'armes par les mouvements islamistes et leur a permis de constituer des bases arrières.

Sur le plan international, les menaces pourraient surgir à partir de trois variables liées essentiellement aux difficultés du Maghreb face à l'élargissement de l'UE et aux risques de marginalisation du partenariat Euro-med, à la dualité affichée et prononcée entre l'UE et les Etats-

⁷ L'exclusion sociale représente une menace pour la sécurité car elle produit des victimes et suscite des tensions sociales.

⁸ La qualité de la gouvernance est un facteur de paix et de sécurité. La faiblesse de la gouvernance a engendré une croissance faible dans toute la région Moyen-Orient/Afrique du Nord, plus accentuée dans les pays producteurs de pétrole et de gaz. Les simulations effectuées par la Banque Mondiale en septembre 2003 montrent que les taux de croissance auraient été plus élevés de près de 1% par an si la région avait crû aussi rapidement que les pays performants durant ces 15 dernières années; les revenus moyens auraient été au moins deux fois supérieurs à ce qu'ils ne sont aujourd'hui. Les analyses affirment qu'une bonne gouvernance a un large effet sur le développement, la paix et la sécurité.

⁹ La sécurité du transport de l'énergie continue à faire peser une lourde menace terroriste sur la régularité de l'approvisionnement de l'énergie. Le Maghreb dispose actuellement de trois gazoducs le reliant à l'Europe: deux de l'Algérie via la Tunisie et le Maroc et le troisième, sous-marin, reliant directement l'Ouest libyen à l'Italie. Deux autres sont en projet et relieront directement l'Algérie à l'Espagne et à l'Italie.

¹⁰ Le phénomène migratoire Nord/Sud qui apparaît de plus en plus comme un phénomène à dominante "sécuritaire", appelle une action coordonnée et une responsabilité partagée. Plus d'un millier de personnes auraient péri en mer depuis trois ans.

Unis¹¹, à l'américanisation forcée de la région qui entraînerait l'effondrement de la souveraineté et la remise en cause du consensus national.

Quelles relations de sécurité pour le Maghreb à l'horizon 2030?

La coopération du Maghreb avec l'UE et l'OTAN vit actuellement dans l'attente d'un nouveau souffle. Le processus de Barcelone ainsi que le dialogue de l'OTAN avec les pays méditerranéens pourraient être refondés dans le sens de la consécration d'une spécificité pour le Maghreb. Ces deux enceintes pourraient se compléter mutuellement grâce à une étroite concertation entre ces deux organisations en vue d'un regroupement dans le cadre d'un nouveau processus Maghreb-UE-OTAN et ce, compte tenu du nouveau rôle des Etats-Unis d'Amérique dans la région. En effet, ce rôle ne peut pas être ignoré car il conditionne les chances de succès d'une telle initiative. Un tel processus évitera aussi aux pays du Maghreb une "assimilation" à des pays tels que le Pakistan, l'Afghanistan ou même le Yémen.

Il ne s'agit pas de fusionner le processus de Barcelone et le Dialogue méditerranéen de l'OTAN, mais seulement d'assurer leur complémentarité sur la base de leurs atouts spécifiques.

Dans le contexte actuel, le processus euro-méditerranéen semble avoir atteint un seuil critique après l'échec de l'"intégration" des pays du Sud de la Méditerranée, notamment sous le double effet de la remise en cause du processus de Paix au Moyen-Orient et des événements du 11 septembre et leurs répercussions dont la plus importante est l'intervention étrangère en Iraq.

A la différence du Partenariat pour la Paix, le Dialogue méditerranéen de l'OTAN n'a pas connu un grand succès. Il n'a pas joué un rôle perceptible dans la stabilisation de la région, ni dans la promotion de l'évolution des pays participants. Plusieurs explications peuvent être avancées. Ainsi, par exemple, la méconnaissance de la nouvelle stratégie de l'OTAN par de nombreux pays du Maghreb et la faiblesse des mécanismes de dialogue et de coopération si on les compare à ceux

¹¹ Les rivalités Etats-Unis/UE sont déjà visibles. Comme la rive Sud fait partie des frontières externes de l'Europe, le prolongement de ces rivalités se déplacera progressivement vers toute la Méditerranée. Avec la fin du non-alignement et suite à la décomposition du monde bipolaire, les pays du Maghreb seront amenés à se positionner vis-à-vis de cette nouvelle situation géostratégique imposée par les deux puissances.

utilisés par l'OTAN dans le cadre du Partenariat pour la paix. Ceci peut également être lié à l'impossibilité de dissocier les questions de sécurité régionale au sens large, du conflit israélo-palestinien.

Au vu de ce blocage, la condition la plus importante pour assurer la réussite de ce processus de partenariat et de coopération dans cette région consiste à "diviser" l'ensemble MENA¹² afin de travailler au niveau de la sous-région Maghreb, ce qui revient à traiter séparément celui-ci du Moyen Orient.

Il serait aussi plus efficace d'assurer la cohérence et la coordination des différentes enceintes traitant des questions de sécurité en Méditerranée (processus de Barcelone, Forum méditerranéen, dialogue 5+5 élargi à l'UE, aux Etats-Unis, à la Grande-Bretagne, à l'Allemagne et à l'Egypte, pays partenaires pour la paix dans le cadre du dialogue méditerranéen de l'OTAN).

Dans le même ordre d'idées, il faut rappeler que l'OTAN et l'UE adoptent une approche globale de la sécurité fondée sur la croyance dans le recul des menaces militaires et qui appréhende l'instabilité des régions voisines. Ils ont des intérêts stratégiques communs traduits notamment par leur élargissement parallèle et par la volonté de consolider les rapports avec les pays partenaires pour lesquels la question de l'adhésion ne se pose pas, à ce stade.

Dans ce contexte, l'élaboration d'un système de sécurité régional impliquant l'UE, l'OTAN et les pays du Maghreb pour résoudre les crises potentielles, pourrait constituer une réponse adéquate à la volonté de garantir la paix et la sécurité en Méditerranée occidentale.

Impliquer davantage les pays du Maghreb dans l'architecture sécuritaire euro-atlantique pourrait permettre d'avancer une réflexion prospective. En effet, un scénario d'adhésion à long terme des pays partenaires du Dialogue méditerranéen de l'OTAN à cette organisation pourrait être envisagé moyennant le respect des critères d'adhésion à l'OTAN.

Outre les membres de l'OTAN et de l'UE, ce nouveau processus Maghreb-UE-OTAN devrait associer tous les pays maghrébins du Dialogue méditerranéen de l'OTAN, à savoir l'Algérie, la Tunisie, le Maroc et la Mauritanie; la Libye devra, elle aussi, intégrer le processus. L'Egypte pourra rejoindre ce processus étant donné qu'elle a déjà fait part de son souhait d'intégrer le Maghreb. La coopération devrait se

¹² Middle East and North Africa.

concentrer sur cinq aspects prioritaires: la sécurité, la politique, l'économie, la culture et la société civile.

La première priorité porterait sur le développement d'une collaboration en matière de sécurité militaire qui se concrétise notamment à travers la dimension méditerranéenne de l'OTAN et de l'UE (PESD); elle concerne la transparence, la collaboration et l'information dans les rapports de défense entre les pays de la région. Les pays du Maghreb ont toujours affirmé leur volonté de participer à la prévention et à la gestion des crises dans le cadre du partenariat Nord/Sud. Ils sont conscients que la sécurité et la stabilité de la région passent par la prévention; il s'agit en fait de traiter les origines réelles et potentielles des crises pour qu'elles ne dégénèrent pas, l'OTAN et l'UE étant les acteurs les mieux outillés pour relever ce défi. L'OTAN pourrait, dans ce contexte, contribuer tout spécialement à la réussite d'un partenariat politique et d'un partenariat de sécurité efficaces. Ses atouts spécifiques et les expériences accumulées dans le cadre du Partenariat pour la Paix seraient d'un apport considérable.

La deuxième priorité porterait sur le développement d'une coopération politique plus étroite basée sur la transparence et la confiance. De plus, il conviendrait de soutenir le développement politique engagé par les pays du Maghreb qui vise à instaurer la démocratie, à consolider l'Etat de droit et à garantir la protection des droits de l'homme.

L'accompagnement de ce processus par des organismes tels que l'OTAN et l'UE pourrait accélérer son évolution surtout que des réformes ont déjà été engagées et qu'un approfondissement du processus de démocratisation est en cours.

La troisième priorité pourrait être un partenariat économique privilégié UE-Maghreb. Ce partenariat permettrait aux pays du Maghreb de participer au marché intérieur européen élargi à l'instar du processus de l'Espace Economique Européen qui intègre dans le marché intérieur de l'Union des Etats non membres (Norvège, Liechtenstein, Islande). Ceci est également de la plus haute importance pour la question sécurité. L'accélération de l'intégration maghrébine pourrait en particulier apporter un soutien décisif à la mutation politique et sociale.

La quatrième priorité concerne le partenariat culturel. Le dialogue inter-religieux et inter-culturel, basé sur la tolérance et

l'ouverture, ainsi qu'un partenariat dans le cadre de l'éducation, joueraient aussi un rôle essentiel.

Le dialogue entre les cultures constitue un instrument privilégié de consolidation des liens parce qu'il est fondé sur la tolérance et le respect mutuel, il permet de corriger les effets pervers de l'aspect identitaire de la sécurité: l'islamisme radical et le nationalisme extrémiste.

Le dialogue inter-culturel permet de restructurer les imaginaires collectifs, la croyance en une destinée commune étant de nature à assurer la convergence des identités. La question culturelle a désormais acquis un intérêt majeur parce qu'elle permet de comprendre et de réorienter les rapports internationaux.

La cinquième priorité viserait à renforcer les sociétés civiles. En effet, des sociétés civiles fortes sont indispensables pour la diffusion des valeurs démocratiques et la consolidation de l'Etat de droit. Elles sont également essentielles à tout processus de transition.

Conclusion

L'initiative Maghreb-UE-OTAN pourrait ouvrir aux pays du Maghreb une perspective totalement nouvelle: une coopération renforcée et un partenariat étroit dans un cadre sécuritaire global qui intègre les dimensions politiques, économiques, culturelles et sociales.

Pour l'OTAN, cette initiative permettra de sécuriser durablement les frontières sud de ses membres européens et d'instaurer un partenariat de sécurité stratégique avec les pays du Maghreb.

Cependant, une telle initiative commune repose nécessairement sur deux conditions:

- elle suppose une mobilisation accrue des différents acteurs de la région ou intéressés par la région, et doit s'inscrire dans une vision globale et à long terme;
- les conflits régionaux, dont notamment les questions du Moyen-Orient et du Sahara Occidental, ne doivent pas constituer des facteurs de blocage sans pour autant être occultés. Il s'agira "d'éviter" que ces conflits et leur résolution, ne deviennent des conditions *sine qua non* à la mise en œuvre de cette initiative.

Tableau 1: ECARTS DE DEVELOPPEMENT

PAYS *	Population en 1950 (millions)	Population en 2001 (millions)	PIB /hab. en 1950 (\$ internationaux) (a)	PIB /hab. en 2001 (\$ internationaux) (b)	(b)/(a)
Algérie	8,89	31,74	1365,00	2813,00	2,06
Libye	0,96	5,24	857,00	2284,00	2,67
Maroc	9,34	30,65	1455,00	2782,00	1,91
Mauritanie	1,01	2,75	467,00	2837,00	6,07
Tunisie	3,52	9,71	1115,00	4710,00	4,22
Total UMA	23,72	80,07	1304,72	2997,25	2,30
Egypte	21,20	71,90	910,00	2992,00	3,29
Total Egypte incluse	44,92	151,98	1118,44	2994,77	2,68

Source: *L'économie mondiale: statistiques historiques*, OCDE (2003).

Tableau 2: EVOLUTION DE LA POPULATION

PAYS*	Population en 2004 (millions)	Population en 2030 (millions)	Population en 2050 (millions)	Population maximum en	Population maximum (millions)
Algérie	32,3	44,1	48,7	2060	49,2
Libye	5,7	8,1	9,2	2065	9,5
Maroc	31,1	42,5	47,1	2070	48,4
Mauritanie	3,0	5,5	7,5	2100	9,7
Tunisie	9,9	12,3	12,9	2050	12,9
Total UMA	82,0	112,5	125,4		
Egypte	73.4	109.1	127,4	2075	136,3
Total Egypte incluse	155,4	221,6	252,8	-	-

Source: United Nations, DESA, Population Division, *World Population in 2050* (ESA/P/WP.187)

THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAGHREB IN THE YEAR 2030

Galia PRESS-BARNATHAN¹

The Future of NATO, Transatlantic Relations and the Security Environment in the Maghreb

The most conservative assumption is that in 2030 we will see the continued existence of NATO - transformed into a security-management institution - that offers institutional capabilities for multilateral (ML) cooperation in times of crises. However, another option needs to be considered: a second scenario suggests that by 2030 NATO could fall apart. This is not an unlikely scenario, given that many already suggest that the Alliance no longer stands on firm ground, despite its attempts to refocus its missions. In both scenarios we are likely to find different types of interaction between the two main elements within NATO, the expanded EU and the United States. Let me elaborate on these potential dynamics and how they are likely to affect interaction with the Maghreb.

Even if we accept the conservative assumption that NATO would still be a relevant actor, we still need to consider what would be the nature of transatlantic relations. Given the continuation of American hegemony (a reasonable projection in my opinion, given the huge military gap, as well as American economic power), will the Europeans become followers of the 'hegemon'? Will there be a competition for greater foreign policy autonomy? Will there be an attempt to counterbalance the US (in which case NATO is not likely to exist)? Or will the current process of a growing division of labor between the EU

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and the US, managed partially via NATO, continue to develop in the next 25 years? The nature of transatlantic interaction will be important for two reasons. First, greater harmony would allow for better operation and contribution of NATO to enhancing regional security in the region, while discord may lead to the unnecessary waste of resources and to detrimental competition between different European and American plans for the region. (Such duplication can already be seen in economic-social programs of the EU and of the US via its Middle East Initiative). Secondly, competition between the EU and the US can in fact offer a valuable political card for regional states, that will be able to use this competition in order to receive more aid or better terms or greater involvement of one of the parties in regional security problems. Such a scenario is likely to lead to the reliance on bilateral ties between regional states and the EU or the US, so that they could better play their political cards.

In case the second scenario is realized and NATO disintegrates, then we need to consider the status of the EU at the time. Will the EU be a strong, coherent actor by 2030, with its ESDP fully operational and tested (with further operations like the Concordia mission in Macedonia, which will give it greater self-confidence to undertake independent initiatives)? Alternatively, will the EU be a disillusioned actor in 2030, focusing on the management of economic integration but unable to actually develop and act upon a common foreign and security policy, with limited success to its initial ambitions of developing an independent military capability? Under such a scenario we are likely to see a greater dichotomy between economic-social European activity in the Maghreb and military-security American activity or no such security involvement at all. (This will depend on the nature of interests described next.)

The nature of the interaction between the US and the EU will have a significant impact on their policies toward the Maghreb, as well as on the possibilities of Maghreb states to take advantage of such external involvement.

Nature of dominant security threats in 2030: what will be the threats and who will share them?

The conservative yet quite reasonable assumption is that current security threats will continue to be relevant: the threat of global terrorism is unlikely to disappear. This is due to its illusive nature and the fact that it feeds upon other problems that are not likely to be resolved soon, such as the wide North-South gap. Related to that are the associated threats of failed states that can become havens for terrorists, and the threat of proliferation of WMDs. (It is interesting to note that the danger of failed states and the desire to find ways to deal with it suggest the need for greater cooperation between the Maghreb states and the broader African regional security complex, where most of such potential failed states exist. I return to this point at the end.) These threats, which have come to the forefront after 9/11, have clearly increased the relevance, for the US and Europeans, of the Middle East in general, and particularly of the Maghreb (being the focus of our discussion). Their persistence, therefore, means that the Maghreb region is likely to remain relevant for NATO countries in 2030 and beyond.

This being said, two additional issues need to be considered when projecting into the future:

1- Potential divergence in interests between Europe and the US

While the threats described here are indeed common to both Americans and Europeans, in the overall balance I would argue that the security relevance of the Maghreb region is far greater for the Europeans. This is a function of geography more than anything else. With the Maghreb states being Europe's back yard across the Mediterranean Sea, and with ongoing immigration to Europe, which is not likely to cease, terror and other security problems are much more easily transmitted to Europe. This is true also of other potential threats that fall under a more comprehensive view of security, such as environmental problems and disease control.

Why is this point important? Because, in view of their geographical location, developments in the Maghreb are likely to remain a permanent and serious security concern for Europe, whereas the extent of the security concerns it will create for the US in the year 2030 will be

less easily predicted, and will fluctuate given the state of the global war on terror. This is in contrast to the situation in the Mashreq and the Gulf region, where vested American interests (political, security and economic) are of a long-term and constant nature.

A possible divergence in the intensity of interest in the Maghreb 25 years from now will pose a challenge for NATO and is likely to shift to Europe the burden of investing in regional security. This, of course, highlights the importance of my previous discussion of future EU military capabilities. While North Africa is currently defined as part of NATO's areas of interest, because of the more immediate and vital security threat it poses for Europe, it will prove to be an area where the EU can play a significant independent role. Whether this will be done within or outside the NATO framework will depend on other developments. To give an example of such a scenario, imagine that one of the regional states' governments is under serious military threat from Islamic insurgents and calls upon NATO for help, or alternatively that radicals take over one of the states in the region (e.g., Libya after Qaddafi?) and begin to pursue a hostile policy toward its neighbors - who will come in to help? The US was reluctant to intervene in the Balkans. Will it be willing to engage in the Maghreb? My prediction would be that it would rather shift the burden to the EU's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), should it actually exist.

2- Rise of other threats in Europe

While the Maghreb has always been of some interest to Europe, one cannot ignore the fact that the major conceptual shift southward (e.g., the Barcelona process) occurred with the demise of the Soviet threat. While currently most politicians and scholars would argue that the EU does not face any serious threats from the continent, one should bear in mind the possibility that 25 years from now more traditional threats may reappear. These could come in the form of a nationalistic Russia following disenchantment with the economic liberalization effort and now even more dangerous because of its incomplete democratic institutions, or else in the form of a rise in nationalism in Germany, following crises within the European Union. While this is not likely in the coming decade, a 25-year prognosis should take such a scenario into account.

What is the relevance of threats from mainland Europe to the Maghreb? I suggest that if traditional European threats were to re-emerge, the security threats stemming from the Maghreb would be pushed aside. This of course would have implications for any ongoing investment in regional security. If the nature of security cooperation until then is such that it encourages the creation of independent regional capabilities to manage crises and deal with regional threats, then events in Europe are likely to be less important. If, on the other hand, cooperation over the years develops only bilaterally, naturally creating greater dependence on the extra-regional contribution and initiative, then the impact of events in Europe may be more severe.

We will now examine varying assumptions regarding developments on the regional level, their impact on regional security and on triangular relations.

Potential Developments in the Maghreb and their Impact

All Maghreb states are facing an ongoing challenge of managing a transition toward greater political and economic liberalization. This is a multidimensional challenge, involving economic problems and great political difficulties. While the regimes are rather stable in countries like Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, the problems they face have clearly not been overcome and, in my opinion, will not soon be resolved. When one adds to this the challenge of Islamic radicalism and terror, which has been most evident in Algeria's recent history, but clearly also relevant for other Maghreb states, it is not difficult to understand the difficulty of projecting 25 years ahead. Consequently, we need to consider at least two scenarios here. A pessimistic scenario would predict the stalling of reforms, an increased power of radical Islam and a weakening of the state in the Maghreb. An optimistic scenario would predict a moderate to high success for both economic and political reforms. Each scenario has different implications for the nature of regional security threats and solutions.

The pessimistic scenario and its implications: greater instability will create greater negative spillovers into Europe and is also likely to create greater concern in the US, given the issue of global terror. For regional governments it will create a serious dilemma. Governments in the Maghreb region have a strong interest in maintaining both regional

and domestic stability in order to stay in power and advance economic development. Radical Islam threatens all these goals. Ironically, the intensification of such threats will further create a mutual security interest for all regional states (i.e., governing elites) to cooperate in stemming such challenges to the role of the modern state. The emergence of such a threat could serve as an incentive for Maghreb governments to overcome any inter-state disputes they may have (e.g., Western Sahara) in order to cooperate against the more fundamental mutual challenge of radical Islam. At the same time, if there is indeed a rise in the radical Islamic challenge, then it will also become even more complicated than now to use cooperation with the West (NATO, EU, US) in order to deal with it! This is because such open cooperation, definitely on security issues, can create serious domestic legitimacy problems. (This brings to the forefront an important issue to consider: the common interest of NATO countries and Maghreb countries in the fight against global terror is very much the interest of state actors, state elites. As we have seen more clearly in other regions in the Middle East, this cooperation actually amplified the growing gap between state perceptions and societal perception. Given the relative fragility of the state in the Middle East we should remember to look not only at state-to-state interaction, but also at its impact on state-society relations). In light of the problematic nature of cooperation with the West, if no major inter-state conflicts exist at the time, there should be a greater incentive to deal with such challenges on a regional level. (I later discuss more specifically the potential of regional organizations).

The positive scenario of domestic stability with some degree of democratization and economic progress suggest that less negative spillover will occur from the Maghreb to Europe. Economic development and economic benefits that are relatively equally re-distributed in society are likely to decrease the appeal of radical Islam and the incentive to emigrate. Such positive developments could lead though, for these very reasons, to a more contained regional security system, with less intense interaction with the West. This scenario is strengthened by the fact that if regional states do indeed move forward in their transition to modern, export-oriented economies, with greater political liberalization, then (at least according to Liberal theories) they are less likely to fight each other and will find it easier to cooperate among themselves on a regional level.

The implications of developments in the broader Middle East

While the Maghreb is, to some extent, a partially self-contained subsystem, clearly developments in the broader Middle East are important. Such developments include two main factors: the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the future of the American grand plan to democratize the Middle East. If we look back, then the beginning of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue also coincided with the period of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which created an expectation for greater regional cooperation on all fronts. Similarly, most scholars writing about the limited success of the NMD point to the negative spillover of the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Here as well, when projecting 25 years ahead, we can follow an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario. Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I would actually adopt the optimistic scenario. While clearly this cannot be justified and explained within the scope of this short paper, I suggest that in 25 years this conflict is likely to come to some form of resolution, with the establishment of a Palestinian state. Much has been written about the peace dividend that will be reaped once a comprehensive peace in the Middle East is achieved. I take much of these predictions "with a grain of salt". It seems that many of the regional problems and their roots have been buried by Arab governments under the common cause of liberating the Occupied Territories and facing up to Israel. To assume that a comprehensive peace in the Middle East will serve as a panacea to the region's economic, social and political problems is naïve. In fact, it is even dangerous. Consequently, in our 25-year projection, if peace comes within a decade, then a decade later we may actually witness a bitter disenchantment of the Arab world (Arab societies) with its governments, and perhaps less domestic stability than one would initially predict.

But *turning to the Maghreb, what will be the implications of a comprehensive peace agreement?* First, we are likely to see an increased interaction between Maghreb states and Israel (cooperation that already began following the Declaration of Principles in 1993), putting into action the geo-economic logic of such relations. I would suggest that, somewhat counterintuitively, it is actually the geographic distance between the Maghreb and Israel that may facilitate such cooperation, because Maghreb states feel less threatened by Israel's presence than states like Egypt or Syria. At the same time, regional peace and

consequently the demise of the common Arab cause in fighting Israel may also lead the Maghreb sub-system to drift away from the core of the Middle Eastern regional security complex.

As for the second broader regional development to be considered, the American vision of a new Middle East, I would adopt the pessimistic (and in this case the conservative) scenario. It is quite clear that democracy cannot be imported and forced upon indigenous people. While continuing to support political and economic liberalization in the region, the Americans as well are likely to comprehend the futility of dramatic initiatives backed by force, and are likely to moderate their efforts well before our 25-year deadline. The implications of this withdrawal for the Maghreb are not clear. If the optimistic scenario regarding political and economic liberalization within the Maghreb materializes, then the Maghreb states may come to take upon themselves the role of a model for other Mashreq states in dealing with the extremely complicated challenges of liberalization.

Beyond the triangle: Regional organizations and cross-regional interaction

Two additional factors need to be considered when trying to imagine the security environment of the Maghreb in the year 2030. One has to do with the role of regional organizations in managing regional security. The other has to do with the potential of a greater connection between the Maghreb and the African regional security system, and its implications for relations with NATO states.

As for regional organizations, currently there is no meaningful regional framework to deal with security problems. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which includes Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, was created in 1989. Its activities were stalled in 1995 mainly due to the dispute between Morocco and Algeria regarding the Western Sahara, but since 2002 there have been attempts to revive it. While not extremely promising in light of its institutional capabilities, such a forum can be used to develop greater regional cooperation in the security field as well if a common interest in such cooperation emerges. As suggested before, if governing elites across the region find that they all face a common sub-national and transnational threat to their survival (such as global Jihad combined with domestic groups), then they may find it

easier to use that forum and develop it to deal with this challenge. For external actors like NATO, who wish to promote regional stability, it is important to never forget and when possible, nurture such intra-regional institutional links. The more regional institutional capacity there is in 2030, the more self-contained but stable the Maghreb regional security sub-system will be.

A second regional organization that we need to consider leads us to the last point in this futuristic analysis - the African Union. While the Maghreb is part of the broader Middle East regional security complex, it also has natural ties and common interests with the African complex, given its geographic location. Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania are all members of the African Union (AU). While also not a very strong institution, the African Union is making efforts to enhance its capabilities compared to its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. Furthermore, when one considers the main security threats discussed before (global terror, the negative spillover from failed states, threats related to sustainable development, spread of epidemics), these are highly relevant to the African continent. Already in October the AU met in Algeria to discuss joint action to combat terrorism. As in the case of AMU, external actors have an important role to play, in terms of financing and guidance, in further enhancing the capabilities of this regional organization. The link between the Maghreb and Africa, in the broader context of interaction with the West, is important for all parties. For NATO countries, if my previous optimistic scenario materializes, the relatively stable and economically developed Maghreb states can play an important and positive role in managing security threats in the African security complex as well. For the Maghreb states, playing a bridging role between the West and Africa, is likely to bring important economic, political and prestige-related benefits that make the Maghreb-African link worth pursuing.

Conclusions

The main point made in this paper is that when discussing the future of Maghreb regional security, we need to examine the triangular interaction between the United States, the European Union and the Maghreb states themselves. I suggested that in the long run we could more readily predict that Europe will have a greater direct security

interest in the Maghreb region. Consequently, Europe is likely to play a greater role in helping to manage the region's security challenges, either by sharing a greater part of the burden within NATO, or by operating independently out of NATO. From the region's perspective, transatlantic competition is both a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, such competition is likely to decrease the efficiency of aid. On the other, if both Europe and the US do maintain an interest in the region, then such competition offers various opportunities for the Maghreb states to manipulate transatlantic fractions in order to extract greater benefits.

In terms of policy recommendations, it is very important for NATO (or the US and EU) to try to encourage and enhance intra-regional institutional ties. The more regional capabilities are developed to manage security problems, the less the future of regional stability will depend on extra-regional fluctuations, within Europe or across the Atlantic. For the Maghreb states, in broad strategic terms, it is important to explore a greater political role in Africa as well as can greatly enhance the future strategic value of the Maghreb for the West. Finally, greater regional cooperation within the Maghreb will help to undermine the strong impact of the triangular relations described in this paper. Regardless of whether the partner in 2030 is NATO or the EU, negotiating with it through a regional forum, in a coordinated manner, will increase the Maghreb states' bargaining leverage, as well as their sense of being equal partners in any type of security dialogue.

LE MAROC A L'EPREUVE DE L'ISLAM GLOBALISE

Mohamed TOZY¹

Au soir du vendredi 16 mai 2003, lorsque Casablanca eut fini de compter ses morts entre la Casa de Espana et l'hôtel Farah, un mythe est tombé. Le Maroc ne constitue plus l'exception arabe, il n'est plus protégé par sa particularité politique derrière un commandeur des croyants. Le pays rentre dans la cour des pays otages du terrorisme. La première réaction fut de refuser les évidences et de s'accrocher à la thèse du complot étranger: Al-Qaïda a encore frappé d'autant plus que quelques mois auparavant Ben Laden avait, à sa manière, souhaité une bonne fête du mouton aux musulmans en évoquant une liste de pays susceptibles de bénéficier de son attention. L'Arabie Saoudite et le Maroc étaient du nombre.

La thèse du complot n'a pas résisté longtemps et l'on découvrit deux jours plus tard qu'il s'agissait de Marocains en majorité très jeunes, habitant un bidonville de la périphérie de Casablanca et convertis à l'activisme religieux depuis à peine 6 mois. Durant les jours et les semaines qui vont suivre, des centaines de personnes seront arrêtées et le pouvoir découvrira, non sans inquiétude, que le phénomène n'est ni exceptionnel ni nouveau. On parle désormais à visage découvert de la *Salafiya Jihadiya* sans en cerner tous les contours. Des personnages familiers, que le pouvoir avait traité avec indifférence voire avec mépris tant il pouvait facilement les utiliser à son profit, se retrouvent au centre de l'événement, tel un certain Alim de Tanger ou cet autre de Salé pour qui un proche du Palais avait intercédé quelques mois auparavant pour sa libération. Le pouvoir découvre ainsi les actions de groupuscules dont certains membres avaient été arrêtés l'année précédente. La presse les a

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qualifiés de groupuscules plus proches du banditisme que de l'activisme religieux. La reconstitution des itinéraires des salafistes lors des procès a permis de faire des recoupements qui ne sont pas dus au simple hasard. Les procès, quoique expéditifs, restituent un kaléidoscope déroutant où se mêlent des *ouléma*² confirmés, des petits *chioukh*³ des quartiers périphériques et de jeunes activistes à peine socialisés vivant dans la précarité des métiers ambulants.

On compare souvent les effets du 16 mai au Maroc à ceux du 11 septembre aux Etats-Unis et dans le monde. La chaîne de confiance sur laquelle reposait la société marocaine a été irrémédiablement rompue, ce qui a jeté le doute sur la capacité de la monarchie à gérer le risque islamiste et à assurer le projet de transition politique. Un détournement historique est nécessaire pour replacer les événements du 16 mai dans leur contexte national et international.

Il faut dès le départ éviter les amalgames entre les différentes forces en jeu: une conception conservatrice de la religion défendue par le Maroc lui-même sous le régime de la monarchie de droit divin qui a choisi de mettre la religion au centre de son dispositif institutionnel; les mouvements islamistes qui utilisent un référentiel proche mais qui inscrivent leur mouvement dans une perspective politique de prise de pouvoir et de réforme de l'Etat, exprimant par-là un besoin de mobilité d'une partie de l'élite issue du mouvement de scolarisation et d'urbanisation massive; et, enfin, le mouvement de la *Salafiya* qui prône un retour aux sources avant d'être monopolisé par le projet d'expansion culturelle du *Wahhabisme* saoudien pour s'inscrire dans une dynamique internationale caractérisée par la valorisation du *djihad* et se retourner contre ceux-là même qui avaient engagé la jeunesse dorée du Moyen-Orient durant la première guerre d'Afghanistan et celle des Balkans.

Pour des raisons politiques, la monarchie a, dès l'indépendance, choisi de s'appuyer sur des forces sociales et culturelles conservatrices -le monde rural et les *ouléma* traditionalistes- et sur une conception "fondamentaliste" de la religion. Dans le dispositif institutionnel du royaume du Maroc, les modes d'insertion de la dimension normative de la religion musulmane sont multiples. Ils concernent aussi bien le corpus

² Docteurs de la foi (ndlr).

³ Pluriel de *Cheikh* (ndlr).

légal qu'une pratique politique se référant à l'Islam comme mode de légitimation.

Une lecture rapide de la Constitution marocaine de 1996, du Code du statut personnel d'avant octobre 2003 ou de certaines dispositions du droit foncier, de l'organisation judiciaire et des qualifications de tout un secteur des auxiliaires de justice va nous convaincre du poids du rite *Malikite* dans la structuration de ce dispositif. Par contre, la place de la religion dans la caractérisation du système politique et la place centrale qu'y occupe la personne du Sultan doit beaucoup à une réinterprétation de la théorie du pouvoir dans l'Islam.

Nous reprendrons dans cet exposé les moments forts qui ont marqué l'itinéraire du Sultan dans sa quête d'une légitimité religieuse réécrite et aseptisée, combinant avec un certain savoir-faire les registres hagiographique, juridique et théologique. Cette quête s'est faite dans deux directions: politique (affaiblissement des clercs novateurs et entretien du pluralisme religieux) et doctrinale (monopolisation de l'interprétation de la religion et sacralisation du descendant du Prophète).

L'interprétation conservatrice de la religion a permis de produire une équivalence entre la forme du régime et le statut de la religion, tous deux relevant de l'ordre de l'indiscuté. Ainsi, la personne royale est sacrée et inviolable, elle ne peut faire l'objet d'aucune critique, ni être représentée de manière humoristique⁴. De même, les décisions du Roi sont inattaquables en justice⁵ car supérieures à toutes les normes produites par l'Etat.

Le statut de Commandeur des Croyants que les légistes ont rationalisé dans un langage juridique, est devenu dans la pratique et dans le discours politique une institution sacrée. La sacralité n'est pas assimilable ici à un "objet de culte", elle représente beaucoup plus: place dans la hiérarchie des normes et des acteurs politiques, capacité d'être, référence par rapport à laquelle les lois se font et se défont; elle est suprématie autant que vénération. Dans les deux cas, elle implique le respect et la soumission.

Sur les quatre Constitutions qu'a connu le Maroc, trois affirment expressément le caractère "sacré" et inviolable de la personne royale. L'article 7 de la Constitution de 1908 stipule: "Tout sujet du Royaume doit

⁴ Art. 38 du *dahir* du 15 novembre 1958, modifié par l'art. 41 du *dahir* édictant loi du 10 avril 1973.

⁵ Arrêt Ronda, Cour Suprême, 1960.

obéissance à l'Imam chérifien et respect à sa personne, parce qu'il est l'héritier de la *baraka*".⁶

L'Islam politique

Au lendemain des attentats du 11 septembre 2001, tout comme après ceux du 16 mai 2003 à Casablanca, les islamistes ont été les premiers à réagir. Un groupe proche du Cheikh Yacine a été reçu le 13 septembre par l'ambassadrice des Etats-Unis à Rabat. Le mouvement *Attajdid* a publié un communiqué dénonçant les attentats. Les mouvements de l'Islam politique y refusent l'amalgame et redoutent une instrumentalisation de ces événements pour l'éliminer de la scène politique.

Deux organisations dominent la scène politique islamiste marocaine: *Al Islah wa Attawhid* (Réforme et unicité) et *Al'Adl wa al Ihssan* (Equité et don de soi). Puissantes, bien que moins structurées que dans d'autres pays arabes, elles essaient désormais d'acquérir une présence politique légale et tentent de profiter de l'ouverture qui a caractérisé la fin du règne de Hassan II.

L'association *Al Islah wa Attawhid* a été créée en 1982 -sous le nom de *Jama'a al Islamiya* (Communauté islamique)- par deux anciens membres de la Jeunesse islamique, premier mouvement islamiste marocain, dissous après que des responsables (notamment son fondateur, M. Abdelkarim Moti) eurent été impliqués dans l'assassinat d'Omar Benjelloun, leader syndicaliste et dirigeant de l'Union socialiste des forces populaires (USFP), en 1975. A partir de 1984, après la première vague d'arrestations, l'organisation remit en question l'action clandestine et adopta une stratégie de lutte politique. La troisième phase a commencé en 1992, en réponse aux événements d'Algérie, et a été caractérisée par le changement de nom en *Al Islah wa Attajdid* (Réforme et renouveau). L'année 1996 inaugure la dernière étape. Une partie des membres du bureau de la *Jama'a* rejoint le parti du docteur Al-Khatib, le Mouvement populaire constitutionnel et démocratique (MPCD). Le congrès du parti, tenu en juin 1996, a confirmé l'accord de partage des sièges du bureau

⁶ M. Tozy, *Monarchie et Islam politique*, Presses de Sciences-po., 1999.

politique entre la vieille garde du MPCD et les quadragénaires du mouvement. Quelques mois après, l'association change à nouveau de nom: elle s'appellera désormais *Al Islah wa Attawhid* (Réforme et unicité). A la suite des élections de 1997, le nouveau rapport de force au sein du MPCD se traduit encore une fois par un changement de nom: ce parti devient le Parti de la justice et du développement (PJD), pour affirmer sa nature explicitement islamiste. Ses différentes participations au processus électoral ont fini par l'accréditer d'une certaine normalité que les événements du 16 mai n'ont que peu entamée.

Aussi bien durant les élections législatives qui se sont déroulées au Maroc le 27 septembre 2002 que durant les communales de septembre 2003, le jeu politique est largement déterminé par la présence des islamistes. Le Parti Justice et Développement (déjà présent au Parlement et représenté par une quarantaine de députés), le Mouvement pour la Communauté et l'Alternative Civilisationnelle, et surtout le mouvement de Yacine, Justice et Bienfaisance, ne participent pas aux élections mais pèsent de façon substantielle sur le scrutin en appelant à l'abstention (15% de bulletins nuls). De tous les partis politiques, les partis islamistes sont en effet les seuls à occuper le terrain social, aux côtés des mouvements associatifs, par le biais des fondations et des actions publiques. Il est logique que les islamistes essaient de convertir ces atouts en sièges (visibilité de leurs actions, proximité avec la population, disponibilité).

L'autre association islamiste, *Al'Adl wa al Ihssan* (Équité et don de soi), non reconnue par le pouvoir, est, de loin, la plus importante, tant par ses effectifs que par la qualité de son corpus doctrinal. Elle mêle le charisme et l'activisme politico-religieux. Ce profil singulier s'explique par la biographie de son fondateur et sa figure emblématique, le Cheikh Abdessalam Yacine. Agé d'environ soixante-dix ans, cet ancien cadre du Ministère de l'éducation jouit d'une expérience pédagogique de plusieurs années et d'une parfaite maîtrise des langues arabe et française. Sur le plan religieux, il fut, dans les années 60, un adepte de la confrérie mystique *Boushichiya*, où il fut très écouté par son cheikh. Au début des années 70, il quitta la confrérie, non pas à cause d'un désaccord doctrinal avec le soufisme, mais par désir d'action politique. En 1973, M. Yacine écrit une *Lettre au Roi*, dans laquelle il invite le monarque à faire "acte de rédemption" et à devenir "bon musulman". En 1978, il devient directeur

de la première revue islamiste *Al Jama'a*⁷. En 1984, la publication de deux journaux lui vaut deux ans de prison. Vers 1985, il crée le groupe *Al'Adl wa al Ihssan*, à la fois référence pour ses milliers d'adeptes et organisation militante assez bien structurée. En 1990, la police arrête une douzaine de cadres, dont six constituaient, selon les autorités, le conseil supérieur du mouvement. Jugés, ils furent condamnés à deux ans de prison qu'ils purgèrent intégralement. A leur sortie, ils reçurent un accueil triomphal.

Cheikh Yacine peut être considéré comme l'idéologue le plus important du mouvement islamiste marocain. Sa production doctrinale comporte une quinzaine de titres entre 1973 et 1989, notamment *Al Minhaj Annabaoui* (La Voie prophétique). Ce livre présente une synthèse originale entre les enseignements du soufisme et la pensée politico-religieuse de Hassan Al-Banna⁸ et de Sayed Qotb⁹.

La présence des associations islamistes de bienfaisance sur la scène publique (*As-Salam*, *Al-Birr*, *Al-Michkat*) a permis de banaliser la figure de l'islamiste. L'activisme étudiantin représente le côté visible de cette nébuleuse.

Le mouvement islamiste, notamment *Al'Adl wa al Ihssan*, essaie de profiter du créneau de l'opposition désormais vacant depuis que la gauche est au gouvernement. Il a essayé de faire valoir ses droits politiques. Les manifestations de rue constitue un autre moyen d'accéder à la visibilité. A plusieurs reprises, les islamistes ont montré leur influence sur l'opinion publique et ont fait preuve d'un grand sens de l'organisation. Ils ont toujours gardé la mesure et assumé leurs responsabilités même si les attaques verbales ne les ont pas épargnés ainsi qu'une certaine ambiguïté dans le langage qui rappelle une communauté de pensée avec les salafistes agissant au niveau international, notamment les djihadistes en Afghanistan.

La *Salafiya* entre piétisme et *djihad*

L'itinéraire qui mène des salafistes du début du siècle au kamikazes du 16 mai est pour le moins compliqué. L'ambiguïté réside

⁷ Interdite en 1983 après la parution de dix-sept numéros.

⁸ Fondateur en Egypte, en 1928, des Frères musulmans.

⁹ L'un des dirigeants des Frères musulmans égyptiens dont les textes serviront de base à l'islamisme révolutionnaire.

dans la dénomination *salafi* qui couvre des réalités sociologiques et historiques différentes. Au départ, le mouvement de la *Salafiya* s'inscrivait dans un projet de renaissance de la pensée musulmane porté par des idéologues (Al Afghani et Mohamed Abdou) fascinés par le progrès de l'Occident à la fin du XIX^e siècle. Ce projet n'hésitait pas à concilier un désir ardent de revenir aux pratiques des premiers compagnons, de s'attaquer féroceement aux pratiques maraboutiques de l'Islam populaire et d'opérer un rapprochement avec les loges maçonniques.

Au Maroc, c'est cette version de la *Salafiya* soluble dans le nationalisme qui va prendre le pas sur un autre courant *salafi* resté marginal qui s'est fait l'écho pendant un court moment de l'activisme des *Bani Abdelwahab* d'Arabie Saoudite au milieu du XVIII^e siècle. L'histoire retiendra une lettre rédigée par le Sultan Moulay Slimane et lue dans les moquées, condamnant les confréries et prêchant un retour à l'Islam pur.

Le salafisme va constituer durant les années du protectorat un liant qui va rassembler des clercs issus des cursus traditionnels et les jeunes cadres nationalistes qui sont passés par les universités européennes. A l'indépendance, il ne va cependant pas résister à la logique de l'action politique et le nationalisme va alors s'ouvrir sur d'autres idéologies en cours à l'époque, qu'il s'agisse du nationalisme arabe ou du socialisme. Evincés de la scène politique, les salafistes vont s'investir dans la formation à travers les écoles privées ou prôner un retour aux origines pour servir les projets de l'Islam conservateur et rigoriste amorcés par Hassan dans sa tentative de se réappropriier la scène politique.

Durant les années soixante, la présence du salafisme au Maroc est restée marginale et surtout autochtone, tournée vers une forme de piétisme apolitique. Outre des personnages emblématiques comme Taki Eddine El Hilali, originaire de Meknès, longtemps professeur à Médine après un passage par Radio Berlin durant la deuxième guerre mondiale, le salafisme est surtout le fait de certaines familles de la région nord, notamment à Tanger (Benseddik) et à Tétouan (Rissouni et Boukhoubza). On trouve quelques revues de tendance salafiste (*al Nur* de Tétouan et

Michkat d'Oujda) animées par le *faqih*¹⁰ Tajakani, enseignant à l'université de Tétouan. Pour ce courant, le référentiel est proche de l'école *Hanbalite*. Il s'appuie sur une lecture littérale du Coran excluant tout usage de la raison.

Cette tendance piétiste qui était l'œuvre d'un réseau d'instituts d'apprentissage du Coran, va changer de dimension lorsqu'elle va croiser les ambitions de l'Arabie Saoudite pour la diffusion d'un Islam *wahhabite*.

En 1971, deux ans après le Sommet Islamique de Rabat -qui va décider de la pression de l'Egypte et de l'Arabie Saoudite sur l'ouverture du front pour la prédication islamique-, une «Maison du Coran» gérée par l'Association *Dar Al Qoran*, ouvre ses portes à Marrakech. En 1976 naît une seconde association appelée Association de la *Dawa* pour le Coran et la *Sunna* animée par le cheikh Maghraoui proche de l'Arabie Saoudite. En 2001, le cheikh est à la tête d'un réseau d'une centaine d'écoles dans trente villes différentes.

Ce réseau piétiste tourné vers la formation, sert de référence à une mouvance radicale qui se revendique du *Wahhabisme*. Il s'agit d'un rassemblement non structuré. Il se présente localement sous des dénominations diverses telles que *Attakfir wal Hijra* (Excommunication et Exil), *Jammâat Assirat al Moustakim* (Juste Voie), association *Jama'a salafiya*, association de *Ahl Sunna wa al Jama'a*, etc.

La scission qu'a connue le Mouvement salafiste saoudien à la suite de la guerre du Golfe entre loyalistes au régime et *ouléma* qui condamnent la présence des Américains sur le sol de la Terre Sainte va avoir une incidence directe sur le paysage salafiste au Maroc. Quelques Afghans qui ont pratiqué le *djihad* sur plusieurs fronts en Europe et en Extrême-Orient vont revenir et développer une nouvelle culture focalisée sur le *djihad* et véhiculée par de nouvelles figures emblématiques très éloignées de l'Islam politique. Les nouvelles technologies ont permis de diffuser cette culture "djihadienne" sur de nombreux sites Internet -tels que celui de *Ansar al Islam*-, sur support CDRom contenant des films de la guerre de Tchétchénie ou d'Afghanistan ou encore des sermons mêlant des leçons sur le salafisme et des manuels opérationnels pour la guerre sainte.

¹⁰ Expert en *fiqh* ou jurisprudence islamique (ndlr).

On distingue deux niveaux au sein du mouvement salafiste.

- Le premier est un niveau doctrinal, piétiste théologiquement organisé autour des écoles coraniques et des mosquées privées. Le cursus s'achève par un séjour prolongé en Arabie Saoudite où ceux qui sont consacrés par les grandes figures du salafisme international, tels que Ibn Albaz, Cheikh Albani ou Al Hawali, deviennent à leur tour des cheikhs nationaux, sortis de l'ombre après le 11 septembre grâce à une campagne de presse durant l'été 2002: ce sont par exemple les Cheikh Abou Hafs¹¹ et Hassan Kettani.¹²
- Le second niveau est cet ensemble de groupuscules violents qui se nourrissent de la pensée *wahhabite* mais qui ont basculé dans le banditisme et le crime de droit commun sous couvert du *djihad* (guerre sainte). Ces groupuscules sont actifs depuis cinq ans au Maroc, essentiellement dans les villes de Casablanca, Salé, Tanger, Tétouan, Nador et Meknès. Ils s'articulent en cellules de 3 à 5 personnes avec un "émir" à leur tête. L'objectif de ces salafistes activistes est de "purifier la société et de punir les pécheurs". Leur procès permettra peut-être de prouver leurs liens éventuels avec Al-Qaïda.

Le pouvoir ne s'est pas préoccupé de cet islam radical "en marge" car il croyait ce mouvement apolitique. Il l'a même toléré dans la mesure où cela lui permettait de contenir le succès populaire des islamistes politiques de "Justice et Bienfaisance" et du PJD, et de les faire taire puisqu'ils étaient la cible de ces groupuscules violents.

Cette attitude va changer après le 11 septembre. La pression américaine a joué un rôle important pour faire de la lutte contre le terrorisme une urgence absolue. De plus, l'inquiétude grandit dans la

¹¹ Abou Hafs est né en 1974 d'un père infirmier, très impliqué dans l'activisme islamiste et vétéran de la guerre d'Afghanistan où il a officié comme docteur. Il a fait des études de théologie en Arabie Saoudite à l'université de Médine. Il devint imam dans une mosquée aux environs de la ville sainte. De retour en 1998, il écrit une thèse, passe un doctorat et commence une carrière de prédicateur à Casablanca puis à Fès. Il fait partie des trois grands *Abou Hafs* présents sur internet, al Misri, al Mouritani et Almaghribi. Son discours est très radical et il ne cache pas sa sympathie pour le Djihad de Ben Laden qu'il qualifie de héros des temps modernes. A Fès, il va réunir autour de lui un groupe d'adeptes qui va sévir dans certains quartiers en punissant les pécheurs et en imposant la loi salafiste.

¹² Hassani Kettani est le descendant d'une famille maraboutique qui avait animé une confrérie religieuse à la fin du siècle dernier. Il a fait des études de gestion avant d'aller s'initier à la théologie en Jordanie puis en Arabie Saoudite. Il est prêcheur à Salé.

population quant à la capacité des autorités à assurer la sécurité publique et quant à la perméabilité du territoire face à cette menace potentielle. En la matière, le cas algérien sert évidemment de repoussoir. Le 16 mai 2003 transformera radicalement le paysage politique: le mot *Salafiya* est devenu tabou et la chasse aux “barbus” autres que ceux de l’Islam politique va être ouverte sans pour autant garantir au pays une immunité contre d’autres actes de violence.

Le pouvoir se retrouve devant un rassemblement qui ne correspond à aucune autre forme d’organisation connue. Aucun lien organique entre des *chioukh* qui distillent leur *fetwa*¹³ sur Internet, relayés par des imams dans les moquées de tôle ondulée et des jeunes déscolarisés des bidonvilles prêts à aller se faire exploser devant des cibles approximatives. Aucun projet politique en vue sauf celui de faire mal à une société déclarée ennemie de Dieu. Dans un manifeste distribué sous forme de tracts quelques semaines avant les attentats du 16 mai, les rédacteurs ont décrété que la société est impie et qu’ils sont en état de guerre: “vos femmes et vos enfants sont un butin de l’armée de Dieu” affirme le tract. Quant au savoir, il est méprisé. Les rédacteurs qui se réclament de *Ahl sunna wa al jama’a* revendiquent l’accès direct au Coran et valorisent ce qu’ils appellent la *fitra*, une sorte d’état de nature qui assimile toute civilisation à de la perversion.

Conclusion

Les événements dramatiques du 16 mai et la pression américaine ont obligé le pouvoir à renforcer le plan sécuritaire mais aussi à se doter officiellement d’une politique publique religieuse. Une reprise en main du domaine religieux se décline localement dans un langage emprunté à la science politique: on parle désormais de restructuration du domaine religieux. Le Maroc se replie sur ce qu’il considère son Islam national et en revendique la profondeur historique. Le Ministre des affaires islamiques, historien et romancier à ses heures perdues, réinvestit le *Malikisme* et le porte au devant de la scène pour contrer le *Wahhabisme*.

¹³ Avis donné par les autorités religieuses ou par un Cheikh (ndlr).

Les recettes mises en place sont classiques: contrôle des mosquées, reprise en main des clercs officiels et encouragement discret des confréries renaissantes comme la *Boushichiya*. On se demande d'ailleurs s'il n'est pas trop tard, la crise des institutions religieuses étatiques étant inscrite dans le devenir de l'Islam mondialisé. Les recompositions et réinterprétations que connaît l'Islam standard à l'abri des projecteurs des *network* et les expressions de l'Islam globalisé comme mode d'action sur de vrais champs de bataille, laissent peu de marge aux politiques publiques nationales.

A un défi globalisé qui ne vise plus les régimes, et encore moins les sociétés nationales, ne peut répondre qu'une stratégie aussi globale qui devrait à tout prix casser la ligne de démarcation "religieuse" et "se positionner au sein même de l'Islam".

REPORT THE MAGHREB IN 2030

Peter R. FABER¹

To no one's surprise, the participants of this workshop began by discussing the suitability of using 2005-2030 as a framework for analysis. Was discussing regional security interests and challenges up to 25 years into the future an exercise in futility, as some attendees asked, or did it have actual utility? The general consensus was that it was a worthwhile exercise, primarily for three reasons. 1) The Maghreb will have an entirely new "political guard" soon. They and the social-cultural elites that surround them will have fresh problems to solve and rising expectations to meet. 2) The generation-long timeframe provides ample room for everyone – including nascent elites – to develop and revise a variety of strategies for the area. 3) The role of different Euro-Atlantic institutions in the region may wax or wane, but not necessarily in the near to mid-term. A long-term perspective will be necessary to map out the possible twists and turns that external actors might take in the future.

After establishing the above consensus, workshop participants then clustered their discussions around a second theme – *internal and external reform must be the core objectives of any development strategy for the Maghreb*. (Individual presentations by Dr. Khaled Kaddour, Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques, Tunisia; Dr. Galia Press-Barnathan, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel; and Mme Maya Sahli Fadel, National School of Administration, Algiers, Algeria, contributed significantly to the development of this second theme.)

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Required domestic reforms

Workshop attendees ultimately agreed that region-wide domestic reforms need to take at least three forms.

Political reforms, which include strengthening democratic institutions, promoting political pluralism, establishing formal/institutional mechanisms for the political transfer of power, building up the rule of law, and basically ensuring widespread “good governance” wherever possible. (In the last two cases, potentially subjecting elected officials to judicial overview would be a positive development.)

Economic reforms, which include promoting economic openness and transparency, pursuing privatization, reforming financial and regulatory institutions, practicing long-term planning/strategizing, and indissolubly linking the idea of economic development to the ideas of security and stability.

Socio-cultural reforms, which include creating an active and responsible civil society – i.e., creating “real” citizens that feel they are genuine shareholders in their societies and in institutions that work for them.

Required external reform

According to workshop attendees, the requirement here is to diversify a state-centric, bilaterally organized region – where there is limited “horizontal” activity occurring between the Maghreb states themselves – into a more complex and versatile system that increasingly relies on shared mechanisms to deal with shared problems (terrorism, failed states, and weapons of mass destruction, for example). Defining and creating a common security system with a common doctrine, and perhaps even developing a local Rapid Reaction Force, could represent “digestible” first steps towards greater interdependence. Actively participating in a “broader African security complex” could then represent a doable second step. Finally, both steps would protect the Maghreb states from an unhealthy dependence on outside actors to help address local problems and concerns (bilateral systems often exacerbate this type of dependency rather than ameliorate it).

After establishing the basic parameters of their chosen theme (internal and external reform), workshop participants then explored it in greater detail. The discussion was an eclectic one, but from its various strands there emerged a third and final theme: *The Maghreb – “this tormented area,” as one attendee characterized it – will not be able to reform itself unless it develops a broader sense of space.* But here the emphasis is not just on physical space, but also on expanding psychological, cultural, and political-military topographies as well.

Physical geography

While some attendees felt that it is imprudent to view North Africa in isolation from the more powerful areas that surround it, others disagreed. They argued that the Euro-Atlantic community has traditionally failed to consider the Maghreb *as the Maghreb*. “In hegemonic ways,” its members continue to tie the region to the Middle East, and therefore fail to perceive or treat it as a distinct physical space in its own right. (One might say that the Wider Black Sea Area concept is another geographical model that has suffered from a similar form of historical hegemony, but whose time – as a working concept – has perhaps also come).

For Maghreb elites, however, developing a separate geographical identity could provide local governments with added “efficiencies” to deal with local problems. Second, it could distance them of some of the political burdens of being part of a greater Middle East, including being tied to Arab-Israeli security dynamics and to the large-scale disenchantments of the Arab street. Finally, it could permit them to serve as a positive “bridge” between the West and a troubled “African security complex.” (The “bridging” could occur within an invigorated African Union.)

Psychological/cultural geography

But if the Maghreb is indeed a readily identifiable physical space, a significant number of observers believe that it shares a common mental/cultural space as well. After all, they argue, it has a recognizable collective identity defined by a common history, language, and religion.

What is regrettably still missing though is a common structural/institutional identity (see below). This is the achingly necessary “next step,” although any institutional or political geography that is adopted will be – at core – a psychological and cultural construct. It will not be “real.” It will require the next generation of social and political “entrepreneurs” to integrate this structural identity into the body politic of the region. And finally, it will require the active participation of Libya and perhaps even Egypt. On the last point, however, there is a division of opinion. There are those who feel that the “Occidental” character of today’s Maghreb and the “Oriental” orientation of Egypt are real impediments to the creation of a common physical-cultural space across North Africa. And yet, by 2030 these seeming divides might not exist as they do now.

Political-military geography

The reason that the Maghreb is currently in “a state of malaise” is that it needs “a fresh start.” But if common geographical, psychological, and cultural topographies are already in place, what is missing? What will provide durable regional stability, shared prosperity, and the protection of regional rather than just national interests? As just suggested, the remaining problem may be that the Maghreb states have failed to develop a truly multinational political space. But this *general* brake to progress also includes a *specific* one – an absent regional security system (supported by appropriate doctrines and force capabilities). If the political entrepreneurs of the area are actually going to create these needed general and specific “landscapes,” they will have to toil in five particular areas: 1) US—Europe—Maghreb relations; 2) NATO—EU—Maghreb relations; 3) a Partnership-for-Peace-like Mediterranean Dialogue Program (MDP); 4) government-civil society relations; and 5) an invigorated Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

US-Europe-Maghreb relations - As one participant rightly pointed out, there is no value in discussing whether America or Europe has a more sophisticated policy towards the Maghreb. US interests in the area are certainly not just “about oil and terrorism,” as caricature-prone pundits and opportunistic politicians repeatedly allege. At a minimum, other interests include anti- and counter-WMD proliferation; promoting democracy, rule of law, and transparent economic practices; preventing

failed states, guaranteeing safe transit through Mediterranean waters, etc. At the same time, it is not unfair to ask if the Maghreb will be a “frontline region” for the US in the mid- to long-term, and therefore require the Americans to pursue policies specifically tailored for the area, instead of the often generic ones in place today. The US, after all, is a global power with global interests, but it also has finite resources. While marching towards 2030, the improved “management” of transnational terrorism may permit the Americans to focus the majority of its energies in Asia, which was becoming *the* area of American strategic interest prior to the “detour” precipitated by 9-11. As a strategic preference, the US might therefore want to entrust the stabilization and protection of the Maghreb to “Europe,” while perhaps also retaining a residual Great Power voice in the process.

Of course, this possibility assumes that the Europeans – knowing that geographical proximity is indeed destiny – will take the lead in pursuing a long-term, multi-dimensional Good Neighbour Policy with its North African neighbours. The benefits, after all, could be substantial. If the Maghreb only partially succeeds in its internal and external reforms, Europe will probably see less terrorism, less immigration, and a more self-contained regional security system, which would mean less dependency on external actors over time. For this particular relationship to succeed, however, Europe’s policies toward the region will have to evolve. At present, European views and/or approaches are just too nationalistic – i.e., they are not consistent or homogenous enough to help create the needed “next step” political and security spaces discussed earlier.

NATO-EU-Maghreb relations – The general conviction about this relationship is that NATO and the EU need to “support” and “enhance” the region’s march towards reform. (That the process must be organically driven from within is an article of faith here. *Reform cannot be imported or enforced.*) However, to avoid the “shock effect” of large and powerful organizations working with far smaller and less robust actors, NATO and EU efforts should be tailored and compartmentalized. (This approach would also encourage initially “safe” levels of “horizontal” integration by the Maghreb states themselves.) Finally, several participants reiterated that it was time for the EU to make a full and unequivocal political-economic commitment to the region if it was truly serious about promoting “next step” reforms.

The above policy prescriptions are certainly thoughtful and necessary, but they also exist in a political vacuum. They do not (or cannot?) anticipate just what type of NATO or European Union will exist in the future. For example, will we have a robust NATO with far reaching capabilities, or will it be a mere “toolbox” for coalitions of the willing? Will we have a “disillusioned” European Union preoccupied with mere economic integration, or an EU with a fully operational ESDP? And will we have two security organizations that compete with each other, support each other, or both? Obviously, the nature and extent of NATO-EU cooperation, along with their individual goals and objectives, will have a significant impact on their policies toward the Maghreb (and on the latter’s ability to play one organization off the other for any potential gain).

The Maghreb itself, however, has (and will have) a voice in this triangular relationship. If the regional reform process stalls, a close working relationship with NATO and/or the EU could become a political liability for the area’s governments and elites. And because their “legitimacy” could be threatened, they actually might distance themselves from their potential partners and benefactors. Basically then, establishing this particular type of “space” (*NATO—EU—Maghreb relations*) will be particularly difficult for reform-minded political entrepreneurs.

A PfP-like Mediterranean Dialogue Program (MDP) – The future options discussed for this “space”-enhancing program were familiar ones. The program should remain bilateral while also becoming increasingly multilateral. It should provide a diverse menu of activities that are derived from past and current PfP efforts. (By picking and choosing the breadth and depth of their involvement in MDP, the Maghreb states would minimize cooperative “shocks” and encourage increased horizontal integration.)

At the same time, the program has to account for local “specificities” and promote – yet again – co-responsibility. The hoped-for results, as in the case of the original PfP program, would then be the development of mutual trust, security-centered modernization and professionalization, and growing complementarity. As a closing salvo, however, several participants correctly pointed out that making the MDP PfP-like is already a work-in-progress and should only be seen as a near to mid-term program.)

Government-civilian relations – Improving these relations is obviously a universally desired end. However, creating stakeholder-centred societies in the region that are also politically transparent will require 1) nurturing and promoting the influence of currently embryonic social and cultural elites, 2) pursuing a *vigorous* government-civil society dialogue that features a permanent and candid exchange of views, and 3) making sure that governments “bring along” their own *mid-level* bureaucrats, who can be – if not educated or reassured properly – lethal internal opponents of needed change.

Finally, the Arab Maghreb Union – Is this organization a corpse or a living and breathing thing? Is it actually stalled in its tracks or merely sleeping? Finally, is it suitably robust or just too “fragile” for its own good? Workshop participants repeatedly characterizing the organization in these opposing ways, but without resolution. They did, however, stress that as a “pre-existing forum,” it could be adapted to “nourish intra-regional institutional links,” and thereby regionalize the area’s political and security spheres.

Conclusion

The basic consensus of those who participated in this workshop is that 1) everyone needs to take a long-term (or even generational) approach towards needed reforms in the Maghreb, 2) that these needed reforms must be internal *and* external in focus, and 3) that the people of the region need to embrace three broad concepts of space – physical, psychological-cultural, and political-military – if they expect to radically improve intra-regional dialogue and cooperation, remain anchored to Europe and the European Union, play a greater political role in Africa, and much more.

HYPOTHESES AND EXTRAPOLATIONS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN 2030

Mark A. HELLER¹

Perhaps the most daunting challenge in 2004 is to predict the challenges of 2030, whether in the security realm or in any other area. There is no sound methodological basis for such predictions, and efforts to make them inevitably fall back on extrapolation, more or less linear, from trends in recent years.

Such extrapolation can be extremely misleading, even when it relates only to the underlying structural foundations of domestic, regional and international political systems, such as geography, demography, technology, economy, and culture. It is even less reliable when it is used to project the character of political leaders, political institutions, and policies. For example, it would have been difficult in 1980 to imagine that in 2005, the world would be connected by the Internet, instantaneous global communication and 24/7 news coverage but that instead of a paperless world, we would be snowed under by more paper than ever; that instead of a continuing population explosion, many parts of the world would be grappling with the problems of aging and declining populations; that the world would be just as dependent on fossil fuels as ever; that there would be no Soviet Union, no Cold War, no apartheid in South Africa; that there would still be only 7 or 8 nuclear powers in the world but no major new war between India and Pakistan; that there would be democratization in Eastern Europe, South America, and Southeast Asia; that China would be a dynamic bastion of capitalism, that Iran would still be an Islamic Republic and/or that there would not be any

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others; and that the Lebanese civil war would be over but that the Sudanese civil war would not.

Despite the clear limitations of extrapolation, however, there is no other basis for scenario building. In imagining these scenarios, it is clear that we are not making reliable predictions but only stipulating working assumptions of dubious validity. So subject to very large caveats, extrapolation from recent trends suggests the following hypotheses about the Mediterranean/Broader Middle East in 2030:

1. There is a reasonable prospect of some *modus vivendi* being reached in the conflicts that currently dominate the policy agenda of the region. The nature of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship is likely to change as a result of the emergence of an independent Palestinian state; some sort of accommodation may be reached on the Western Sahara; and inter-communal conflicts in Iraq and Sudan may be mitigated by partition or real devolution of authority, *de facto* if not *de jure*. But there is little reason to predict that the systemic dysfunction – political repression, economic stagnation and social/cultural conservatism – that characterizes much of the Arab world will have been replaced by systemic dynamism.
2. This dysfunction is likely to be accompanied by the continuing Islamicization of much of the southern Mediterranean/Middle East, in both the ideological and the demographic senses of the term, and by the continuing export of dysfunction abroad. This will produce ongoing threats elsewhere to physical security (because of terrorism) and to collective identity (because of migration).
3. These threats will be felt in many parts of the world but most acutely in Europe, because of geographical proximity and the historical and personal linkages that already exist. In other words, the eastward institutional expansion of Europe may be accompanied by the northward sociological expansion of North Africa. As a result, the debate about what Europe is and what it should be, which is already gathering momentum, will become even more rancorous.
4. Coupled with the continuing relative decline of Western Europe's economic and political power, both at the level of individual states and of the EU, this phenomenon will lead to a rising demand for European action but a diminishing capacity for Europe to act as an agent for

change, either alone -- through ESDP -- or as a serious partner of United States -- in NATO.

5. At the same time, there may well be a growing convergence of interests among other non-Arab powers (US, Russia, India, China, Turkey, Israel) to disengage from and compartmentalize the Arab world rather than to persist in futile attempts to transform it. If the nuclearized Iran of 2030 is still an Islamic republic, it will continue to pursue a destabilizing role in places like Iraq and Lebanon and it will encourage the search for nuclear capabilities in other countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If it is post-Islamic, it may well seek to be a part of the above-mentioned community of interest.
6. The interest in disengagement and compartmentalization could be accompanied by a growing capacity to achieve those objectives, except in Europe, if technological change leads to a reduced dependency on Middle Eastern energy sources.

In short, by 2030, many parts of the Mediterranean/Middle East may have more interests and challenges in common with one another but less in common with the rest of the world. That does not necessarily mean that there will be no issues of "common humanitarian concern," such as environmental degradation or natural disasters, issues that seemed to constitute a potential platform for regional cooperation during the hopeful days of the "New Middle East" and the Barcelona Process in the mid-1990s. But such issues are no more likely to overcome profound political-cultural divisions twenty-five years from now than they were ten years ago, for underlying this lies a fundamental contradiction of interests: for most of the regimes and entrenched social/economic and economic forces in the region, transformation is a basic threat; for most of the rest of the world, it is the lack of transformation that constitutes the threat. But while there may well be consensus within NATO about the need for change, the way to respond to this need is actually one of the most divisive questions within the trans-Atlantic community, and any effort to push NATO to adopt a concerted position on the issue could conceivably bring it to a breaking point.

Of course, things may turn out completely differently. It is conceivable that externally-induced change, such as a possible reduction in foreign capital transfers stemming from donor fatigue, the

development of alternative energy sources, or some other change, could weaken the *rentier* state in the Middle East and encourage the rise of a more vibrant private sector and civil sector, leading, in turn, to more transparent and accountable governments. It is also impossible to preclude the potential for change of a far-sighted local leadership which rejects marginalization and sees globalization as an opportunity rather than a threat; some evidence of that sort of leadership can already be found in Jordan, in some of the Gulf sheikhdoms, and in Morocco. Consequently, it is not entirely inconceivable that some kind of Cultural Revolution will take place and that political and economic change in the Arab world in the next 25 years will resemble, *mutatis mutandis*, that which has taken place in southeast Asia in the last 25 years.

But predictions of that sort require identifying the likely indigenous agents of change. And from the perspective of 2004, it is difficult to say what those agents might be. It is even more difficult to locate them in the current realities of the region.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Ahmad Majed AL-AITAN¹

Introduction

Talking about the Mediterranean region and the Middle East means talking about a wide geographical region extending from Morocco to Yemen or to Bangladesh and Kabul within the standards of a greater Middle East. It is not only an area of diversified peoples, ethnologies and languages, but of politics, government interests and peoples' ambitions as well.

Discussing the concerns and challenges that face this region, means talking about a broad area with endless issues. This entails a more detailed and comprehensive paper than this one.

This paper will confine to three broad titles, about the serious and current challenges to the Middle East region and broader Middle East: Security and Stability in the Middle East, Political, Economic and Social reforms in the region, and International Terrorism.

Security and Stability

The main challenge that the Middle East region and greater Middle East face is establishing stable security in which the possibilities of war and conflicts are removed, regional cooperation and stability prevail, and the population and the society are given room to grow politically, economically and scientifically. This is the actual challenge for these societies in the coming 25 years. Indeed this is the objective that societies and governments of this broader region seek to achieve.

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When looking deep into the future we should be accurate in defining our status quo. Future solutions that do not start from an in-depth understanding of the nature of the problems that the region faces will not guarantee success.

This region was destroyed by wars and conflicts in the second part of the twentieth century. It is a permanent theatre for wars and conflicts; there have been fifteen conflicts in the last fifty-one years, an average of one conflict every 40 months. It is an unacceptable record for any region.

The Arab-Israeli conflict, in which the Palestinian issue represents the pivotal part, is the central political security issue in the geographical region we are talking about. We in Jordan, Egypt and Israel can pretend that we have found solutions to the conflict in the region through peace agreements signed between these countries. But the general situation is still gloomy. This is not the real and definitive type of peace we want to have in the region. A state of tension still exists. It seems we will have a lot of hard work to achieve permanent, just and real peace in the Middle East region.

Between the Jordan Valley and the Mediterranean Sea there are two peoples. One seeks security, but its government only finds it by occupying territories and adopting policies of violence, isolation and individual security. The other seeks independence and an end to the occupation. Its method of achieving its national ambitions rests on a vicious circle of violence. International politics call this terrorism. The Palestinians look at the issue from another point of view. Supported by hundreds of millions of people throughout the world, they believe they are the victims of Israel's violent policies, and are willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their national dream of freedom in an independent state. A circle of violence and antiviolence developed between the two peoples. All the geographical and political space making up the Middle East and the Mediterranean region have fallen hostage to the final results that this conflict will lead to.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unique in the history of wars and conflicts because it is not limited to the geographical space between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan valley. Its impact extends from Casablanca on the Atlantic coast through North-East Africa to the southern part of the African desert and the shores of the Arabian Gulf, to Iran, Afghanistan right up to the borders of Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia,

and the Philippines in the South China Sea. This gives the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a far more geo-strategic and ideological depth than the mere region of the conflict.

This conflict must be ended. The Mediterranean region and the Middle East must be freed from the consequences and results of the Palestinian question. The biggest challenge that faces not only the Palestinians and Israelis but also the whole international community is finding a way to solve this conflict decisively and establishing stable security which would prevent future conflicts.

The only means lie not in an individual solution or in seeking security behind the walls. They lie in establishing an independent geographically continuous Palestinian state, which is viable and disarmed, and based on the borders of June 1967, with Jerusalem as a common capital for both countries. International forces must be deployed for a number of years to ensure security and stability and to avoid the conditions that lead to new wars and circles of violence.

Washington and the European Union are responsible politically and morally for finding a way out of the political stalemate that the crisis has reached. The only option, in my opinion, is to return things to international legitimacy by holding an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations and under American leadership. This option may not suit all parties to the conflict but it is the only one available.

The serious search for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue will allow:

- To continue the peace process in other directions (Syrian and Lebanese) and transform the “cold peace” with Egypt into an actual warm peace.
- To establish regional security institutions to manage security in the region according to the standards of the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and under the auspices of the United Nations.
- To accept Israel as an essential geopolitical member in the geography of the Middle East.
- To handle the Iraqi issue by using EU (including France and Germany) and NATO capabilities not only to fund the reconstruction

but also to deploy a credible and acceptable international military force, to work within a certain timeframe prior to the withdrawal of all foreign forces and hand over actual sovereignty to an elected free Iraqi government.

- To conclude an agreement with Iran on a series of conflictual issues: refined uranium, the international cooperation of Iran in the field of nuclear fuel, the Iranian perspective on the security of the Arabian Gulf, and the future relations between Iran and Iraq.
- This option will lead India and Pakistan to sit around the negotiating table in order to achieve a final peaceful solution in compliance with the standards laid down in the peaceful solution of the Arab Israeli conflict.
- The security of oil and the Arabian Gulf.

This option is equal in its strategic value to both South Africa and Ukraine abandoning the nuclear choice in favor of international peace and security, and is equal in its historical value to the fall of the Berlin wall. This is the only option to ensure a century free of wars and conflicts in the region. This is the first real challenge facing the international community.

The Political, Social and Economic Reform

The initiative came at a time when American forces were engaged in three successive wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and against terrorism. The timing of the initiative was extremely poor. It confirms our convictions that the United States will engage in a fourth war using force to impose these reforms.

The actual challenge facing the region is to begin with a comprehensive reform process at the political, social, and economic levels: a built-in process not imposed by people from outside but taking into consideration the population, ethnic, geographical and ideological differences of the states in the region. It should be expanded within a reasonable time without threatening to dismantle the societies or destroying their cultural and historical identities and at the same time allowing gradual and regular development according to their own interests and national aims. In this context, the United States of America and Europe could support, direct and finance the biggest democratic

transformation process in history. This is the challenge and together we must look for convincing answers.

International Terrorism

The third main challenge that our area and the world face is “international terrorism”. It is a multifaceted challenge. A narrow view of this issue will lead to a limited understanding of the nature of this threat and consequently to policies moving in the wrong directions. Speaking about terrorism without taking into consideration international politics is just like moving through muddy waters. Two facts regarding terrorism need to be mentioned:

First: there is no military solution to terrorism. Terrorism is a political, social, and economic phenomenon and we have to defeat it in the same way.

Second: all indications show that terrorism is not diminishing but is growing and prospering and we have to expect difficult days ahead in facing the great challenge.

“War on terrorism” is a slogan free from any strategic content. In its present form it is a far more serious threat to international peace and security than the threat of terrorism itself. It deliberately places Islamic civilization in contraposition with the West’s. This in itself will lead to disastrous results throughout the twenty-first century. It is also a devastating war that is neither governed by clear objectives nor limited in time and is without any criteria for success or failure. It doesn’t distinguish between fanatics and moderates who see in religion a peaceful means of understanding and communicating with other peoples and cultures.

The war on terrorism in its current version refuses to link the content with the form, the reasons with the causes, and the origins with the results. It insists that killing a great number of terrorists, or arresting them, is the most effective means to stop terrorism. The roots of terrorism and its causes are another matter. We should not cease examining and attempting to understand the political, economic and social phenomena linked to the growth of terrorism. What do you think of the theory that says that finding a just solution to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict will abate the Arab and Islamic anger of more than 1.2 billion Muslims? It

will put an end to the attraction of terrorism. Of course some will say that the solution to the conflict is no guarantee to stopping the growth of terrorism. That is correct, but at least it is depriving terrorism of its political and social bases. It gives the war on terrorism a chance of success. I would like to adjust the strategy of war on terrorism from “access to the source” to “deprivation or eradication”.

When we kill a large number of terrorists we create the political and social circumstances favorable to the growth of rage and frustration and later on to the growth of terrorism. An Iraqi who is killed by a Polish soldier in Iraq is considered by over one hundred million Muslim not as a terrorist but as a martyr and defender of his country's independence. Thus many generations of Iraqis will grow up with war, hatred, and rage just as generations of Palestinians have done. The solution is “deprivation”.

THE FUTURE ROLE OF NATO IN THE MIDDLE EAST: FIVE SCENARIOS

Martin BECK¹

Introduction

This short paper attempts to present and discuss what relations between NATO and the Middle East may look like in 2030. Five scenarios related to theories on international relations are presented, and the factors determining the probability of these scenarios becoming true are discussed. Special emphasis will be given to NATO's contribution to achieving the different scenarios. Finally, an outlook will be presented.

Five Scenarios on the Role of NATO in the Middle East in 2030

Democratic Peace

Scenario one is based on the spread of democracies in the Middle East. If a critical number of authoritarian regimes in the Arab World were to be transformed into fully-fledged democracies in the next two decades, the foundations of the liberalist vision of security communities would have been laid. According to the school of *Democratic Peace*, democracies refrain from using force against each other. All security problems related to the anarchical structure of the international system, as analysed by realism, would be dissolved.

Scenario two would become reality if in 2030 a closely-meshed web of security regimes between NATO and Middle Eastern states were established. Then, according to the vision of institutionalism, all conflicts between NATO and Middle Eastern countries could be solved peacefully thanks to mutual trust and institutions facilitating cooperation.

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Scenario three points in a direction similar to scenario two, but has a more limited scope. NATO might fail to prevent violent behaviour in the Middle East and security threats from this region towards NATO members in general. Yet, according to modest variants of institutionalism and flexible realism, NATO could develop capacities for effective management and containment of security threats in specific areas, especially terrorism. Apart from unity among NATO members, a shared perception on common interests between NATO and Middle Eastern states is crucial for realising this scenario.

Scenario four, which reflects what could be labelled mainstream realism, regards NATO as a military alliance capable of providing effective crisis management in cases of security threats from the Middle East. Contrary to scenario three, though, NATO would not be able to influence effectively security-related developments in this region. NATO could also not count on alliances with reliable partners in the Middle East. Thus, ad-hoc NATO crisis management towards threats from the Middle East would prevail.

Scenario five means a total failure of NATO's Middle Eastern policy. In this case, which meets the expectations of blunt realism, NATO would not be in a position to contain security threats from the Middle East by joint efforts. Possibly, sub-groups of NATO, unified by geographical proximity or mutually shared security threat perceptions, could partially replace NATO as a relevant actor in the Middle East.

Critical Discussion of Five Future Scenarios for NATO's Role in the Middle East

Democratic Peace

The creation of democratic peace in the Middle East was, and possibly still is, the aim of the US-American *Greater Middle East Initiative*. However, since the chances of democratising Iraq after the war of 2003 look rather bleak from today's perspective, it is doubtful whether the re-elected Bush Administration will seriously stick to its initial goal. Although a civil society with democratic values is not a necessary precondition for the transition of an authoritarian system to a democratic one, the concrete chances of achieving democratic peace in the Middle East are fairly small in the foreseeable future.

The potential role of NATO to contribute directly to the democratisation of the Middle East is limited at best. The NATO approach to handling “the dilemma between democratisation and security cooperation” (Malmvig 2004: 6) focuses on security cooperation. Thus, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia reflects a decision of NATO to strengthen cooperation with existing regimes all of which, except Israel, are authoritarian. Thus, the success of the dialogue would contribute to the fortification of authoritarianism rather than democratisation.

A Fully-Fledged Web of Security Regimes between NATO and Middle Eastern Actors

The major minimum preconditions for this scenario are unity among NATO members, their readiness to develop and implement a coherent policy towards the Middle East and long-lasting, strong common interests between NATO and major players in the Middle East. Yet, even if we presuppose that these conditions were met, there would be a long way to go. In order to mesh a web of security regimes between NATO and major players of the Middle East, a prior process of intensive confidence-building would have to be pursued. However, to date, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue has not even eradicated more or less pronounced feelings of suspiciousness among Middle Eastern actors. The 1995 statement of the then NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes that Islamic fundamentalism is “at least as dangerous as Communism was”² has still not been forgotten in the Middle East. The main barrier to a dynamic process of deep confidence-building leading to a web of security regimes between NATO and the core states of the Middle East, is rooted in Middle Eastern suspicion of the “true” aims of the USA. Leaving aside problems related to the wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the prolonged Israeli occupation of Palestine constitutes a high wall segregating NATO and Arab states from each other (Cordesman 2004: 14-16). The American refusal—or inability—to put pressure on Israel to end the occupation constitutes a thorn in Arab flesh. Moreover, harsh American policies towards Syria (and Iran) are not appropriate for dismantling distrust. Especially, since a change of American policy towards Israel is not to be expected and, partly therefore, a peaceful management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is difficult to achieve in

² Quoted after Gareth Winrow (2000: 157-158).

the foreseeable future, NATO's chances of implementing scenario two are hampered. It remains to be seen whether NATO's invitation to Israel to participate in joint exercises, expressed in November 2004, and related plans to send NATO troops to the Gaza Strip after the scheduled Israeli pullout from Gaza will bring a breakthrough in terms of confidence-building.

Security Regimes between NATO and Middle Eastern States in Specific Areas

Obviously, the main leverage point for establishing specific security regimes between NATO and Middle Eastern actors is their common interest in combating terrorism. The fact that terrorist networks such as *Al-Qaida* chose Western countries as their battlefield, should not blind anyone to the fact that (one of) their main goal(s) is to revolutionize the Middle East. Moreover, numerous recent attacks in Arab countries prove that terrorist attacks committed by militant Islamic groups are by no means confined to targets in the Western world.

However, the common interest of NATO and Middle Eastern states in combating terrorism represents only part of the actors' interests. Both actors simultaneously pursue aims conflicting with their common interest in fighting militant Islamism. The American decision to wage war on Iraq and to impose a sanction regime on Syria strongly irritated the Arab world. The Syrian case may also trigger suspicion that the policy of the US Administration is being obstructed by Congress' influence.³ In turn, Arab protagonists' interest in cooperating with NATO is in potential conflict with their aim of preserving sovereignty since combating Islamism is a delicate internal issue. Thus, pursuing the common aim of fighting militant Islamism is embedded in a complex context significantly reducing the likelihood of success.

³ US-President George W. Bush only reluctantly approved the *Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act* in December 2003 when, as a result of intensive bargaining, the Congress agreed to give more flexibility to the President in terms of implementing the law. Also in the case of Saudi Arabia, there are indicators that the Congress might push the US Administration in a direction that is not in its genuine interest.

Effective NATO Crisis Management towards and in the Middle East

A basic prerequisite for the realisation of scenario four-and, of course, also for the two preceding scenarios- is a high degree of unity among NATO members. George Robertson (2004) presents three major aspects of NATO unity towards the Middle East: a shared perception of security threats from the Middle East, the readiness of European core members of NATO to become global players, and American willingness to share power multilaterally. Robertson argues that after some troublesome years, all these criteria were fulfilled after the end of the war in Iraq. However, some scholars are more sceptical.

Firstly, although there can be few doubts that the USA and Europe share the general aim of containing terrorism, there are indicators that they give this aim varying degrees of priority. Even if not, differences on the best means of fighting militant Islamism are still an issue between the USA and the EU.⁴ Moreover, some security threats related to migration as perceived by (Mediterranean arbiters of) the EU are neglected by the USA due to different geopolitical circumstances (see Masala 2003).

Secondly, among the big three European powers—Great Britain, France, and Germany—the latter especially is not well prepared to become a global player (Cordesman 2004). Although the Federal Republic recently for the first time in its history became involved in troubled situations such as the war against Yugoslavia (1999) and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during *and* after the Oslo peace process (Beck 2004), resistance to becoming a “regular” European power is still significant both in the public and the political establishment. Furthermore, since reunification Germany has been increasingly focusing its expenditures on issues of social welfare rather than foreign policy, with no signs of alteration ahead. Moreover, regarding other members of NATO, it can ask whether they are investing sufficient financial resources in their relations with the Middle East (see Cordesman 2004). Thirdly, it is far from clear whether the USA is planning to use the Middle East to experiment with genuine multilateralism again in the foreseeable future.

Anthony Cordesman (2004) points out that common oil security interests in the Middle East may unify NATO in the future, particularly since the Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil will almost

⁴ For instance, see the debate between Will Marshall and Peter Rudolf (2004).

inevitably increase in the next two decades. Although this sheds new light on the issue, it is questionable whether NATO provides the appropriate means to deal with this kind of security problem. Note that neither NATO nor any other military alliance played a significant role in managing the two oil crises in the 1970s.

No Major Role for NATO in the Middle East

Due to factors inhibiting the cohesion of NATO members vis-à-vis security threats from the Middle East, the role of NATO could be limited - or even non-existent - in 2030. Graeme Herd (2004) goes even one step further by outlining a scenario of NATO disintegration as a result of total failure in its activities in the Middle East. Although this scenario is apparently just worst-case thinking, it can indeed be doubted whether NATO could avoid a major internal crisis if the *International Security Assistance Force* produced a failed state in Afghanistan and/or if the engagement of NATO members in Iraq fell short of creating a stable regime.

Outlook

NATO's influence on the realisation of scenario one is extremely limited and scenario two requires nearly optimal circumstances, which cannot realistically be expected. Thus, NATO should attempt to avoid scenario five. It still seems too early to predict whether scenario three or four should be aspired to. If scenario three were approached too aggressively, NATO could suffer a major setback. Thus, the expansion of NATO's activities in the troubled Middle East should be guided by a clear but cautious step-by-step strategy.

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SOME EVALUATIONS OF STRATEGIC SECURITY DOMAINS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST UP TO 2030

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Generally speaking, analysts do best to avoid the long view; despite the tradition in geopolitics and economics of the Kondratieff cycle, forecasts more than five years hence have a horrible habit of being wrong. The complexity of the international scene is simply too great to allow meaningful projections to be made at such time scales. Nevertheless, there are probably some things about the Mediterranean and its security concerns that will not have changed so markedly, so that certain kinds of projection may still have meaning and relevance to the situation, as it will be then.

The environmental domain

One development that seems unlikely to change is the gradual warming of the earth's atmosphere. Not only will this cause a rise in average temperatures – of up to 5°C over the next century, according to some sources – but it will also cause greater instability in local climatic events. In the context of North Africa and the Middle East, one major danger will be increasing desertification with the result that the arable land area will decrease. This will not only affect total food output but will also promote urban drift with consequent pressure on urban services and employment. Growth in urban areas also further limits the availability of arable land – perhaps not a problem in many countries, but of crucial importance in a country such as Egypt where expansion absorbs over

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1,000 hectares a year. There will also be the concomitant increase in pressure on water supplies, both in terms of collection if rainfall declines or if weather events are too violent, and in terms of accessibility, as demand on the resource grows with increasing population growth.

All these tendencies are, of course, already present, often for reasons unconnected with the environment and already have security implications, in soft and human security terms. However, they are likely to accelerate under environmental pressure, alongside demographic growth. They are exaggerated by the deficiencies in regional infrastructure, particularly as far as water supply and sewage are concerned. Often these systems are debilitated by neglect because of declines in state funding and already the strains are beginning to show. In Algeria, for instance, up to 50 per cent of water supplied to the capital is lost through leaks, and water supply in many parts of the country is irregular. The collapse of sewage systems is emphasized by the regular eruption of isolated typhoid and cholera outbreaks, resulting from the pollution of potable water supplies by damaged sewage disposal systems.

Attempts to arrest desertification have a long history, going back to the 1960s, especially in North Africa where desertification can advance at a rate of 16 kilometres a year. There, initiatives such as the use of oil to fix mobile sand and to provide a basis for cultivation in Libya or "*La Ligne Verte*" in Algeria have had a chequered history. Often they have been undermined by contradictory initiatives, such as the World Bank's adoption of "non-traditional exports" – often requiring intensive water use – in the attempt to re-orient production towards the export market. Similarly, large areas of arable land have been damaged by salinization in Saudi Arabia (the al-Hassa development has been an exemplary case of land reclamation but at massive cost) and Iraq, where up to 80 per cent of arable land in Babil province is now unusable. Sometimes, of course, this has been the result of deliberate acts of government policy, as was the case with the southern marshes around the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates, which are now down to one third of their original size and unlikely ever to fully recover. Even initiatives designed to reclaim desert areas have had very mixed records, as Egypt's "new valleys project" has demonstrated.

Demographic implications

The irony is that these adverse developments are all taking place in a fragile and marginal environment and one which is also subject to significant demographic pressure. Admittedly population growth rates have fallen, from around 2.6 per cent per annum on average up to the start of the twenty-first century, to around 2 per cent per annum today. They are expected to continue to fall, thus avoiding the spectre of Middle East and North African population reaching 300 million by 2030. Nonetheless, they will certainly reach well beyond 200 million persons by that date. This will cause manifold problems that have security implications.

Two issues immediately stand out: firstly the ability of states to provide the social services and physical infrastructure that such populations will require, given the fact that, today, more than half of the population of the region is under 30 and around 40 per cent are still under the age of 15, and, secondly, the present and future problem of employment. The World Bank today estimates that regional economies must grow at between 5 and 7 per cent per year if they are to generate the goods and services their predominantly economically inactive population will require – in terms of education, health and housing – yet, even today, they grow at barely half this rate, only occasionally reaching the level of 5 per cent, as occurred last year, largely as a result of the explosion in oil prices. Questions also need to be raised about how these services should be provided, for there are serious doubts about the viability of private sector provision, which is currently the vogue.

One major cause of these low growth rates, alongside problems associated with economic structure, is that unemployment is already undermining the state's ability to raise revenues outside rent. According to official sources, average levels of unemployment range from 15 to 30 per cent of national labour force, with unemployment mainly affecting youth where, in some countries levels reach up to 70 per cent. It is estimated that, over the next twenty-five years, employment creation will have to total 90 million jobs for the Middle East alone, a rate of job creation of up to three times the current rate. Of course, the informal sector soaks up

much of current unemployment, but that falls outside government control by definition and contributes nothing towards state revenues.

Of course, it can be argued that the state is an extremely inefficient mobiliser of resources and that the private sector should take the burden of supplying effective goods and services to the public-at-large. This may be true but evidence to date is not fully convincing and, in any case, such service provision often results in declines in employment and unaffordable costs on the population. In any case, such a technical solution almost certainly cannot cope with the magnitude of the tasks it faces, given the limited time scales involved. Twenty-five years is a very short time, unless massive amounts of capital are efficiently mobilised – and neither North Africa or the Middle East have an equivalent to Japan - as a source of unlimited foreign investment - so that a South-East Asian miracle seems very unlikely.

There is, however, a future problem facing the region which is barely hinted at. This is that the current decline in birth-rates means that the age pyramid in twenty-five years time will begin to be dangerously over-weighted towards the increasingly non-productive elderly. This is a problem well-known to Europe, where the post-war baby boom is beginning to make its pernicious effects felt in terms of pensions and retirement. In the Middle East and North Africa, where the tradition of family responsibility for the elderly and limited life expectancy have minimised the problem, the implications of this have not even been contemplated. It can, of course, be argued that the delayed development of the middle class, with its success-oriented goals and nuclear family ambitions, means that this problem will not emerge. Yet the simple fact that declining numbers in the economically productive community will have to support a growing economically inactive superstructure means that some phenomenon akin to the problems facing Europe will emerge.

Migration

Almost certainly, these pressures, alongside inadequate employment opportunities and the continuing decline in European birth-rates, will increase migratory pressures on Europe. Although European demand for immigrant labour will have grown dramatically by 2030, it is

very likely that European xenophobia will have marched in step. The result will be the increased isolation of the immigrant communities involved, not their integration into European society. These tendencies may well be fuelled by the fact that the communities themselves may choose to emphasise their cultural and ideological distinctiveness as well. For the individual the sense of an alien environment will feed an inevitable antagonism and thus the danger of violence against the host community – a known pattern stretching back to the 1980s at least.

These developments seem likely to occur whatever the future of European policy in the Mediterranean may be. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which sought to create a shared zone of “peace, prosperity and stability” in the Mediterranean is under threat, both from American initiatives which may or may not lack credibility (the Middle East Initiative and the US-Middle East Partnership initiative) and from the European Union’s latest policy initiative, the European Neighbourhood policy which offers benefits equivalent to membership of the European Economic Area to countries which undertake liberalising economic and political reforms. This approach of positive conditionality both supports and supplants the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as it creates bilateral, rather than multilateral agreements with Mediterranean (and other) states.

In theory, such policy initiatives should include free movement of peoples into Europe, although there is some doubt as to whether this will be the case, both because of the securitisation of European border regimes and anticipated European xenophobia. Yet, even if such free movement is made available, there is every reason to fear that the resultant migrant communities will still suffer isolation and victimisation – precisely the conditions that produced violence and resentment in the past.

Security implications

These long-term patterns of social and economic change do not normally apply to security concerns, even when the main issue is soft security or human security, to use a modern phrase. They tend to have the imperceptible characteristics of Braudel’s historical vision of “*la longue durée*” and can also produce the consequences, which quite clearly

belong to the hard security domain.. Thus, for example, although specific political events were the cause of the decade-long virtual civil war in Algeria, the major reason for the extreme bitterness and the widespread support that characterised its early years was the long-term disappointment and resentment over the failure of the Algerian state to fulfil its promises, coupled with the growth in unemployment and poverty.

Similarly, the problems of terrorism that Europe now faces have their roots as much in the sense of alienation and discrimination experienced by migrant communities in Europe as in the presumed terrorist networks stretching from the Middle East and North Africa, towards some mythical node in Afghanistan or the Gulf. Networks undoubtedly do exist and have always existed, but they often serve different purposes to, and have origins different from, those usually attributed to them. Similarly, terrorism in the Middle East reflects age-old causes, which the policies of major powers have failed to address.

It is clear, however, that it is impossible to predict what will happen in the major political crises of the Middle East-North Africa region over the next twenty-five years, although some trends may persist. Thus, for example, the separateness between the populations of the Muslim South and those in Europe and the United States, in cultural and political terms, may well persist if solutions to the specific political problems of the region are not found soon. That, together with the political consequences of the environmental and demographic factors mentioned above, will certainly be part of a regional hard security agenda.

Hard security issues

This raises the question of what kind of mechanism will respond to such a hard security agenda and where its priorities will lie. The twenty-five year time horizon might well mark the beginnings of the decline in American hegemony, as an alternative multi-polar system begins to emerge, driven by China and India, perhaps together with a resurgent Russia – by then having recovered much of the periphery that it lost in 1991. China and India are likely to have keen interests in the

Middle East and North Africa because their energy needs will have fuelled the expected growth in the role of the Gulf in satisfying world energy demand. The Persian Gulf will actually satisfy most of the expected increase in world oil demand from 82 million b/d today to 120 million b/d in 2030, as it grows by 1.6 per cent per year, with China's imports alone rising from 30 to over 60 per cent.

By 2010, South East Asia will become a net oil importer. By 2020, just four Gulf states – Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – which supply 23 per cent of world production today and have 53 per cent of world reserves, will meet 31 per cent of world hydrocarbon demand. European and American needs for access to Middle Eastern supplies are unlikely to significantly diminish – currently the United States satisfies 18 per cent of its oil needs from Saudi Arabia alone, just as it did in 1997, despite attempts to diversify. Access to Gulf energy is likely to be an over-riding security concern, as global competition grows, particularly as European dependence on Middle Eastern and North African oil and gas – supplied through fixed pipeline systems – expands.

The hard security agenda is thus likely to include both the security of energy and strategic lines of communications through the Mediterranean – which harbours two of the world's nine choke-points in terms of maritime communications and trade at Gibraltar and Suez (with the Bosphorus as a potential new restriction to trade movements) – and through the Red Sea – with its third recognised choke-point at Bab al-Mandab. In addition, the agenda will have to deal with the problems associated with continued migration into Europe and European attempts at controlling such flows as well as the dangers of continued and rising violence, both trans-national and national in Europe or in South Mediterranean states. Interestingly enough, direct conflict between states seems improbable, despite the threat of Iranian missiles and Iraq's instability – unless the United States persists in the habit of unilateral intervention, which seems unlikely given the immense costs involved.

Hard security mechanisms

The question is how this demand for hard security is to be articulated. At present NATO has successfully begun the process of

transforming its nascent Southern Flank dialogue into something more substantive, as South Mediterranean states consider joining Partnership for Peace initiatives on an opportunistic basis. The dialogue is becoming more substantial as its Southern members begin to consider issues of security governance and civil-military relations mediated through the dialogue itself. It is clear that one possible way of articulating hard security concerns in the future could be an expanded and reformulated NATO.

This, however, begs the question of what NATO will become in the future. It is already clear that the United States is not anxious – in the near future at least – to repeat the problems of command-and-control that have dogged NATO initiatives in the recent past, hence its unwillingness to consider NATO's invocation of Article 5 in 2001 as integral to its global strategy. In addition, it is also clear that the American commitment to European defense will decline and continue to do so in the immediate future. If, in addition, problems arise in the interpretation of the trans-Atlantic relationship over the next decade, it may be that a future NATO might have very different preoccupations and a very different structure in the years to come.

Whether this will extend to the Europeanization of NATO or an American abandonment of its NATO commitments seems unlikely, at least in formal terms. There will, however, be substantive changes in what role the United States will play. Given the fact that it spends three times as much on military preparedness as all European states taken together, this is hardly surprising, even if the Bush administration's preference for "coalitions of the willing" does not become a normative part of American defense and foreign policy. Europe, too, has begun to develop its own rapid deployment forces, with ten battle groups now projected for active service next year.

Another question is to what degree Southern Mediterranean forces may be integrated into such security structures. Morocco and Jordan are already beginning to participate in peace-keeping forces and intelligence and information services are increasingly cooperating because of regional fears of terrorism. However, the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has failed to fulfil its initial promise owing to

the failure of the Middle East peace process and seems unlikely to be revived. Collective and cooperative security is thus likely to be piecemeal, rather than systematic.

In the end the real issue of how Mediterranean security is to be articulated depends on how Europeans perceive future security threats. The Mediterranean, after all, is part of the European periphery and eventually European states or the European Union will have to take primary responsibility for establishing the mechanisms through which this can be done. In this context, the future of NATO and its relationship to a future European entity will be of crucial importance. And, underlying that is the crucial question of what the trans-Atlantic relationship will become!

**RAPPORT DE L'ATELIER:
CONTEXTE STRATEGIQUE, SYSTEMES REGIONAUX
DE SECURITE, PROGRAMMES DE COOPERATION,
ROLE DE L'OTAN ET DES AUTRES ORGANISATIONS
SECURITAIRES**

Abderaouf OUNAIES¹

Quatre conférenciers ont présenté des tentatives de projection du tableau régional à l'horizon 2030. Sur le fond, on peut distinguer quatre grands axes ayant animé méthodiquement ou transversalement les échanges.

Le premier thème portait sur la centralité de la question de la paix, notamment de la paix israélo-palestinienne

La question de la paix scande les interventions et les débats. L'hypothèse d'un Etat palestinien indépendant à l'horizon 2030 est évoquée, mais sans être assortie des attributs qui accompagnent l'avènement de la paix, de la véritable paix dans l'ensemble de la région. Le Moyen-Orient élargi reste pour la majorité des intervenants une région en crise, y compris à l'horizon 2030. De bout en bout du débat, l'exigence de la paix, dans laquelle la libération du peuple palestinien et la reconnaissance de ses droits forment le pivot central, revient avec insistance et, à tous égards, domine la vision de la région pour les années et les décades à venir.

L'appel pour un rôle accru de l'OTAN et de l'Europe est fréquent dans le but de servir directement la cause de la paix ou, du moins, de créer un environnement de paix, malgré les réserves isolées de quelques

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orateurs qui estiment que les attributions de l'OTAN ne l'habilitent pas à interférer dans cette question. Pour la majorité, les évolutions strictement régionales, y compris la décision, partielle mais bienvenue, du gouvernement israélien de se retirer de Gaza, ne permettent pas d'amorcer une véritable dynamique de paix, à moins d'une contribution résolue des puissances extérieures, notamment les Etats-Unis et les Etats européens. Dans l'ensemble, et à une seule exception près, les analyses sont pessimistes et les perspectives sombres. Les facteurs pouvant renverser cette tendance, sans être exclus, ne sont pas maîtrisés.

Curieusement, le Dialogue méditerranéen initié par l'OTAN il y a dix ans et dont la portée vient d'être étendue lors du Sommet d'Istanbul de juin 2004, n'est pas lié à la question de la paix mais uniquement à la recherche de la stabilité. Cette stabilité, comme finalité du Dialogue, a fait l'objet de vives réserves compte tenu de la situation très contestable de la sécurité et de la gouvernance dans la région. Si l'OTAN doit recentrer son rôle dans la région et lui donner le statut d'un partenariat, le format et l'agenda du Dialogue méditerranéen devront être revus et complétés par un appareil d'accompagnement à l'instar du Processus de Barcelone où le Dialogue politique et de sécurité est l'un des trois piliers qui forment, dans leur convergence, le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen.

Dans cette hypothèse, le potentiel de réforme et d'assainissement du contexte sécuritaire et politique y gagnerait certainement en dynamisme et en efficacité dans l'intérêt de toutes les parties.

Le deuxième thème abordé est celui de la prolifération nucléaire

Curieusement, le sujet n'est pas étendu à l'ensemble des Armes de Destruction Massive qui, tout au long des années 2002 et 2003, avaient pourtant dominé la problématique de la sécurité régionale et qui avaient déterminé le déclenchement de la guerre en Iraq par une coalition formée en majorité par des pays membres de l'OTAN.

Les échanges et les interrogations sur le danger de prolifération se limitent à l'arme nucléaire soit strictement iranienne, soit dans le contexte sous-régional polarisé par l'Iran et Israël. Les débats ont porté

sur la menace de prolifération plutôt que sur un risque sérieux et actuel, sans doute en raison de l'évolution diplomatique favorable où semble s'engager le gouvernement iranien. Cependant, le monopole nucléaire israélien dans la région a fait l'objet d'une série d'objections qui s'inscrivent dans le débat classique tel qu'il s'était développé aux Nations-Unies et au sein du Processus de Paix.

A aucun moment le rôle de l'OTAN n'a été mentionné dans cette problématique, à moins de l'inclure implicitement dans les nombreux appels à l'OTAN pour promouvoir un système ou des systèmes de sécurité régionale, estimés indispensables pour la sécurité et la stabilité futures de la région.

Le troisième thème portait sur le terrorisme international

La question du terrorisme a connu une évolution dramatique au lendemain du 11 septembre 2001 dans la mesure où toute violence non étatique est depuis lors criminalisée et qualifiée de terrorisme. La politique de répression du terrorisme a été structurée et généralisée à l'ensemble des gouvernements qui, du reste, s'y prêtent volontiers et qui étendent exceptionnellement la collaboration jusqu'aux services de renseignements. Cependant, la réponse militaire est insuffisante et le terrorisme, en fait, ne recule et ne faiblit pas.

La répression et l'éradication du terrorisme doivent être complétées par le souci de s'attaquer à ses causes profondes. La réponse par des moyens politiques s'impose de manière tout aussi impérative, notamment le règlement des conflits régionaux persistants dans la région du Moyen-Orient.

L'amalgame entre terrorisme et résistance nationale a fait l'objet d'un bref débat, qui s'est conclu par la nécessité de tirer les enseignements du passé.

Le quatrième thème est celui de l'évolution des facteurs non politiques

La région Moyen-Orient/Afrique du Nord est particulièrement sensible aux phénomènes de dégradation de l'environnement: réchauffement de l'atmosphère, désertification et réduction des surfaces arables, épuisement des ressources hydrauliques. De surcroît, la démographie portera la population à 200 millions de personnes en 2030. Ces évolutions détermineront un accroissement du chômage, des pressions accrues sur les services sociaux –hygiène, santé et éducation– ainsi qu'une intensification de l'émigration en direction de l'Europe.

Les implications inhérentes à ces évolutions posent des problèmes de sécurité qui risquent d'être compliqués par l'environnement politique hostile, dans le cas où les conflits régionaux attribués à l'hégémonie américaine n'auraient pas été résorbés.

Ces problèmes de sécurité seront encore aggravés par les besoins d'approvisionnement du marché en produits pétroliers, dont la région détient des parts importantes et, avec le temps, croissantes. A ce titre, les intérêts occidentaux dans la région seront concurrencés par ceux des nouveaux acteurs asiatiques, la Chine et l'Inde, dont les besoins de consommation en carburant seront considérablement plus élevés.

L'OTAN sera ainsi confrontée à l'impératif de sécuriser les approvisionnements à travers les détroits qui commandent la Méditerranée. Cet impératif obligera l'OTAN à poursuivre et renouveler ses missions dans la région.

En conclusion, l'atelier s'est donné pour objectif de cerner les intérêts et les défis de sécurité communs dans le Moyen-Orient élargi en 2030. Cet objectif a été théoriquement satisfait. Le débat a toutefois révélé un problème de confiance. Edifier la confiance n'est pas un problème de psychologie. Edifier la confiance pose un problème de fond, de terrain et de doctrine. Dans cette optique, il faut bien admettre qu'il existe un problème dramatique de confiance entre le Sud et le Nord et, partant, il en découle une absence de confiance dans l'avenir.

TURKEY, GREECE AND ISRAEL: EAST MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

Amikam NACHMANI¹

Much use of the word “dramatic” will be made because there is no any better way to describe the changes experienced recently in Turkey, in particular in the east Mediterranean.

Turkey’s international situation has changed dramatically for the better during the last 10 – 15 years. Globally speaking there are not very many parallels to this improvement. One could even go so far as to say that Turkey now perhaps enjoys some parallels with Great Britain’s heyday in the 19th century, and even with the more positive sides of British “splendid isolation”.

The second comment relates to methodology. It is impossible to understand eastern-Mediterranean current affairs without focusing on the history of the last 15 years. Hence, my presentation will be divided between history and current events. I will begin with history; and although focusing on Turkey I will start with Greece.

Surveying the Greek and Turkish media over the last 15 years reveals that, Greek newspapers devote more column space to Turkey and related issues than to any other foreign topic. Not so in the Turkish press, which ranks Greek-Turkish relations only sixteenth in order of importance.

Another point that is repeatedly found is that people in Greece bitterly complain that the United States has continuously sided with Turkey against Greece. One of the explanations given is that as a young nation, the United States has absolutely no sense of history. As far as the Americans are concerned the past began in 1945. Having burst in on the international stage in 1945, at the onset of the Cold War, the United

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States found Turkey a much more valuable ally than Greece, hence Washington's continued partiality towards Turkey.

Some 18 months ago, when the museums were robbed in Baghdad, one of the explanations given was that this could only happen under American responsibility because Americans lack a sense of history. I am not going to take issue with the validity of this explanation. True, America is a young nation, probably among the youngest of nations. But America has the longest memory. For the moment it seems that Turkey is able to limit the repercussions of its decision not to grant the right of passage through its territory to American troops on their way to Iraq. The current administration in Washington seems to have swallowed the blow: capturing Iraq without going through Turkey did not increase U.S. casualties. In fact defeating Iraq during March–April 2003 was achieved with relatively small numbers of casualties. Hence there has been little criticism of Turkey. Washington's reactions would have been had things gone differently.

Referring to Turkish-American relations, William Safire, the *New York Times'* famous publicist, quoted the Kennedy family's phrase: "Forgive, not Forget". But Safire also added: "we are not inflicting vengeance and punishing somebody for not cooperating with us, if this punishment means damaging our interests"².

But let us delve for a moment into older times. It seems that the 1940s are the starting place for everything. Because the communist threat to post World War II, Greece was internal - stemming from poverty, disease, famine, etc., and the sheer destruction from World War II when Greece was practically burnt to the ground by the Axis forces -massive economic aid was poured into that country, alongside with some military assistance. But for Turkey, where the communist threat was external -Stalin demanded the Bosphorus and the Dardanel- massive military aid was provided. When, in the course of time, the Turkish-Greek conflict exacerbated and worsened, Athens complained that the immediate post World War II period was the reason for its weakness. The external communist threat to Turkey resulted in Turkey acquiring an offensive military capacity, and on the other hand Greece, facing an internal threat, obtained at the most economic help and a defensive capacity.

Parenthetically one could note that in the years 1946-1949 a vicious civil war raged in poverty-stricken Greece. It was a communist attempt to

² Ha'aretz, 1st June 2003, quoted from the *New York Time*.

take over the country. During the 1940s 10% of the Greeks perished – 700,000 out of 7 million – most of them during the civil war years, and almost nobody has heard of it. “The Hidden War” was the name given to this civil war in a program produced in 1986 by British Granada Television. It is interesting to observe that when one considers the Greek civil war they refer to the war between Athens and Sparta.

Turning to the present, something dramatic happened to Turkish-Greek relations. As if by magic, all of Turkey’s fronts and conflicts vanished. Communism collapsed; the Soviet Union disintegrated; Iraq and Iran lick their wounds following their eight years of vicious war during the 1980s; Baghdad was defeated in the Gulf war of 1991, and put under heavy international monitoring; the regime in Baghdad was defeated again in 2003 as a result of the American intervention there; the PKK lost its war against Turkey.

Turkey remained with two fronts: Syria, with which it has territorial and fresh water resource conflicts, and Greece with which it is at logger heads over Cyprus, sovereignty in the Aegean, territorial waters, etc. But on 20 October 1998, Syria and Turkey signed an agreement, the Adana Memorandum. Turkey was left with only one front: Greece. I happened to hear in Athens a description of this new situation: the worst nightmare Greece could think of. Why a nightmare? Because Greece - being smaller and weaker than Turkey – was counting on Turkey being busy with as many conflicts and fronts as possible.

Recently, some information has surfaced regarding the negotiations that led to the Adana Memorandum. It was reported that during the negotiations the Head of Turkish Intelligence made very clear to his Syrian counterpart that “Turkey’s military would enter Syria from one side, and leave it from the other”. Another version spoke of Turkish tanks rolling into Damascus within 10 hours of crossing the border - unless Syria expelled Abdullah Öcalan. The rest is history: Öcalan was expelled, and Syria stopped supporting the PKK. A report of what happened later in Nairobi, Kenya (February 1999), from where Öcalan was kidnapped, said that it was done by “tall, blond guys, crew-cut hair style, no moustaches, neatly shaved, expensive after-shave”.

For the sake of our discussion - and strategic planners in Athens noted the same thing - it is important to note that ALL of this Turkey achieved without having to fire a single shot. Add to this the fact that Turkish troops in the Aegean continued to keep up a 90% state of alert,

whereas for the rest of Turkey it was only 50%, and one understands the concerns felt in Athens. The bottom line was that Greece remained Turkey's single front. Dialogue with Turkey rather than distance from it, looked extremely necessary to Greek strategists.

Allow me to sidetrack again, just to mention two things. A decade or so from now Turkey will be able to celebrate the truly remarkable achievement of not having been directly involved in an international war for almost a century. How many countries could boast such an achievement? Bear in mind Turkey's "benign" or tractable neighbours -Iran, Syria, Iraq- Russia's intermittent civil wars, the Chechens, etc. and you highly appreciate this record. All of Turkey's neighbours have intermittently found themselves involved in international wars and not even one drop of Turkish blood has been shed in the Middle East since W.W. I. True: there was the 1950 Korea war and the 1974 events in Cyprus. But the former was Turkey's meal ticket into NATO and took place thousands of miles from home, while the latter was, militarily, an easy mission.

What are the reasons for this most enviable Turkish position where, practically, nobody dares to meddle with Turkey? Some people have given a humorous explanation and said it is the lesson drawn from President Demirel's words. The President once commented that you survive in the Middle East only if you remember that you eat or get eaten. Others, among them frustrated Israelis who envy Turkey's achievements with its neighbours, say that unlike any other language, if you talk Turkish to your neighbours they are bound to agree with you. And there is a more serious reason, namely the legacy of the Ottoman Empire that dictates extreme caution when dealing with Turkey. During the 500 years of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey never stopped fighting. Between 1450 and 1900 the Ottoman Empire spent an average of 61 years per century fighting. No doubt present Turkish diplomacy enjoys an asset named "deterrence" that originated in the Ottoman past.

The second sidetracked topic refers to a simulation carried out a couple of years ago by American, Turkish and Israeli scholars. The opening story of the simulation refers to a border town in your country that has been incessantly shelled by Katyusha missiles for the last two weeks. What would you recommend your government should do? Obviously the reference was to the town of Kiryat Shemona at the northern tip of Israel and the continuous shelling of it by the Lebanese Hizbullah. The Turkish

participants roared with laughter. They explained that it would be impossible for a Turkish border town to be shelled for a fortnight. The Turkish military would have massively retaliated within two hours.

What were the Greek and Turkish reactions to all this? Ankara's agreement with Syria in October 1998, followed by the practical end of the PKK insurrection in the summer of 1999, was the finale of a process that started at the end of the Cold War. This decade is probably the most important and most dramatic in the history of modern Turkey. Turkey's ability to impose its will on its neighbours, again without having to fire a single shot, led to a reassessment and huge changes in the east-Mediterranean. When Turkey's last active fronts vanished -Syria and the PKK- Greece remained Turkey's only source of conflict. Greek media then asked whether Athens was going to be faced with a Turkish demand for Finlandization. That is to say: Athens would be requested to co-ordinate its defense and foreign policies with Ankara – exactly as Moscow did with Finland during the Cold War years.

We should add that Turkey's Prime Minister at the time (in 1999) was Bülent Ecevit, and this did not help to calm Greek nerves. Ecevit was not only responsible for the arrest of Öcalan in 1999, but he was the one who had ordered Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974. But the same Ecevit also wrote the following poem: *"It is only in a foreign land that you can understand that Greeks are your long lost brothers"*.

These developments made the possibility of talks and negotiations between Greece and Turkey an extremely urgent proposition. All this goes a long way in explaining the current rapprochement -some call it dialogue; others call it *détente*- that replaced the mood of alienation between Greece and Turkey.

The rapprochement did not start with the two earthquakes of August and September 1999, in Istanbul and Athens, respectively. The quakes were only an opportunity, literally a God-given opportunity, to open a dialogue. As we have explained the roots go back to 1990.

But there was also Israel's modest contribution to Turkish-Greek *détente*. Some termed it the "sandwiching" of Syria between Turkey and Israel, or the "pliers-like strategy" vis-a-vis Syria that explained why Damascus had been omitted from Turkey's list of troubles.

In 1999, I was fortunate enough to meet Yannis Kranidyotis, the Greek Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Soon afterwards Mr. Kranidyotis was killed, together with his son, in a tragic aircraft accident.

Both were in an aircraft that hit an air pocket over northern Greece. The aircraft eventually regained its balance but the father and son who were not wearing their seatbelts both broke their necks and died.

Mr. Kranidyotis had an interesting, perhaps even a unique view, of the Greek-Turkish-Israeli triangle. Greece, he said, sees no problem in the military cooperation between Turkey and Israel. Had it not been Israel, than others would have loved becoming Turkey's weapon suppliers. He even lamented the fact that the Greek military industry could not win some of Turkey's weapon modernization tenders. However, the damage done to Greece was the "sandwiching" of Syria, in reality the omission of Damascus from any possible list of anti-Turkey allies. "We used to sleep well at night when we knew that Turkey had to deal, simultaneously, with six or seven fronts. However, we are now on our own: Öcalan in prison, PKK kaput, Syria castrated. Nobody in the world to rely on", said Kranidyotis.

Indeed, a sense of loneliness was felt in Greece at the end of the Cold War. The reason for which the West and Washington in particular, persuaded Turkey to leave Greece intact, was the need to pose a united front before the Soviets. But now this reason has disappeared.

However, a recipe for improving relations in the east Mediterranean - and in fact anywhere else in the world - was eventually found. As far back as 1996 a meeting of Greek and Turkish business entrepreneurs convened in Izmir. Leaving politics aside they talked business, and concluded that once the annual trade between their two countries reached the 2 billion dollar mark, soldiers and politicians would be much less eager to orchestrate crises.

Indeed, consider the impressive development in the volume of trade between Turkey and Greece: in 1999, this stood at a mere \$450 million for a combined population of more than 75 million people. The figure tripled and reached more than \$1.3 billion dollars in 2003 with Turkey enjoying the upper hand. (Turkey's exports to Greece amount to 0.9 billion dollars, while Greece's export figures to Turkey are running at 425 million dollars).

Tourism increased - and tourism is the symbol of security and confidence, perhaps even of good will. In the 1980s the number of tourists from both countries dropped sharply. By 1985 only 130,000 Greeks visited Turkey and 200,000 Turks visited Greece. Unfortunately, as the most popular tourist sites in Turkey proved to be the areas from which the Greeks

were expelled during the 1920s, Greek tourism, at this point, did nothing but fan the flames of ethnic hatred. But records have improved dramatically since then, and in 2003 numbers soared to close to 1 million Turks and Greeks who spend their holidays in Greece and in Turkey, respectively.

In this context of business, trade and tourism, we should say a word about Turkey and Israel. If Turkish-Israeli cooperation has strategic dimensions, it is precisely the non-military links between Ankara and Jerusalem that support them. More than between any two Middle Eastern countries, the bilateral Turkish-Israeli civilian trade (tourism and military excluded) is the highest in the region. These non-military aspects of the relations give a wide basis to the pyramid, probably insuring its longevity. All Israel's other special bilateral relations that failed - with France in the 1950s, Iran in the 1970s, and South Africa in the 1980s - were principally of one dimension: the military or governmental one. They lacked the above-mentioned width of the pyramid.

A word of caution is needed here. Turkey in 2004 is *not* the same country as it was in the early 1990s when it shared common threats and interests with Israel. As mentioned before, from the Turkish point of view, most of these threats have vanished. For example: Iraq's powerful and threatening army doesn't exist anymore. True, Turkey faces new problems - Iraq's weakness for example. However, Ankara doesn't consider cooperation with Israel to be the remedy to these new problems. On the contrary: Iraq's weakness has introduced suspicions into Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations because of Israel's alleged contacts with Iraqi Kurds. This is but one example that explains the growing gap between Ankara and Jerusalem.

Furthermore, Ankara's views on Iraq, Iran, Syria and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, now resemble those of the EU, not of the U.S., not of Israel. The Europeans view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - besides its military aspects - as having crucial political and social issues that need to be dealt with by international organizations and international negotiations, and that is precisely how Turkey sees things. This is not the Israeli policy, which calls first for the elimination of military threats and then the cessation of violence.

One of the most interesting explanations to the growing gap between Turkey and Israel, has recently been given by Bulent Aras, a

Turkish scholar³. Aras argues that Turkey now enjoys a different status in the field of human rights, minority rights, democracy, multiculturalism, etc. - in short Turkey has experienced a structural change in this respect and is approaching EU standards. On the other hand, according to Aras, Israel is still stuck in its exaggerated nationalism, abuse of human rights, abuse of democracy, discrimination against minorities, etc. Turkey has already experienced the depth of the structural change and one could consider whether Israel's exaggerated nationalism is any different for instance, from that of any other Western country. The point is that intellectuals in Turkey think that they are already beyond the national pros and cons, and that they are actually close to the EU view of nationalism, i.e. that human rights or unity of political entities should prevail over national manifestations.

Some even say that the more Turkey becomes democratic, the more it becomes EU-minded; the more the Turkish military is marginalized, the greater the gap between Turkey and Israel. Alternatively, should the EU reject Turkey, we could expect a Muslim upsurge in the country, something that does not augur well for Turkish – Israeli relations. Hence, in some way or other, the gap that has recently appeared between Turkey and Israel is to remain for the foreseeable future. (Incidentally, we mentioned the marginalization of the military in Turkey: the latest disagreement with the Turkish military is about the EU demand to increase civil supervision of troops; this is to be achieved by the Turkish General Staff becoming accountable to the Defense Ministry rather than to the Office of the Prime Minister).

Turkey still faces serious European reservations as regards its non-Christian “otherness” and it being the epitome of the “other” among Muslim immigrant communities in Europe. Moreover, persisting rumors claim that one of the reasons for the May 2004 accession into the EU of 10 new members was a European wish to outbalance the growth of the non-European, non-Christian element in the EU. If this analysis is valid, then a Turkish accession goes against EU not-so-hidden wishes to maintain a Christian majority in the Organization.

Some even predict an Islamic Europe in case Turkey is accepted. With Turkey in the EU – with its population of 80-85 million people within a generation and the largest country in the EU - and considering

³ Bulent Aras, “A Big Chill: a Duo Divided by Democratic Legitimacy”, *The Daily Star*, 10 August 2004.

the current EU negative demographic growth, some see a Muslim majority in Europe by the year 2020. Add to this the possibility that when Turkey is in, the EU would find it hard not to have some sort of accession negotiations with the Muslim countries of North Africa. The picture, thus, is far from being clear.

We mentioned the EU negative demographic growth. It is said about Italy that by the year 2010 it will be the “first culture in history” in which the number of people over 60 will be greater than the number of under 18s. And, more apocalyptically, if perhaps fancifully, “900 years from now and there will be no more Italians”.

Going back to Turkey and Israel, it is interesting to note that alongside the growing Turkish criticism of Israel, tourism and business continue as usual and even increase; military and economic cooperation prosper; and political meetings and exchange of information and intelligence never stopped. That is to say: business as usual, alongside growing open criticism.

And Turkish criticism of Israel is quite tough – Israel is the cause of the world’s anti-Semitism, Israel is a terror state, etc. This has been repeatedly said by Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Erdoğan. No wonder that there are those who declare that the “Turkish-Israeli honeymoon is over”.

It seems that for the foreseeable future this will be the pattern of relations between Israel and Turkey: Business as usual, alongside growing open criticism. It could even be, that other countries with which Israel has close and special contacts, India for instance, will follow the Turkish example.

Some of the sentiments portrayed here were best depicted by İlhan Selçuk, a left-wing Turkish intellectual not renowned for his pro-Israel sympathies. An article of his published in the Turkish daily *Cumhuriyet* (10 July 1997) interprets the Israeli-Turkish rapprochement. According to Selçuk, Saudi-Arabia and Iran, their mutual rivalry notwithstanding, both see secular Kemalist Turkey as a threat. Even if they detest one another, all the “*pro-Sharia*” groups are the enemies of Turkey. According to Selçuk all the Muslim states would sense triumph should secular-Kemalist Turkey and its democracy collapse.

Selçuk goes on and specifies that Orthodoxy and the Orthodox world do not wish Turkey well - Armenia; Greece; the Cypriot Greeks as well as the Greek and Armenian lobbies in the United States. That leaves

Turkey with nobody but Israel and its lobbies in the U.S. Selcuk's conclusion is: since Turkey is encircled by a world of *Sharia* and Orthodoxy, it is in its vital national interest to cooperate with Israel.

We mentioned here the Turkish model of secularism and democracy. Will this be applied by Turkey's neighbors? It is not sure. If democracy prevails in the Arab Middle East I think there are slim chances that secularism will follow. It is interesting to note that the Turkish model did have success among Black Sea countries. But there, there has been a real tendency towards westernization. It is not sure that we see the same happening in the Arab Middle East; there, Turkey's democracy and secularism are not a model. Moreover, legacies and emotions from the Ottoman-Arab past will not allow a Turkey-led Arab Middle East, not even genuine and deep Turkish-Arab cooperation.

Will Turkey be at the head of a Middle Eastern coalition that will cope with the region's problems? I doubt it. Consider the following assessment of the chances of such a development⁴:

"Turkey hasn't become the political pillar of the region, a focus that could influence regional conflicts. Ankara is always ready to help, to mediate, to host conferences, to be the courier, to deliver messages, but it lacks the leverage which Egypt or even Saudi Arabia have. Turkey is overwhelmingly Muslim but not Arab; secular but intermittently perceived as anti-religious; close to the U.S. which is, alas, an occupier of an Arab country (Iraq); and a close friend of Israel. ... Turkey isn't a threatening force like Iran; and unlike Egypt or Saudi Arabia it doesn't possess the ability to shape a regional Arab policy. In short, it is an actor with limited potential as regards the Arab Middle East. It might be even isolated in the Middle East. It is a member of NATO but not of the EU; a friend of Washington but opposed to the war in Iraq; has good relations with Iran but suspicious about Iranian intentions; a member of the Islamic Conference but objects to religious influence within it."

However, it seems that the main factor was omitted from the above quotation: as a country that aspires to become a Western, EU country, Turkey will not spend much energy in the Arab Middle East, nor in Central Asia. It seems senseless and futile to waste your energies on the Arab world while your aim is Brussels. This is a crucial point: if you aim at Brussels, you are not going to burn your fingers in the intermittent Middle Eastern conflicts, nor in Central Asia.

⁴ *Ha'aretz*, Zvi Barel, 14 January 2004.

In fact this should not be a surprise because a clear thread goes from the end of World War I to the present. It shows that Ankara leaves Middle Eastern wars to others. Let the Great Powers - GB, France, U.S. and the Soviets -and the Arabs and the Israelis eat what they have cooked and spoiled in the Middle East. We, the Turks, aren't going to pull the chestnuts from the fire. Besides, the more we see progress in Turkish-EU relations, the more we will NOT see a Turkish use of force to solve regional or internal issues.

In addition, one way or another all Middle Eastern and East Mediterranean actors have fought each other and shed blood, apart from Turkey. Amazingly Turkish tranquility bothered some people and Turkey was asked not to be the exception. Consider the following quotation from a 1992 issue of *Time Magazine* (19 October 1992). In the middle of an article on Turkey, the writer inserted the following "ad": "Help Wanted - Nation to serve as go-between for the Western world and the Middle East and assist in turning suspicion into cooperation. Must be firm U.S.-European ally, desirous of still closer ties yet, Islamic in religion and culture, capable of serving as a role model of secularized Western democracy for other Muslim states. Ethnic links with some of those states, booming free-market economy, permitting some assistance to poorer brethren, highly desirable. Benefits: regional superpower within a few years; eventual major influence on wider world affairs possible."

To which the article's author observed, "There is no need to look for such a country: Turkey fits every specification. Moreover, it wants the job."

Turkey finished fighting almost a century ago and has no inclination to serve as the West's policeman in the Middle East.

Listening to Turkish officials, it is interesting to note that all expect changes in the Middle East; the status quo will not prevail. They all agree that it is better that the change comes from within. The Iraqi example shows that when reforms do not come from within, they will come as a result of external intervention. Alas, this foreign intervention is not always sensitive enough to Middle Eastern realities. Incidentally, Turkey is no exception: Turkish officials admit that only EU pressure brought about the internal reforms that have recently been enacted and applied in Turkey.

Concerning the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel, the annual volume of trade between Turkey and Israel approaches the \$2 billion line. This renders Turkish-Israeli interaction more permanent, as a

structure whose components have an interest in its survival over time. Middle classes and elites in the two countries have mutual trade contacts. Many, as a result, have vested interests in the survival of trade and in its development.

Moreover, following the improvement in Turkish-Greek relations, Greek-Israeli relations also improved. There was an increase of almost 30 percent in the 2003 bilateral trade between Greece and Israel, reaching 375 million dollars. Greece also carried out mediation efforts in Iran on behalf of Israel, to promote the release of Israelis who had been captured by pro-Islamic militias, as well as on behalf of Jews captured by the Iranians on charges of conspiracy against Teheran.

Turning to Cyprus, it is interesting to note that Koffi Annan's Plan for a unified Cyprus failed. It is 1,200 pages long. With the appendices it approaches 9,000 pages (some say 12,000). With typical UN arrogance, it has not been translated into either Greek or Turkish, so most people have only a vague idea of what is in it. Since May 1st, 2004 the current Green Line dividing Cyprus and running through Nicosia, has also become the external border of the EU.

Israel kept a close eye on the negotiations. As from 1st May 2004 the EU is 30 minutes from Tel Aviv. It will become harder to dismiss the EU, which is now closer to us, and to ignore its interests in the Middle East, and in particular in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Israel is particularly interested in the articles of the Cypriot agreement that deals with the Turkish settlers. According to Annan's Plan, 45,000 Turkish settlers (out of 115,000), who had arrived from Turkey to settle in the TRNC, would be allowed to remain in unified Cyprus.

In spite of the failure of the Annan Plan, the current Greek-Turkish rapprochement shows that diplomacy and politics are the art of the possible, not of the impossible. Who remembers that Turkey took an oath and swore that the moment the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU without the TRNC, Turkey would immediately annex the northern part of the Island? Who remembers that Athens and Nicosia solemnly declared that unless Cyprus is first reunited, they would block any accession of Turkey into the EU, even negotiations towards accession? You now go to Athens and there find the staunchest supporters of Turkey entering the EU. We should all complement politicians and diplomats in Athens who knew how to limit the impossible and how to further the possible.

One could suppose that Nicosia too will remove its objection to the EU starting negotiations with Ankara. Nicosia also understands that you gain more from a dialogue with Turkey than if you alienate it. Besides, following the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots - and Nicosia was heavily criticised in Brussels for rejecting it - they wish to demonstrate that they support constructive policies. In particular they don't want to give further evidence to the Turkish claim that a Greek Cypriot membership in the EU means 'two Greeces' in the organization.

Talk to Greek Cypriots and you find that one article in the Annan Plan rattles them most. This is the prohibition on Greek Cypriots to move freely or settle in the Turkish part of the island. This means that in a united Europe where every French, Portuguese, Polish or Estonian citizen will be more or less free to take up residence and work in the Turkish part of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots will not have the same freedom of movement in their own country. "In a way, we'll be ghettoized in our own country", they complain.

One way or another, it seems that offering disputed communities the possibility of entering the EU is a strong enough carrot to persuade them to compromise. Surely Israelis and Palestinians ask: why not us? Why not offer Israel and the Palestinians meal-tickets into the EU in return for an end to the Middle Eastern conflict?

The message of the following quotation is very clear: "Turkey's leadership, after buttressing the country's integration and borders, is ready to cope with its domestic issues, like the standard of living, human rights, etc." Turkish accession into the EU now looks more feasible because, among other things, Turkey doesn't bring with it an open military ethnic conflict with the PKK, but social, political and cultural disagreements, perhaps even conflicts, with its Kurdish minority. The conclusion is that when guns do not roar, more monies can be diverted to butter.

Indeed with rare frankness and unique sincerity - unique for a leader and extremely rare for a politician - Turkey's President, Suleiman Demirel, said the following⁵:

"Twenty-nine percent of the women in my country are still unable to read and write by the time they are 15 years of age. Do you have a project to solve this problem? ... Do you have a project to solve this? In my country, 43 children out of every 10,000 die during birth. Do

⁵ *Turkish Daily News*, 16 March 1999, Istanbul.

you have a project to prevent that? There are 21 cases of polio in my country. This number is zero in many countries, but I have 21 cases to deal with. I am so ashamed that I don't know what to do. Let's get together and try to find a solution for these problems. ... This has nothing to do with money or wealth. Let's concentrate on every household in all of Turkey. Do you have a project to solve these problems? No, there isn't one. We constructed highways from one end of Turkey to the other and provided electric power to every corner in the country. We have erected schools, universities and hospitals. But I am still concerned about what kind of a life a particular city, country or village leads. We were in a much worse situation 50 years ago. I fully understand that, but we have much to accomplish to arrive at a much better condition."

NATO AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

David S. YOST¹

This essay considers two sets of questions. First, to what extent is the NATO experience relevant to the pursuit of a peaceful international order in the Mediterranean and the Middle East? Would it be possible to clone NATO, to reproduce its cohesion and structure, as a template for regional order? The short answer is that, at least in the foreseeable future, it would not be possible to duplicate NATO's cohesion, structures, and mutual defense commitments in this broad region. The relevance of the NATO experience as a model for the construction of international order in this region is therefore limited at best.

The second set of questions concerns a more realistic set of objectives. To what extent - and how - could NATO foster international security cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East? What are the obstacles to promoting security cooperation in this region? In view of these obstacles, what are the limits to what might be achieved in the foreseeable future? The short answer is that the obstacles are so formidable that it would be prudent not to raise expectations about what may be achieved. However, the economic and security stakes for the nations in this region and the Alliance are so substantial that it is imperative to implement lessons from NATO's long-standing and continuing efforts to promote international stability and cooperation, notably via Partnership for Peace, to the maximum extent possible.

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Why NATO Cannot Be Cloned in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

The non-reproducibility of the NATO model in the Mediterranean and the Middle East becomes apparent if one examines the origins and key features of the Alliance.

The chief organizers of the Alliance at the outset - British and French statesmen such as Ernest Bevin and Georges Bidault, who in 1948-1949 turned for assistance to their counterparts in the U.S. government, notably George Marshall and Dean Acheson - had a powerful argument for a collective defense treaty in Stalin's Soviet Union. There is no comparable large-scale threat to the Middle East as a whole today, nothing analogous to the threat of conquest and Sovietization that the USSR posed to Western Europe. Furthermore, when the Soviet Union appeared most menacing to the Middle East in the late 1940s and the 1950s, the threat resulted in a set of bilateral security arrangements with the United States, not a lasting and effective multilateral security organization.²

Another factor from the outset has been the U.S. role as the ultimate security guarantor of the Alliance. As Josef Joffe has pointed out, by extending protection to Western Europe against the Soviet Union, "the United States embedded still another girder into the postwar order. The lasting integration of the United States into Europe's state system dispatched the prime structural cause of conflict among its nations - the search for an autonomous defense policy. . . [T]he United States swept aside the rules of the self-help game that had governed and regularly brought grief to Europe in centuries past. . . Once the problem of security was dispatched, collective gain could overwhelm the zero-sum logic of rivalry and relative gain."³ In other words, NATO can be seen as the framework within which certain previously intractable problems of competition and insecurity in European international politics have been successfully addressed. NATO has furnished the security framework of reassurance within Europe for political and economic integration in the

² The troubled history of the 1955 Baghdad Pact, also known as the Middle East Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization, illustrates some of the long-standing difficulties in forming and sustaining multilateral security alliances in this region.

³ Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 178, 183, 184.

institutions, beginning in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel Community, that have led to the European Union. Solving the security dilemma in European interstate relations has facilitated the pursuit of economic and political cooperation.

The contrasts with the Mediterranean and Middle East region stand out. Owing in part to the absence of a compelling external threat, the United States has never extended a security guarantee comparable to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to a set of cooperating allies in the region. Patterns of self-help and rivalry persist to a significant extent in interstate politics, and not only in Arab-Israeli relations. Furthermore, while the United States supported the European integration movement, it was encouraging an effort with a powerful indigenous dynamic, thanks to the lessons drawn from the Second World War by Jean Monnet and other European statesmen. Despite organizations such as the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union and experiments such as the United Arab Republic (1958-1961), nothing remotely comparable to the European Union has appeared in the Mediterranean and Middle East region.

The Atlantic Alliance has from the beginning benefited from U.S. nuclear protection. The first Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, approved in December 1949, made clear the commitment of U.S. nuclear forces to the security of the NATO Allies.⁴ The Alliance has functioned to limit the scope of nuclear proliferation in NATO Europe in that several allies technically capable of pursuing national nuclear weapons capabilities have chosen, for various reasons - including U.S. protection via NATO - not to do so. The North Atlantic Treaty has thus been, in a sense, the West's most successful nuclear non-proliferation agreement. Only two of the NATO European allies have independent nuclear forces, and of these one decided to "go nuclear" before the United States extended nuclear security commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty.⁵ U.S. nuclear commitments and NATO

⁴ Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, approved on 1 December 1949, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*, vol. 4, *Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

⁵ Britain had the world's first practical nuclear weapons program, and turned to cooperation with the United States during World War II in what became the U.S.-led Manhattan Project. The British decision to follow through with a national nuclear weapons program was made in January 1947, well before the formation of the Atlantic Alliance. The French decision involved multiple motives in addition to reservations about relying on U.S. nuclear commitments: France's autonomy and international status and the political balance within the Alliance, as well as broader strategic

consultation arrangements have helped to obviate the incentives that some of the other Allies would probably feel, in their absence, to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.

The contrast with the Mediterranean and Middle East region is again obvious. While the United States has had privileged security relations with various states in the region (including Iran, until 1979), no formal treaty with a mutual defense clause has bound Washington to offer nuclear extended deterrence commitments to an ally or set of cooperating allies. The absence of reliable nuclear protection from the United States (or any other nuclear weapons state) has probably spurred the pursuit of national nuclear capabilities in several countries of the region.

The denationalization of defense planning constitutes another noteworthy feature of NATO. The Alliance's collective defense planning process derives from and helps to sustain the commitment to shared defense goals and other common purposes. The Allies have to a significant degree institutionalized transparency and dialogue in defense planning. Every year the Allies participating in the collective defense planning process under the Defense Planning Committee (at present, all the Allies except France) submit detailed responses to questionnaires about their forces and plans, engaging in systematic and extensive information exchanges that would have been unthinkable in earlier periods of European history. Collective decision-making regarding exercises and the acquisition and operation of certain types of capabilities has contributed to the growth of trust among the Allies. To a significant extent decades of consultations and working together have "socialized" Allies into a shared outlook on security affairs, and have given them confidence that they understand each other. This "mutual surveillance" in cooperative institutions can be seen as a form of intra-Alliance reassurance.

The disparity with the Mediterranean and Middle East region could scarcely be more complete. Defense planning remains national, with little informed public debate, except in Israel and Turkey. Mutual distrust and antagonism promote secrecy and deception rather than transparency. The constant "mutual surveillance" in the region generally

purposes, such as enhancing deterrence by obliging Moscow to face an additional center of nuclear decision-making in Europe.

has a distinctly Hobbesian connotation,⁶ at variance with that in NATO. Rather than building confidence, open-source and espionage-derived information about the activities of neighbors may incite hedging investments in capabilities to resist possible aggression or subversion. This follows from the absence of any mutual defense pledges similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Such pledges could not be credibly made without great increases in mutual trust.

Obstacles and Limits to NATO Fostering International Security Cooperation

While the NATO experience in promoting international order in Europe cannot be readily replicated in the Mediterranean and Middle East region in the foreseeable future, the Alliance can nonetheless take useful steps in support of security in the region. Certain obstacles and constraints must, however, be recognized from the outset. These include the infeasibility of NATO offering security guarantees, the sensitivity associated with democratization efforts, political sensitivities associated with dialogue and cooperation with the United States and other Western nations in the context of ongoing conflicts, possible reservations about applying to be accepted for participation, and the difficulty of promoting sub-regional cooperation on the multilateral model pioneered under Partnership for Peace in Europe.

There is no prospect of NATO offering security guarantees to states of the region. One could not bring Israel or other Middle Eastern states into NATO without amending the North Atlantic Treaty, which specifies in Article 10 that “any other European State” may be invited to accede to it. The true obstacle is not, however, legal, but political. If the Allies had the political will to do so, they could amend this portion of the treaty with a protocol, just as they have added a protocol to the treaty for the accession of each new ally. There is no political will in the Alliance to make Article 5 commitments - or to offer security guarantees in any other form - to Israel and its neighbors in the foreseeable future. Such

⁶ According to Hobbes, “[I]n all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours, which is a posture of War.” Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. by Richard Tuck (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 90; first published in 1651.

commitments could amount to a permanent obligation to intervene in order to contain and terminate conflicts involving these states. Caution about such involvement helps to explain why the Alliance's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative refers to "the need to avoid misunderstandings about the scope of the initiative, which is not meant to either lead to NATO/EAPC/PfP membership, provide security guarantees, or be used to create a political debate over issues more appropriately handled in other fora."⁷

In other words, one of the reasons why NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative explicitly excludes membership in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) is that the Allies wish to underscore that no security commitments to ICI participants are envisaged. In contrast, the Allies have accepted a security consultation obligation to PfP participants. In language that appeared to have been copied from Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the North Atlantic Council declared in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document in January 1994 that "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security."⁸ Unlike PfP, the ICI does not involve any Framework Document or security commitments.

Another sensitive issue is democratization, a concept that could threaten many regimes in the region. The United States has advocated democratization in this region (and globally) with perhaps more vigor than any other NATO nation. Yet official statements have often qualified the commitment to democratization in the long term with references to specific cases and the uniqueness of each nation's autonomous path to political change. For example, R. Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, has characterized President Bush's Middle East Partnership Initiative as follows:

"Under the initiative, we are working to support good governance and democratic institutions, reinforce the rule of law, encourage the participation of non-governmental organizations in society, further the empowerment of women and reform economic and educational sectors. . . We believe that genuine democratic reforms and advances toward

⁷ *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*, NATO Policy Document, 9 July 2004, paragraph 3e.

⁸ *Partnership for Peace Framework Document*, approved by the North Atlantic Council, 11 January 1994, par. 8. According to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."

pluralistic, inclusive societies will emerge from within the region in forms suitable to each country. . . . [T]here is no uniform, one-size-fits-all reform plan for all the countries in the Greater Middle East. Each nation will have to come to its own conclusions about the pace and the direction of change. Change cannot be imposed from the outside by anyone.”⁹

Chris Donnelly and other experts have expressed caution about making a commitment to democratization an element of any NATO cooperative program in this region. In Donnelly’s words, “PfP membership was originally offered to all countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union without conditionality. Subsequently, for those countries such as Serbia and Montenegro that aspire to join the Partnership for Peace as a path to rejoining the Western community, a condition of democratization and good governance has been imposed. . . . It is essential that a new program for partnership and cooperation with North Africa and the Greater Middle East should include no such condition. The countries of the region will choose different paths towards democracy and modernization, and will move at different speeds. They will resent anything that appears condescending or culturally imperialistic.”¹⁰

In their description of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative the NATO Allies included a sentence suggesting that the Alliance’s role is restricted to carefully delimited security matters and that it has no role in democratization other than “[t]aking into account other international efforts for reforms in the democracy and civil society fields in the countries of the region.” This sentence was therefore the only reference to democracy in the document:

“Taking into account other international efforts for reforms in the democracy and civil society fields in the countries of the region, NATO’s offer to those countries of dialogue and cooperation will contribute to those efforts where it can have an added value: in particular, NATO could make a notable contribution in the security field as a result of its particular strengths and the experience gained with the PfP and the Mediterranean Dialogue.”¹¹

⁹ R. Nicholas Burns, “NATO and the Greater Middle East,” speech at the European Parliament conference, “Highlights from the Islamic World Against Fundamentalism,” 30 April 2004.

¹⁰ Chris Donnelly, “Building a NATO Partnership for the Greater Middle East,” *NATO Review*, Spring 2004.

¹¹ Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, *NATO Policy Document*, 9 July 2004, paragraph 4.

Political sensitivities associated with dialogue and cooperation with the United States and other Western nations in the context of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East may hinder the development of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative as much as they have hampered the pursuit of the Mediterranean Dialogue. In November 2004, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary General, pointed out that:

“In the past, the absence of progress in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has proved to be a real impediment to the development of our [Mediterranean] Dialogue. Without any prospect for a just and durable settlement, some Mediterranean partners have hesitated, and perhaps continue to hesitate, to commit themselves to going further in their relations with NATO. . . Can we be entirely sure that the new dynamic of cooperation between NATO and its Mediterranean neighbors will not suffer from the same dilemmas as those which burdened the Dialogue in the past?”¹²

In the Mediterranean and Middle East region NATO is inaccurately but widely equated to the United States. The tendency persists in this region to hold Washington responsible for Israeli policy and, more broadly, for the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For those holding these views, dialogue and cooperation with NATO may seem like a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. Similarly, regional observers who blame Washington and London for the intervention in Iraq and the continuing conflict in that country may be reluctant to cooperate with NATO. To a lesser degree, regional frustrations with European Union immigration and aid policies may affect views on working with NATO, because nineteen European nations are members of both organizations.

The Alliance’s policy on applying for participation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative could in some cases discourage applicants. In a paragraph entitled “geographic scope of the initiative” (which included no definition of the region),¹³ the Allies stated that “the initiative could be opened to all interested countries in the region who subscribe to the aim and content of this initiative, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . Each interested country

¹² Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech in Algiers, 25 November 2004.

¹³ The absence of any definition of “the broader Middle East region” in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative may have been deliberate, owing in part to the global nature of security challenges such as terrorism. It might be mutually advantageous for Indonesia, Pakistan, and other countries to participate in certain ICI-related discussions and activities.

would be considered by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis and on its own merit.”¹⁴

The requirement for Mediterranean and Middle Eastern nations to apply to the North Atlantic Council to be accepted for participation might dissuade some governments from expressing interest. Given the distrust in the region toward former colonial powers and toward the United States as Israel’s chief supporter and the leading organizer of the intervention in Iraq (plus the widespread ignorance and suspicion about NATO and Western intentions), some nations might have reservations about being obliged to petition the Alliance for acceptance and approval.

This approval is intended to lead, according to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, to bilateral agreements between the Alliance and specific regional governments: “The Alliance would engage these countries, on a 26+1 basis, to develop and execute agreed work plans.”¹⁵ The bilateral approach, consisting of agreements between the Alliance and specific nations, facilitates self-differentiation, with each nation able to pursue as many cooperative activities with NATO as is mutually acceptable. This has been one of the guiding principles of Partnership for Peace since its initiation in 1994.¹⁶

Despite the attention devoted to national cooperation plans with NATO, Partnership for Peace has also helped to foster multinational cooperation among small groups of countries, notably in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. To what extent is this model replicable in the Middle East? It would probably be difficult to extend the model to the Mediterranean and Middle East region, because the incentives for cooperation are different. Several PfP members were eager to demonstrate that they had resolved ethnic and border conflicts with their neighbors because they wished to gain membership in NATO and the European Union. Furthermore, aside from the economic, political, and security advantages of membership in NATO and the EU, many PfP members had an additional motive for cooperation: a determination to gain recognition for their political identity as part of the West.¹⁷ Since

¹⁴ Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, *NATO Policy Document*, 9 July 2004, paragraph 8.

¹⁵ Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, *op. cit.*, paragraph 10.

¹⁶ The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative share other principles with Partnership for Peace, including complementarity, co-responsibility, and non-discrimination (that is, an activity made available by the Alliance to one participating country is offered to all participants).

¹⁷ This may have been what Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary General, had in mind when he said that “Partnership for Peace developed in a largely European context. It therefore cannot be

there is no prospect of membership in NATO or the EU, and no interest in most of these countries in obtaining recognition as part of the West,¹⁸ these incentives for cooperation with NATO (or with neighbors under NATO auspices) are not present.

In view of the obstacles to promoting the development of a security system in this region, the Allies and their eventual partners in programs of cooperation beyond the Mediterranean Dialogue need to recognize the limits to what might be achieved in the foreseeable future and be careful not to raise excessive expectations. NATO cannot eliminate the mutual antagonisms in the Mediterranean and Middle East region, and in the foreseeable future it can probably play no more than a supporting role in the steps toward improved understanding and security cooperation that the countries in this region are themselves prepared to take.

Conclusion: The Imperative of Pursuing International Security Cooperation

The Alliance cannot foster the establishment of an organization for international security cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East in its own image because the political requisites for such a parallel structure are absent. Moreover, there are significant obstacles to pursuing the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and achieving useful results.

However, the economic and security stakes for the nations in this region and the Alliance are so substantial that it is imperative to implement lessons from NATO's efforts to promote international stability and cooperation, notably via Partnership for Peace, to the maximum extent possible.

The ambitious "illustrative menu" of possible practical activities outlined in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative includes advice on defense reform and planning and civil-military relations; military-to-military activities to promote interoperability, including exercises, training, and participation in NATO-led peace support operations; counter-terrorist

applied as a whole to a region which has particularities of its own." Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech in Algiers, 25 November 2004.

¹⁸ Turkey has, of course, been a member of the Alliance since 1952, and it is expected eventually to become a member of the European Union. Turkey's position is exceptional on various grounds, including its status as the only Middle Eastern country with territory in Europe. Israel is the only other country in the region that might be classified as part of "the West."

information-sharing and maritime cooperation, including participation in Operation Active Endeavor; contributing to Alliance efforts concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means; border security cooperation; and civil emergency planning and response capabilities.

This menu suggests that the Allies agreed (a) that NATO's efforts must not duplicate or complicate the efforts pursued by the European Union or other organizations and (b) that the ICI should focus on "practical activities where NATO can add value."¹⁹ A sign of the potential utility of these efforts came in November 2004, when the Mediterranean Dialogue nations agreed to enhance counter-terrorist intelligence exchanges.²⁰

The Alliance is most likely to prove to be the right instrument for cooperation with nations of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in areas in which it has unique expertise and experience, notably in multilateral military planning, exercises, and operations. Such activities could promote interoperability, build confidence, diminish mutual ignorance and suspicion, and contribute to countering terrorism and other security threats. In addition to countering specific threats, national governments have a general interest in enhancing their forces and equipment and mastering operational skills with a view to conducting missions on a national or multilateral basis. In other words, the prospective participants in Mediterranean Dialogue and/or Istanbul Cooperation Initiative activities, within and outside the Alliance, have genuine common interests that may motivate them to work within the constraints outlined above and to try to surmount the various obstacles to effective teamwork.

Some observers have noted that, in addition to unique expertise and experience, the Alliance may also have an exceptional political status that could enable it to function as an "honest broker" and peace-maker in the Middle East. According to Chris Donnelly:

"NATO's role in the International Security Assistance Force [in Afghanistan] could provide a model applicable to Iraq and even, in time, to helping resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. . . . An "honest broker"

¹⁹ Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, op. cit., paragraph 5.

²⁰ Associated Press, "NATO steps up Mideast ties," *International Herald Tribune*, 18 November 2004.

is needed, trusted by both sides, which can help negotiate and then enforce a sophisticated security package. The United States cannot do this, nor can Europe, as neither is seen as impartial. However far-fetched this might seem at the moment, NATO is probably the only institution that could tackle this problem in the next few years.”²¹

To date, however, the Allies have not expressed any willingness to seek such responsibilities. Indeed, in the policy document on the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Allies declared that these responsibilities remain in the hands of other institutions and nations: “Full and speedy implementation of the Quartet Road Map is a key element in international efforts to promote a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which Israel and Palestine live side by side in peace and security.”²² Some of the main obstacles to NATO accepting a leading role as an “honest broker” and peace-enforcer in the Middle East reside within the Alliance itself. In the foreseeable future, several Allies are likely to remain wary of committing their political credit and military capabilities to such an endeavor. Moreover, some Allies may have doubts about the Alliance’s ability to reach a consensus consistent with their national objectives concerning international order in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

²¹ Chris Donnelly, “Building a NATO Partnership for the Greater Middle East,” *NATO Review*, Spring 2004.

²² Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, op. cit., 9 July 2004, paragraph 2. The Middle East Quartet, organized by the United States in 2001-2002, consists of the European Union, the Russian Federation, the United Nations, and the United States.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SHAPING THE PERCEPTION OF SECURITY THE ISRAELI CASE

Mossi RAZ¹

Writers, journalists, filmmakers and others have in the past influenced the Israeli perception of security, but the most influential were the extra-parliamentary protest movements. Movements such as *Peace Now*, *Four Mothers*, *The Council for Peace and Security*, *The Judea and Samaria Council* and *Baltam* (the movement for the rights of soldiers in the army reserves) have had an enormous influence on the shaping of the Israeli perception of security.

The first and most influential was *Peace Now*, which had a major sway on shaping the Israeli perception of security in a number of instances since its establishment in 1978. The great amount of information that the movement amassed regarding events in the occupied territories more than once caused members of the Knesset and the government to turn to me in order to obtain this information.

The *Peace Now* movement was established in 1978 after 348 officers in the army reserves signed a letter to the then-Prime Minister of Israel, Menahem Begin, calling on him to prefer peace over control of the occupied territories. Thus a year later the government (whose head had promised prior to the elections that not even one centimeter of land in the Sinai would be ceded and that when he retired he would go to live in the *Neot Sinai* settlement) decided to withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula in exchange for a peace agreement with Egypt.

This was a revolution in the perception of security, whereby in the course of only a few months public pressure caused the State of Israel to withdraw from the occupied area of Sinai, which was twice the size of

¹ Jewish-Arab Center for Peace, Israel.

the area of the sovereign State of Israel. Not only this, the Minister of Defense in the early seventies, Moshe Dayan, who was the personification of Israeli security, had always stated that, in terms of security, control of the Sinai was preferable to a peace agreement.

In later history as well, *Peace Now* had a significant influence, in labeling the settlements in the occupied territories as the main obstacle to achieving peace and security. Years later this influence can be seen on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's proposed disengagement plan, for a unilateral withdrawal from the settlements. Another significant influence of the movement was in its running a multi-year campaign for the recognition of the PLO and efforts towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. When the movement began this campaign, there was widespread general opposition to the idea within the Israeli public and in the defense establishment, but today there is general agreement – both in the population at large as well as within the defense establishment.

Here indeed is a non-parliamentary movement of civil society which influences the viewpoint on security, and goes as far as suggesting the establishment of a future state and a geopolitical change entailing a two-thirds reduction in the size of the country.

Another movement, which had great influence on the Israeli outlook on security, is the *Four Mothers* movement. During the years of the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, there was widespread public agreement and complete unanimity in respect of the defense establishment, as well as a lack of international pressure to end it. It was only 14 years after the beginning of the occupation that the *Four Mothers* movement was created, consisting mainly of mothers of soldiers, and within a very few years, it completely changed the perception of security of the State of Israel regarding the occupation of Lebanon. The movement's struggle caused a full and unilateral withdrawal by Israel from Lebanon, four years after the establishment of the movement. The international community also took part in this change in perception and the United Nations imposed on the State of Israel the location of the new border, on which it constructed a fence.

The *Four Mothers* movement is a classic example of a small movement (as opposed to the massive *Peace Now*) initiated by women, which caused a geopolitical change in the Middle East.

Another much more up-to-date example is *The Council for Peace and Security*. This Council is made up of hundreds of senior reserve

officers, which in recent years has advanced the peace process. The Council appealed to the High Court of Justice this year against the route of the security fence, stating that construction of the fence is justified only if it is on the Green Line, the border between Israel and the occupied territories, and in that case would also afford more security.

The High Court decided to accept most of the claims of the Council and invalidated the plan to build the fence beyond the Green Line in the occupied territories.

This is an example of an organization in civil society, using the professional expertise of its members (security) and the High Court to change the perception of security of the country on its eastern border, based on the fence.

Another good example of civil society's influence on shaping the perception of security can be found on the other side of the political map in Israel – in the Judea and Samaria Council. The Judea and Samaria Council is comprised of the settlers in the territories. The settlement of Israelis in the territories is generally accompanied by an initiative of civil society, sometimes with government approval and sometimes without. The first settlements (*Merom Golan* and *Kfar Etzion*) began as a civil society initiative which received government approval, as did the settlements which came later, some of which have not yet received government approval even today.

Every settlement founded, influenced the perception of security twice: first, in that military forces were attached to it in order to defend it, and second, in that the perception of the map of the permanent agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians changed as a result of the establishment of the settlements. Not only the Israelis but also an official delegation of the Palestinians proposed at the Taba talks in 2001 to adopt a map of the permanent agreement in which a part of the occupied territories where the settlers make up most of the population, would remain under Israeli control.

The last example I would like to introduce from the Israeli context is the *Baltan* movement. This movement is made up of soldiers in the reserves who are struggling for the economic rights of reserve soldiers. A number of the movement's demands have been accepted, but much more significant is the fact that as a result of this activity, the Israeli defense establishment came to understand that it must change the basic standpoint on security, whereby the State of Israel and the Israel Defense

Forces rely on the reserve forces, to an understanding in which greater reliance is placed on regular forces and the reliance on reserve forces decreases.

The fact that in the past civil society organizations in Israel have succeeded in changing its borders, in determining where soldiers will be sent, in influencing the route of the security fence and in changing the conception of reliance on reserve forces, proves that civil society has a major role in shaping the perception of security, and it is only proper that it continues to play this role in the future as well.

Civil society in Israel, with the appropriate organizations, can continue to shape the perception of security in the future too. Civil society must influence the Israeli Establishment, so that it will end the state of war with the Arab countries and especially Syria and Lebanon, by means of signing a peace agreement, and sign a peace agreement with the Palestinians, such as the Geneva Initiative (another excellent example of civil society activity on a bi-national basis).

Civil society in Israel can also influence the State of Israel and the Palestinian state to arise, to become regular members of the expanding European Union, as well as of NATO. Such membership could increase the security of Israelis and Palestinians in general, and of all nations in the region in particular.

LE ROLE DU MOUVEMENT ISLAMISTE ET DU MOUVEMENT *AMAZIGH* DANS LA PERCEPTION DE L'OCCIDENT AU MAROC

Mikael BENSADOUN¹

*«Le Maroc ressemble à un arbre dont les racines nourricières plongent profondément dans la terre d'Afrique, et qui respire grâce au feuillage bruissant aux vents d'Europe».*² Cette métaphore du Roi Hassan II exprime l'idée d'une communauté de destin qui unirait le Maroc et l'Europe. La situation géographique du Maghreb, l'Occident du monde arabe, et son histoire font de lui le pays musulman le plus proche de l'Europe et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Mais, si le Maroc respire les vents d'Europe, son cœur est en Orient, un Orient qui tend aujourd'hui à se définir par opposition à un Occident perçu par beaucoup comme l'ennemi du moment. Amour et haine, fascination et ressentiment lient et délient le Maroc et l'Occident.

Depuis l'intronisation de Mohammed VI, le 30 juillet 1999, la société civile jouit d'une certaine liberté d'expression et d'action qui rend particulièrement intéressante l'analyse de nouveaux discours sur l'Occident. La menace de la mondialisation, les échecs de l'Etat-nation et l'évolution du contexte géopolitique international ont radicalisé la société marocaine et les perceptions islamistes de l'Occident sont devenues dominantes sans que la monarchie puisse lutter contre ce développement. Pour autant, d'autres acteurs de la société civile dont le mouvement des droits de l'homme, les mouvements féministes ou le mouvement berbère dit mouvement *amazigh*, s'opposent à cette radicalisation des esprits. Ces groupes ont une perception tout autre de l'Occident si bien qu'on peut parler d'un choc de civilisation interne.

¹ Chercheur à l'Université Bar Ilan, Tel Aviv, Israël.

² Hassan II, *Le Défi*, Albin Michel, Paris, 1976, p 189.

Nous analyserons l'influence de deux mouvements dans la formation des perceptions de l'Occident au Maroc. Ces deux mouvements antagonistes sont le mouvement islamiste et le mouvement *amazigh* qui défend les droits des autochtones berbères.

Les mouvements islamistes et l'Occident: “la radicalisation des esprits”

Les cinq années du règne de Mohammed VI ont rendu les islamismes marocains beaucoup plus visibles et influents. Si la mouvance islamiste marocaine est fragmentée politiquement, elle est relativement unie dans son rejet de l'Occident. Ce rejet s'exprime à trois niveaux: par une critique radicale de la culture occidentale; par un rapport ambigu à la démocratie; par la conviction que le monde occidental est en croisade contre l'Islam.

Critique de la culture occidentale

La critique islamiste de la culture occidentale est bien connue. Pour les islamistes, le Maroc serait encore sous le joug de la colonisation culturelle occidentale. L'Occident pourrirait la société marocaine en exportant ses valeurs décadentes: la laïcité, le scepticisme, l'individualisme et le matérialisme. Avec la complicité des élites marocaines, l'Occident mécréant diffuserait des valeurs et des pratiques de la '*jahiliya*', à savoir de l'époque pré-islamique.

Les premières années du règne de Mohammed VI ont été marquées par une série d'interventions islamistes visant à lutter contre l'occidentalisation de la société. Les mouvements islamistes s'opposèrent par exemple à l'organisation de festivals populaires, à la diffusion des œuvres du cinéaste marocain Nabil Ayouché 'victime de son éducation française' ou à la promotion de 'valeurs de débauche' par les centres culturels étrangers. Avant les attentats de Casablanca du 16 mai 2003, la pression islamiste fut souvent efficace, comme l'atteste la condamnation de 14 jeunes marocains adeptes du hard-rock en mars 2003. Pour les islamistes, ces jeunes sont des adorateurs de Satan et méritent donc d'être condamnés.

Si les islamistes rejettent certains aspects de la culture occidentale, ils ont une perception plus nuancée des avancées technologiques, du respect des libertés ou de la démocratie occidentale.

Islamisme, modernité et démocratie

Ils se disent attachés à une certaine idée de la modernité, une modernité islamisée. Ce qui constitue un paradoxe pour Samuel Huntington n'en est pas un pour le cheikh Yassine, le maître à penser de l'islamisme marocain. Pour Yassine, la vocation de son mouvement est d'islamiser la modernité et non pas de moderniser l'Islam dont l'essence n'est pas modifiable. Les mouvements islamistes disent promouvoir une modernité à visage humain, une modernité islamisée sensible au sort des déshérités et des laissés-pour-compte de la mondialisation.

Quant à l'idéal démocratique, il n'est pas rejeté de manière catégorique. Les islamistes sont confrontés à un sérieux dilemme. D'une part, ils ne peuvent se permettre d'assumer leur penchant liberticide, voire totalitaire, alors même qu'ils se posent en défenseurs des libertés face à des régimes non-démocratiques. Mais d'autre part, ils ne peuvent accepter la séparation du religieux et du politique qui sous-tend l'idée démocratique. Tout en rejetant la laïcité, Yassine dit adhérer à certaines valeurs démocratiques d'essence musulmane comme la justice, la dignité, la libération de l'homme, la consultation du peuple (*shura*) ou le respect du pluralisme.

En règle générale, lorsque l'application de la *sharia* est incompatible avec le respect des droits de l'homme, la loi religieuse est privilégiée. Ainsi, les mouvements islamistes ont été les plus farouches opposants à la réforme de la *moudawanna*, code du statut personnel, qui détermine le droit des femmes. Le 12 mars 2000, les islamistes organisèrent une manifestation d'opposition à la réforme qui rassembla des centaines de milliers de manifestants à Casablanca. Ils appelèrent au *djihad* contre les "gauchistes", complices "des ennemis des Arabes et de l'Islam". Sous la formidable pression des islamistes soutenus par les *ouléma*³ et le ministre des *habbous*⁴, Mohammed VI fut contraint de battre en retraite.

³ Docteurs de la foi (ndlr).

⁴ Biens religieux (ndlr).

Les islamistes marocains ne craignent plus de révéler leur véritable puissance: l'Islam ou le déluge.

Le choc des civilisations

Le contexte politique de l'après 11 septembre est très favorable à la diffusion des perceptions islamistes de l'Occident. Jusqu'aux attentats de 2003, les sentiments anti-occidentaux se sont exprimés avec une liberté et une virulence sans précédent. Les jihadistes salafistes assumaient publiquement leur soutien à Ben Laden à l'image du Cheikh Abou Hafs, imam et jeune leader de la *Salafya Djihadya*. Dans une interview accordée au journal Maroc-Hebdo en novembre 2002, celui-ci déclarait que Ben Laden donne *“une leçon à tous les mécréants qui ont torturé et tué des musulmans à travers le monde. (...) Tuer un mécréant n'est pas un crime. C'est du djihad!”*⁵

Si une large majorité de Marocains considèrent les attentats du 11 septembre comme moralement injustifiables, ils sont nombreux, à l'image de Nadia Yassine, fille du cheikh et égérie de l'islamisme marocain, à comprendre les terroristes:

*“C'est en soutenant les tyrannies les plus ignobles, après avoir déstabilisé les populations colonisées et les avoir appauvri, avilies, fragmentées, 'déculturées', que l'Occident a poussé ce renouveau qui est un destin naturel du monde musulman vers des dérives dangereuses pour tous. (...) Ben Laden a fait son coup au nom de l'Islam certes, mais beaucoup auraient souhaité manifester leur colère au nom du malaise généré par tant de puissance et d'ignorance de l'autre.”*⁶

La guerre contre le terrorisme menée par les Etats-Unis renforce l'image d'un Occident arrogant et dominateur. Sous l'influence islamiste, les sentiments anti-occidentaux et l'antisémitisme atteignent des proportions inédites dans le Maroc contemporain. Selon un sondage effectué en mars 2004⁷, 45% des Marocains voient d'un œil favorable Ben Laden, 92% ont une opinion négative des Juifs et 73% n'apprécient pas les Chrétiens.

⁵ Interview du *Maroc-Hebdo*, n° 531, 1-7 novembre 2002.

⁶ Nadia Yassine, *Toutes Voiles dehors*, éditions Le Fennec, Casablanca, p. 11.

⁷ Sondage du Pew Research Center.

Comment expliquer cette haine de l'Autre? Si une partie de la société marocaine est encline à adhérer aux idéaux islamistes, c'est que la monarchie l'y a bien préparé. L'Etat a toujours utilisé les conflits moyen-orientaux à des fins de politique intérieure si bien que la défense du peuple palestinien et la haine d'Israël mobilisent davantage que n'importe quel enjeu de politique intérieure. Il a contribué à la diffusion de mythes et de fantasmes dont il paie aujourd'hui le prix. Après la révolution islamique iranienne, Hassan II a choisi d'encourager la pénétration du wahabbisme dans les mosquées et les écoles du Royaume afin de légitimer son pouvoir religieux et affaiblir l'islamisme marocain.

Le sociologue Mohammed El Ayadi a analysé les effets de cette politique sur les consciences marocaines⁸. Il cite par exemple les manuels d'éducation islamique qui présentent les musulmans comme les victimes d'une conspiration judéo-chrétienne visant à affaiblir leur foi dans l'Islam et à faire régner l'athéisme. L'idéologie islamiste pénètre non seulement la société mais également le cœur de l'Etat, ses écoles et ses mosquées.

Face au fondamentalisme d'Etat et aux mouvements islamistes, des groupes résistent, notamment en produisant un tout autre discours sur l'Occident. Le mouvement berbère/*amazigh* en fait partie.

Le mouvement *amazigh* et l'Occident

Qu'il s'agisse de leur narration de l'histoire du Maroc, de leur conception de l'identité nationale marocaine ou de leurs positions concernant les grands enjeux de politique étrangère, les intellectuels *amazigh* élaborent un discours original plutôt favorable à l'Occident dont certains éléments sont aujourd'hui repris par la monarchie.

Le récit *amazigh* de l'histoire du Maroc

Pour les intellectuels de ce mouvement, la reconnaissance de l'identité *amazigh* du Maroc est un moyen de mettre fin à sa schizophrénie culturelle. Reconnaître "l'amazighité" du Maroc, ce serait réconcilier le Maroc avec lui-même, avec sa mémoire et son identité. Le peuple marocain serait un peuple amnésique ou plutôt "*un peuple qui*

⁸ Bourquia, Rahma, M. El Ayadi, M. El Harras, et H. Rachik, *Les jeunes et les valeurs religieuses*, éditions Eddif, Casablanca, 2000.

aurait la mémoire des autres peuples, les peuples arabo-islamiques du Moyen-Orient.”⁹

Pour lutter contre cette amnésie, les historiens berbères écrivent une nouvelle histoire du Maroc qui remet en question certains mythes fondateurs de la Nation et rend possible une relation moins conflictuelle à l’Occident. Selon le récit *amazigh*, les Berbères ont toujours lutté contre les invasions d’origine occidentale ou orientale, tout en intégrant certains éléments de civilisations étrangères. Méditerranéens par excellence, ils ont su s’enrichir des valeurs portées par les trois monothéismes et créer une identité hybride assumée. Les Berbères sont devenus des serviteurs de l’Islam, mais de leur Islam, un Islam national tourné vers la Méditerranée et l’Occident. Selon Rachid Raha, rédacteur en chef du journal *Le monde amazigh*, le Maroc doit son âge d’or andalou au génie des dynasties berbères:

*“Au Moyen Age, ce sont les Berbères qui sont à l’origine de l’islamisation presque totale de l’Afrique du Nord, après avoir été préparés au monothéisme par les chrétiens amazigh donatistes et les enseignements de saint Augustin. Ils ont créé de grands empires qui régnaient jusqu’au Nord de l’Espagne, comme les Almoravides et les Almohades, développant toute une civilisation exemplaire de raffinement, de sciences, de lettres et de philosophie en Andalousie.”*¹⁰.

La décadence du Maroc serait due à la colonisation arabe. Dans le *Manifeste amazigh* du 1^{er} mars 2000, document révolutionnaire signé par plus de 200 intellectuels berbères, Mohammed Chafik, autorité intellectuelle du mouvement, oppose les pratiques despotiques des élites orientales à celles des Berbères épris de liberté et de démocratie.

Une nouvelle identité nationale

L’objectif affiché du mouvement est de construire un nouvel Etat marocain: un Etat fédéral démocratique qui reconnaîtrait le pluralisme culturel et linguistique du Maroc. Le Maroc devrait s’inspirer de pays occidentaux comme l’Espagne, la Suisse, la Belgique et le Canada afin de

⁹ Mohammed Boudhan, *Quand un intellectuel a peur de son patronyme*, Tawiza, avril 2004.

¹⁰ Rachid Raha, *Le mouvement amazigh du Maroc exige la réforme de la Constitution*, Communication à la plénière du Forum Social Européen dédiée aux Berbères, Paris, 15 novembre 2003.

gérer ses divisions ethniques. Les intellectuels *amazigh* défendent une nouvelle idée de la citoyenneté marocaine qui suscite la colère des mouvements islamistes. Pour Yassine, le mouvement *amazigh* est un mouvement laïc qui menace l'identité musulmane du Maroc: *“Et voilà que Kossaila, le chevalier jahilite qui a combattu les musulmans devint symbole et bannière et non Tariq le conquérant. Et voilà que ‘l’amazighité’ politique devint la référence et non l’Islam. Et voilà que l’Amazigh ‘musulman’ donna comme noms à sa progéniture ‘Kossaila’ et ‘Kahina’.”*¹¹. En réponse à Yassine, Chafik défend un Islam rationnel et individualiste, compatible avec les valeurs universelles que porte l'identité *amazigh*. Pour lui, l'Afrique du Nord a su produire des esprits rationnels comme ceux de Ibn Ruchd ou de Ibn Khaldun, parce qu'elle est intellectuellement proche de l'Occident¹². Ces idées influencent le discours officiel qui présente l'Islam marocain comme un Islam tolérant, ouvert au dialogue avec les autres civilisations.

Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, certains intellectuels comme Myriam Demnati ou Ahmed Assid vont plus loin et défendent une idéologie laïque, faite d'ataturkisme et de multiculturalisme. La laïcité et le rejet des idéologies orientales constitueraient une solution aux maux de la société marocaine, dont le terrorisme.

Le mouvement *amazigh* et les grands enjeux de politique étrangère

Les intellectuels *amazigh* fustigent la solidarité systématique des 'arabo-islamistes' envers 'l'Orient despotique' et leur indifférence face à la souffrance d'autres peuples non arabes, y compris le leur.

Certains intellectuels radicaux appellent le Maroc à se détacher du monde arabe. Le Maroc échapperait ainsi à un déterminisme culturel qui l'empêcherait de se moderniser et de se démocratiser. Pour Mohammed Boudhan, rédacteur en chef du journal *Amazigh Tawiza*, si l'élite makhzénienne est incapable de développer le pays, c'est parce que, *“elle puise son idéologie et ses principes dans la grande source de stagnation qu'est l'Orient arabe (...). Pourquoi continuer à être au*

¹¹ Hassan Aourid, *Le substrat culturel des mouvements de contestation au Maroc. Analyse des discours islamiste et amazigh*. Thèse de doctorat d'Etat, Université Mohammed V, Rabat, 1999, p. 397.

¹² Ibid. p. 277.

service des arabo-musulmans quand ces derniers ne sont même pas reconnaissants des services que le Maroc amazigh leur rend? (...) Qu'a-t-on gagné de cet attachement irrationnel et irréaliste envers l'Orient arabo-musulman? L'intégrisme, le terrorisme, le fanatisme, la misogynie, l'irrationalisme, le sous-développement, l'analphabétisme, la généralisation de la corruption et la violence du 16 mai 2003."¹³

Des intellectuels *amazigh* radicaux renversent la critique des nationalistes salafistes qui considéraient la culture berbère comme un obstacle au développement et à la promotion d'un Islam éclairé. Les Berbères seraient les nouveaux Modernes et les arabo-islamistes, les Anciens, condamnés à la stagnation. Comme les Kurdes irakiens, les Berbères seraient des agents de démocratisation et de modernisation et donc, des partenaires potentiels pour la construction d'un nouveau Moyen-Orient respectueux de ses minorités.

Conclusion

Malgré l'existence de voix démocratiques, la société marocaine impatiente se réfugie dans le fondamentalisme. Comment faire en sorte que l'arbre marocain respire vraiment "des feuillages bruissant des vents d'Occident" ou tout du moins, que les vents d'Occident ne soient pas perçus comme une menace déstabilisatrice? Tout changement doit venir de l'intérieur, de l'Etat et de la société civile.

Une réforme profonde du système éducatif peut contribuer à une meilleure connaissance de l'Occident. Pour Pierre Vermeren, historien de l'Afrique du Nord, "*la politique scolaire d'arabisation et de déminage de la pensée critique a peuplé peu à peu les lycées et universités de sympathisants ou de militants gagnés aux idées de l'islamisme, à l'unisson des jeunesses arabes focalisées par l'Intifada, la victoire du djihad afghan et la figure de Saddam Hussein.*"¹⁴ A l'Etat de donner davantage la parole aux défenseurs d'une interprétation libérale de l'Islam et de se réformer pour promouvoir démocratie et développement.

¹³ Mohammed Boudhan, op. cit.

¹⁴ Pierre Vermeren, *Maghreb : la démocratie impossible?*, Paris, Fayard, 2004, p. 296.

Le Maroc est aujourd'hui un pays déchiré entre Orient et Occident et la promotion d'un Islam marocain libéral peut aider le Maroc à assumer cette double appartenance.

Quant à l'Occident, ses moyens d'action sont limités. Il est évident qu'une résolution du conflit israélo-palestinien et la mise en œuvre d'une politique étrangère occidentale moins cynique au Moyen-Orient pourraient contribuer à apaiser les esprits mais ces changements ne suffiront pas à anéantir l'islamisme radical. Un Occident uni pourrait renforcer les forces démocratiques du pays et surtout, contribuer à lutter contre le sous-développement dont se nourrit l'islamisme marocain.

WE KNOW WHAT TO DO

Mohammad DARAWSHE¹

The last few years have proved to be a true challenge for *Givat Haviva*, the leading Israeli institute for peace education. The huge rift that was opened during the October 2000 events was deeper than it felt at the time. Those events left a scar on the notion of coexistence, making it sound like a negative term. For the Palestinian Israelis it meant a subordinate relationship, which they did not want to continue, while for the Jewish Israelis it meant a betrayal of friendship.

Jewish-Arab relations before the October 2000 events were a mix of positive progress and difficult socio-political differences. The events revealed how fragile these relations were, and they forced us – the staff of the Jewish Arab Center for Peace at *Givat Haviva* – to reexamine each and every one of the projects we were conducting.

Already at the beginning, during the staff meetings, we realized that coexistence cannot be based on cultural exchange, nor can it be sustained by working with youth only. It was also obvious that true coexistence will never be properly achieved amongst non-equals. This realization led us to restructure the programs so as to include discussions on the hard political topics, expand the range of participants focusing on leadership training that would have a multiplying effect, and push forward the empowerment projects of the Arab community in Israel in an attempt to contribute to the search for civic equality.

These days our programs feature art workshops for children who have problems in verbal communication - using the arts as a tool to

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dialogue, twinning Jewish and Arab classrooms so that they can get a chance to learn about the two historic versions of the conflict, hoping to promote a shared and deep understanding of the conflict as well as learning each other's language and develop common civic values. With high school students we still feature the face-to-face program, which starts as a confrontational encounter and ends up examining possible avenues for living together as different citizens of the same state. One of the newest projects for junior high and high school students is the Student Councils Program, working with the elected student bodies on issues of identity and civic responsibilities.

We found that we needed to expand our support for the students when they return to their home environments, which are critical and sometimes hostile to these encounters, and we started a variety of projects training teachers and community leaders to also become anchors of the idea of Jewish-Arab dialogue and partnership.

The principle of empowerment and self-help training programs became a new highlight in our activities. In partnership with the Arab Mayors Council we are conducting a variety of courses for municipal executives to improve the level of skills and professional management offered by these service authorities. Among the target staff are the top executives, including directors, spokespersons, and advisors on women's affairs, accountants, town planners and educators.

The holistic approach of working with youth, community leaders and on empowerment projects, while at the same time focusing on regions including the Triangle, the North and the Negev, helps us to reach new and influential audiences, and promises to result in better relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel.

Our biggest challenge today is to replicate our work many times over, and this requires assistance from government authorities and the international community to allocate the needed funding for this outreach program.

ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF THE WEST

Issandr EL AMRANI¹

Arab perceptions of the West are a theme that has become an important topic of discussion in the international press, in policymaking circles and in academia. It has been linked to Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and the effort to combat it, and the lack of democracy in the Middle East. American commentators have especially been prone to ask the question “Why do they hate us?” while Europeans, who live amidst large Arab immigrant communities, intensified their concern about the possibility that Islamist radicals were operating in their countries. In America and Europe, some intellectuals called at times for a greater understanding of the Arab world, while others spoke of an Arab mentality that is dominated by nationalism and religious fundamentalism and of the need for radical change in the region.

As a journalist working mostly for Western organizations, I spent for the past four years in writing what we call “reaction” articles. Whenever something happened in the region or around the world – such as the invasion of Iraq, Israeli military operations in the West Bank, the banning of headscarves in French schools or the recent US elections – my editors wanted to know what the Arab reaction was or, in other words, what the Arabs thought of the West. Of course, since the events that the reactions were based on tended to be negative for Arabs, the articles I and many other journalists wrote tended to be about angry Arabs, disappointed Arabs, Arabs swearing revenge, Arabs burning American or British flags, and Arabs generally with an antagonistic view of the West, Western policies and Western ideas. This has contributed over the past few years to a perception that Arabs are constantly angry with the West,

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that what some scholars have called a “clash of civilizations” is taking place between the Arab world and the West.

President Bush, perhaps the most unpopular American president in history for the Arab world (although it should be noted that the Bush administration has also been unpopular in many European countries and elsewhere around the world) has stressed that his administration would strive to win the battle “for the hearts and minds” of the Arab world, an objective in which the administration has thus far failed despite spending considerable sums of money on satellite TV channels, radio stations, and other forms of media that show a more positive image of America than local media does.

The same administration has also argued that these steps were necessary because Arab media was so biased against the US and so deaf to American attempts to explain that US policy in the Middle East was really for the benefit of Arabs. One particular channel became a target of the administration for its coverage of the aftermath of 9/11 and the Iraq war: *Al Jazeera*. It stands accused, depending on whom you talk to, of being a propaganda station for *Al Qaeda*, of being anti-American and biased in its reporting, of being anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic, and in Spain one of its correspondent is regularly arrested on terrorism-related charges. And that’s just in the West. Because in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco among other Arab countries, it’s seen as an anti-government troublemaker, in Palestine it is accused of normalization for interviewing Israelis, while the Iraqi insurgency and Abu Musab Al Zargawi have called it a tool of American propaganda. As the saying goes, if you’re upsetting that many people, you must be doing something right.

In any case, *Al Jazeera* is not unique anymore in the Arab world – there are now many other satellite stations and even government-owned TV stations that have begun, in some countries, to have more serious coverage of the region. But it remains very good at what it does and symbolic of a relatively recent phenomenon of serious television coverage of regional events targeted at an Arab audience.

It is true that *Al Jazeera* and other Arab television stations often depict events in a highly emotional, manipulative way. But at the same time, there is no denying that what has happened in Iraq or in Palestine over the past few years is, for lack of a better word, horrible. The images of war, or even worse, torture such as what took place in Abu Ghraib had a powerful emotional impact on the Arab world and beyond. These

images have probably caused an increase in anti-Western sentiment in the Arab world. But blaming it on the images or their messenger serves no purpose: the events they describe are all too real. As Human Rights Watch noted at the time: *“Rather than advance the war on terror, the widespread prisoner abuse has damaged efforts to build global support for countering terrorism. Indeed, each new photo of an American soldier humiliating an Iraqi could be considered a recruiting poster for al-Qaeda. Policies adopted to make the United States more secure from terrorism have in fact made it more vulnerable.”*

The Arab reaction to Abu Ghraib was strange, and worrying. Whereas at the beginning of the Iraq war thousands took to the streets in protest, Abu Ghraib passed by without a major public upheaval. It was as if, by confirming their worst notions about the West, the Arabs had returned to silent despair rather than public indignation.

While I do not see a trend of anti-Western sentiments arising in the Arab world – the clash of civilizations that writers such as the American political scientist Samuel Huntington predicted – I do see rising anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. In the United States, and to a lesser extent in Europe, these trends have often been interpreted as a fundamental Arab or Muslim dislike of Western values. The failure of the Oslo peace process and the second Intifada, the radicalization of Islamist discourse by Al Qaeda following the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have created a sense of gloom in the Arab world about the future of the region and the impotence of Arabs in the face of a vastly more powerful Western opponent.

This perception of a hostile West bent on dictating its wishes to the region against the desires of most of its inhabitants has also led to a perception that the West is hostile to Islam itself – that at best, it is dismissive of Islamic culture and values and at worst, Westerners would like to see Islam disappear entirely. In some ways, Arabs are much better informed about the West than Westerners are about the Arab world – perhaps because what happens in the West is much more likely to have an impact in the Arab world than vice-versa. So when right-wing columnists like Ann Coulter in America or Oriana Fallaci in Italy say that Muslims should be forced to convert to Christianity or that their value-system is barbaric, they hear about it. In this climate of suspicion, decisions by foreign governments that affect Arabs – such as France’s ban of the

Islamic veil in public schools or America's decision to impose stringent security measures, including fingerprinting, on Arab visitors – cause outrage and add fuel to a feeling of paranoia.

Speaking of paranoia, many of you know that conspiracy theories are widespread in the Arab world – such as the belief that American or Israeli secret services were behind the 9/11 attacks or that Yasser Arafat was poisoned. This is in part because of paranoia about foreign intervention and partly the result of the lack of solid information Arabs generally have about what goes on in their region, where many important decisions are taken behind closed doors with little transparency and generally no public debate or consultation. Political rumors flourish in this atmosphere, especially as they are often the only form of information available about critically important events.

To be fair, though, it should be remembered that conspiracies do exist – they have been part and parcel of the Arab political experience for the past hundred years. Westerners may call them mere power politics, but to Arabs they are plots in which they are the main victims. Among the bona fide grievances that Arabs have against the West are the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 between France and Great Britain, the Balfour Declaration which promised a homeland for European Jews in Palestine, the UN partition of Israel and Palestine in 1948 against Arab wishes, the 1956 tripartite invasion of Suez by Israel, Great Britain and France, the unexpectedly devastating feat of military power that Israel exhibited in its surprise attack in 1967, the bloody Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and countless other examples, some of them more valid than others. This is in addition to conspiracies within the Arab world – coups, secret agreements, covert and overt Western support for repressive regimes, underground Islamist movements, terrorist attacks, civil wars, Israeli intelligence and terror operations like the Lavon Affair in the 1950s, etc...

All of these have reinforced the feeling that the Arab world is at the mercy of powerful, generally Western, forces whose actions have a direct impact on the political life – and sometime the daily life – of Arab countries. The Arabs feel that they are not the masters of their own destiny. This is something that the great Syrian philosopher Sadik Al Azm expressed brilliantly in a recent essay: *“In the marrow of our bones, we still perceive ourselves as the subjects of history, not its objects, as its agents and not its victims. We have never acknowledged, let alone*

reconciled ourselves to, the marginality and passivity of our position in modern times. In fact, deep in our collective soul, we find it intolerable that our supposedly great nation must stand helplessly on the margins not only of modern history in general but even of our local and particular histories."

"When this unexamined, unexorcised, highly potent, and deep-seated self-image collides with the all-too-evident everyday actualities of Arab-Muslim impotence, frustration, and insignificance, especially in international relations, a host of problems emerge: massive inferiority complexes, huge compensatory delusions, wild adventurism, political recklessness, desperate violence, and, lately, large-scale terrorism of the kind we have become familiar with all over the world."

It is this feeling of inadequacy and resentment that has fueled a radical Islamist backlash against the West and all things Western and a more general weariness about the state of affairs in the Arab world.

The intellectual founder of the virulently anti-Western trend of Islamism is the thinker and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activist Sayyid Qutb, who was sentenced to death in the 1960s by the Nasser regime. Before Qutb's death – seen as martyrdom by fundamentalists across the Arab world – he wrote the quintessential text of anti-Western Islamist ideology, *Milestones*. In *Milestones* Qutb wrote of his travels in America, an experience that left him with an overwhelming feeling of disgust and dread of the modern, Western lifestyle, which he knew was already beginning to change his home country of Egypt: *"Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, not because of the danger of complete annihilation which is hanging over its head - this being just a symptom and not the real disease - but because humanity is devoid of those vital values which are necessary not only for its healthy development but also for its real progress. Even the Western world realizes that Western civilization is unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of mankind. It knows that it does not possess anything which will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence."*

But even Qutb did not reject everything about the West. *"It is necessary for the new leadership to preserve and develop the material fruits of the creative genius of Europe, and also to provide mankind with such high ideals and values as have so far remained undiscovered by*

mankind, and which will also acquaint humanity with a way of life which is harmonious with human nature, which is positive and constructive, and which is practicable."

This is the ideology that fuels *Al Qaeda* and other extremist groups. It is an ideology that has proved particularly popular among what is called in the Arab world "the Afghan Arabs" – veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union who would later form the backbone of the international Jihadist movement and train others in Chechnya, Bosnia and elsewhere. But what it is not is a populist ideology. Most people have little awareness of it and do not endorse it.

How, then, does the average Arab feel about the West? In my experience, outside of politics, popular Arab sentiment towards the West is rather positive. Moreover, politics is not a priority for most Arabs, who have far more immediate things to worry about and in any case have little political power.

Arab intellectuals, who have had their own debate about Arab reform for several decades, are understandably upset when the Western press, academic journals or politicians talk about the need for Arab reform or ask whether Islam is compatible with democracy. These debates are not new in the Arab world – see the recent Arab Human Development reports – but are currently being discussed in Western capitals as if policymakers had only recently discovered a great and urgent problem. They know it is a great and urgent problem, but resent the idea that grand policies imposed by foreign powers are going to solve it – especially when they see that the behavior of these foreign powers has not been to their benefit in the past. Nor do they think that Western values about the role of religion in society should be imposed. In this way, the Arab world is fundamentally different from the West and Europe in particular: religion plays an important role in daily life and the idea that it should inform the laws of the state is not seen as particularly radical.

But, most of all, Arabs object to Western and especially American policies in their region. The foremost objection is of course to American and European support of Israel, which in my opinion has done more to spread anti-Western feelings among Arabs than any other issue. Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute with a peace that is considered fair by the Palestinians and the Arab world at large would bring an end to

one of the biggest differences between the Arabs and the West. The fact that a pan-Arab initiative for peace offered in the Beirut Declaration, Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah's initiative, Syrian offers to resume negotiations on the Golan Heights without preconditions and the Geneva Peace accord have gone unanswered by the current Israeli administration raises doubts that Israel actually wants peace, since it is within its power to keep what it has gained since 1967 with few consequences.

But you should not take my word for it. One of the main conclusions of one of the reports I mentioned above, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press' "Global Attitudes Project" is, that while Arabs are in many cases quite positive about the West, they think that the reverse is not true: *"The people of Islamic nations also believe that Western nations do not respect Arab or Islamic values, do not support Arab causes, and do not exhibit fairness toward Arabs, Muslims, or in particular, the situation in Palestine... The people of these Islamic cultures say that the West pays little attention to their situation, does not attempt to help these countries, and makes few attempts to communicate or to create cross-cultural bridges."*

The Pew report concludes with the following remarks on what the Arab world would expect from the West: *"There are, however, strong suggestions from the Arab and Islamic side of the equation about what to do. The one cry to the West that seems to be most dominant: trust, respect and understand us. The people of the Islamic world say that the West should moderate its attitudes and exhibit less prejudice toward Arabs and Muslims, that the West should show more respect and should not underestimate the people of the Islamic world. The people of the Islamic world say that the West should increase its level of economic concern and support around the world, should moderate its stance on the Palestinian issue, should attempt more dialogue and cultural interaction, and should make much stronger attempts to understand what the Islamic religion is and what it stands for."*

In brief, the current hostility towards the West in the Arab world is largely about policy, not values. The Arab world knows that it is virtually powerless to affect Western policy in its own region. But it should not be expected to have to like it.

RAPPORT DE L'ATELIER: LE ROLE DE LA SOCIETE CIVILE DANS LA FORMATION D'INTERETS COMMUNS DE SECURITE

Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP¹

Cette session était centrée sur les images de l'Occident circulant dans le monde arabe, ainsi que sur le rôle de la société civile dans la production et la transformation potentielle de ces perceptions.

Quatre idées principales ont émergé des présentations comme de la discussion qui a suivi.

1. Entre pays du Nord et du Sud, les perceptions restent encore très négatives. Les médias arabes présentent souvent les pays du Nord comme étant potentiellement hostiles au Sud, dangereux et imprévisibles. Cependant il ne faudrait pas confondre le message et le messager: les perceptions reposent sur une part incontestable de réalité. La politique d'intervention agressive en Iraq, le soutien inconditionnel à Israël, la marginalisation de l'Iran, les attaques verbales et les sanctions contre la Syrie, la politique de double standard appliquée à la présence d'armes de destruction massive et au respect des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité renforcent globalement l'idée que la supériorité technologique du Nord se double d'intentions systématiquement malveillantes. Les médias du Nord, de leur côté, abondent en clichés anti-arabes ou anti-musulmans.

2. Les Occidentaux doivent éviter les amalgames. Les différents segments des sociétés du Sud ont des visions très contrastées de l'Occident: il faudrait pouvoir différencier ici l'appréciation des élites occidentalisées, la position, souvent ambivalente, des régimes politiques, les sentiments et ressentiments des populations rurales et des sociétés urbaines. Il existe au sein même de ces groupes des lignes de fractures et

¹ Conseiller de recherche, branche Recherche, Collège de Défense de l'OTAN, Rome.

de nombreuses nuances concernant leur perception de l'Occident. Enfin, le Nord devrait surtout relativiser: l'ensemble des populations du Sud est davantage préoccupé par la vie quotidienne que par son opposition idéologique à l'Occident.

3. Les stéréotypes, se répondant comme des miroirs réciproques et déformants, servent souvent des visées politiques, tant sur le plan intérieur que sur le plan international. Ainsi au Maroc, la position vis-à-vis de l'Occident sert d'arguments à deux discours opposés visant chacun à assurer à ses auteurs une légitimité politique. Les mouvements islamistes fondent leur légitimité religieuse, politique et sociale sur leur opposition à l'Occident. Au contraire, le discours berbère ou *amazigh*, prône un Islam ouvert à l'Occident et en particulier à l'Europe. L'enjeu premier de ces deux discours est la construction de l'identité nationale marocaine, la perception de l'Occident étant ici instrumentalisée au bénéfice d'une cause nationale. D'une façon analogue, en Occident, un "orientalisme" traditionnel, fait d'attraction et de répulsion, nourrit le cliché du "choc des civilisations" et est instrumentalisé au profit des politiques internationales.

4. La société civile a joué un rôle important dans la transformation de ces perceptions, tant par le biais des mouvements politiques et sociaux que par celui de la culture au sens large du terme. La construction d'une vision positive de l'autre, prémisses indispensables pour accepter les compromis politiques nécessaires à la résolution des conflits, passe par trois étapes, successives et étroitement liées entre elles:

- la première étape est la *connaissance* de l'autre: apprentissage des langues, connaissance de l'histoire, approfondissement de la sociologie des sociétés et communautés;
- la seconde étape est la *reconnaissance*, au sens où l'entend le philosophe Paul Ricoeur dans son dernier ouvrage, c'est-à-dire l'acceptation de la légitimité de la mémoire de l'autre, de sa construction identitaire, de sa propre perception². Cette reconnaissance ouvre naturellement la voie à la tolérance. C'est ainsi que six écrivains israéliens et six écrivains palestiniens ont écrit puis fait traduire dans les deux langues, hébreu et arabe, une histoire parallèle de la relation israélo-palestinienne à travers trois événements clés: la déclaration

² Paul Ricoeur, *Parcours de la Reconnaissance*, Stock, Paris, 2004.

Balfour, la création de l'Etat d'Israël et la première Intifada³. Il ne s'agit pas tant ici de s'entendre sur une vision commune de l'histoire, tâche impossible même pour des pays qui ne sont pas en conflit, mais plutôt de confronter deux interprétations de l'histoire, aussi scientifiques que possible. La mise en parallèle des deux discours historiques permet à chacun de percevoir ce qui a un sens pour l'autre, dans l'histoire qu'il partage avec son adversaire. Elle permet aussi à chaque partie d'identifier les points de blocage irréductibles de l'autre.

- Ces deux étapes doivent être complétées par une troisième: l'élaboration de programmes visant à *développer des valeurs et des intérêts communs*. Ainsi, le *Jewish Arab Center for Peace* s'est aperçu que le travail intellectuel de connaissance et de reconnaissance initié depuis plus de dix ans pour rapprocher les deux communautés, palestinienne et israélienne, était devenu insuffisant en période de crise aiguë. Il doit être complété par la mise en présence physique des différents acteurs, la formation des responsables locaux communautaires, le développement de projets réalisés en commun et impliquant les deux communautés dans une même citoyenneté. Cette troisième étape, essentielle, est naturellement la plus délicate. Les acteurs butent très vite sur des difficultés concrètes: jusqu'où accepter les valeurs de l'autre? Faut-il par exemple accepter que le statut personnel de la femme la laisse, comme en Algérie, dans la dépendance vis-à-vis de son mari, alors même qu'elle est juridiquement émancipée lorsqu'il s'agit de sa vie publique et professionnelle?

En tout état de cause, les participants ont conclu qu'il fallait s'efforcer de rechercher tout ce qui, dans les cultures de part et d'autre de la Méditerranée, pourrait servir à une fertilisation croisée des valeurs, le but étant de cultiver ce qui unit les communautés autour d'intérêts communs.

³ Version française: *Histoire de l'Autre*, Liana Levi, Paris, 2004.

RESUME DES TRAVAUX

La situation géopolitique actuelle est caractérisée par un réel malaise

- Du côté du Sud, déceptions et inquiétudes: essoufflement du Processus de Barcelone; déséquilibre de la politique des Etats-Unis vis-à-vis du Processus de Paix; rhétorique du Grand Moyen-Orient perçue comme anti-musulmane et anti-arabe; guerre et désordres en Iraq;
- Du côté du Nord, désaccords de fond et de forme sur la nature et les missions de l'Alliance, l'analyse de la menace et la méthode appropriée pour y répondre.

Dans ce contexte, assurer la sécurité des échanges en Méditerranée reste une préoccupation commune, tout comme la lutte contre le terrorisme; cependant il faut éviter de confondre l'Islamisme politique national avec le discours totalitaire, terroriste et déterritorialisé du Salafisme/Wahhabisme.

Chacun doit se sentir responsable de l'évolution de la situation

- Les pays arabes doivent s'engager dans la résolution du conflit Israélo-Palestinien, par exemple en proposant un statu quo stratégique rassurant Israël et en abandonnant le principe du droit au retour des réfugiés en échange d'un Etat palestinien créé selon les termes de l'Accord de Genève.
- Les pays occidentaux doivent revoir leur politique d'intervention fondée sur des critères communautaires et ethniques: en Iraq, elle empêche l'émergence de la démocratie; dans le reste de la région elle retarde la réforme de l'Islam par les Musulmans eux-mêmes; elle complique l'évolution de pays où les sociétés sont de plus en plus sécularisées alors même que la religion investit de plus en plus la scène politique.

- L'OTAN, quant à elle, doit adapter ses forces à la complexité et à la versatilité du paysage stratégique dans la région, savoir doser une approche coercitive et une approche de prévention et de dissuasion (concept de "high-low mix");
- Le Dialogue méditerranéen (et l'ICI?¹) doit cesser de conforter les régimes autoritaires de la région, au détriment de leur objectif global de démocratisation.

En 2030, la situation du Maghreb et du Moyen-Orient devrait être assez contrastée. Outre les incertitudes géopolitiques, beaucoup dépendra de l'évolution de l'OTAN et de l'Union européenne en tant qu'institutions de sécurité et de défense.

En 2030, le Maghreb pourrait avoir développé avec les pays du Nord de réels intérêts communs de sécurité

En dépit des évolutions préoccupantes des grands équilibres démographiques et environnementaux, les tensions pourraient s'apaiser. L'ancrage du Maghreb à l'Europe, sous des formes encore à déterminer, paraît un horizon plausible. Les intérêts communs de sécurité entre pays du Maghreb et entre pays du Nord et du Sud sont assez faciles à identifier mais passent par les conditions suivantes:

- que les pays du Maghreb poursuivent des efforts soutenus pour réussir leur politique actuelle de transition vers la modernité politique, sociale et économique;
- qu'ils entament une politique vigoureuse d'intégration régionale, peut-être en inventant une nouvelle relation avec l'Egypte;
- que les pays européens dynamisent leur "Politique de Voisinage" et revitalisent le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen pour soutenir les évolutions politiques, économiques et sociales.

Dans ce Maghreb transformé, l'OTAN, acteur parmi d'autres, doit jouer un rôle de soutien et de facilitateur

De l'OTAN, les pays du Maghreb attendent avant tout un rôle de soutien pour que soient réussies les adaptations nécessaires dans ce qui

¹ Initiative de Coopération d'Istanbul/Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

est vécu, par eux, comme une phase cruciale de transition. Ils rejettent toute intervention directive. Les formes que prendra ce soutien de l'OTAN devraient donc être décidées au cas par cas et de façon sectorielle. Il reste que les attentes des différents pays du Dialogue méditerranéen sont assez différenciées, à la fois quant à la nature des coopérations souhaitées et à leur intensité. L'OTAN devra veiller à ne pas contribuer à aggraver des déséquilibres régionaux.

Le Moyen-Orient en 2030 restera une région en proie à de vives tensions

Tout d'abord, beaucoup dépendra de l'évolution de trois dossiers:

- les besoins de sécurité des deux Etats voisins que seront Israël et la Palestine;
- la nécessité de gérer le nouvel équilibre régional créé par l'apparition potentielle de nouveaux acteurs nucléaires comme l'Iran;
- la construction et la stabilisation d'un nouvel Iraq.

Non résolus, ces trois dossiers continueraient à créer des lignes de fracture au Sud comme au Nord et empêcheraient le développement d'intérêts communs de sécurité entre tous les acteurs.

Par ailleurs, les tensions pour l'accès aux ressources naturelles, la démographie ainsi que le rôle central du pétrole pourraient déstabiliser la région tout en provoquant l'apparition de nouveaux acteurs, tels la Chine et l'Inde, ainsi que la réapparition de la Russie.

Quelle pourrait être la réponse sécuritaire?

La réponse sécuritaire pourrait alors être de deux sortes: d'une part une réponse classique, mais difficile à percevoir clairement aujourd'hui, impliquant la constitution d'alliances régionales, (par exemple: Iran, Israël, Russie et pays du Caucase tels que l'Azerbaïdjan et l'Arménie); d'autre part un effort à long terme en faveur d'un libéralisme politique, économique et social des pays de la région. Sans être contradictoires, ces deux évolutions sont-elles compatibles? Envisage-t-on un partage des tâches? A l'Union européenne, à l'OSCE, au G8 les efforts politiques et économiques? Aux Etats-Unis le soin de régler de nouvelles alliances militaires avec l'Asie?

Dans ce nouveau Moyen-Orient, l'OTAN devrait avoir un rôle réactif et secondaire

L'OTAN ne pourra jouer un rôle qu'à la condition que son image dans la région se soit améliorée. Plus qu'une politique de communication renouvée, les pays membres de l'OTAN et les sociétés civiles du Sud doivent mener ensemble des programmes de coopération visant à développer des intérêts communs de sécurité par une meilleure connaissance mutuelle et la reconnaissance de leurs divergences et convergences.

Par ailleurs, l'OTAN ne pourra intervenir efficacement qu'à la condition que les politiques occidentales de ses membres contribuent à résoudre d'une façon acceptable les trois dossiers évoqués plus haut.

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'OTAN ne serait alors qu'un acteur secondaire, appliquant des politiques décidées ailleurs (ONU, OSCE) mais dont la valeur ajoutée pourrait se vérifier à trois niveaux:

- soutenir la modernisation des outils de défense: la coopération militaire, en particulier la réforme de défense, pourrait contribuer à l'ouverture démocratique des régimes, à condition toutefois que cela soit complémentaire à d'autres efforts;
- contribuer à l'inter-opérabilité des forces, à la fois en vue d'opérations communes si nécessaire, mais aussi en tant que façon de développer des intérêts communs;
- intervenir pour garantir le maintien des accords de paix entre Israël et la Palestine, seul domaine d'intervention opérationnelle que les participants ont envisagé.

Conclusion

En 2030, au Maghreb comme au Moyen-Orient, la sécurité sera un défi commun pour le Nord comme pour le Sud. La sécurité des échanges en Méditerranée restera un bien partagé et nécessaire.

Développer des intérêts communs de sécurité plus vastes, demandera à tous créativité, générosité, courage et détermination.

L'OTAN, organisation réactive par excellence, peut-elle avoir un rôle pro-actif dans cette démarche volontariste? Tel est le défi qui lui est lancé.

SUMMARY

The current geopolitical situation is characterized by deep unease

- As far as the South is concerned, disappointment and concern: the Barcelona Process has run out of steam; an unbalanced United States' policy vis-à-vis the Peace Process; the rhetoric surrounding the Broader Middle East, which is perceived as anti-Moslem and anti-Arab; war and chaos in Iraq.
- As far as the North is concerned, disagreement, in terms of content and form, about the nature of the Alliance and its missions, the threat analysis, and the appropriate response.

Within this context, protecting communications in the Mediterranean is still a common concern as is fighting terrorism; however, we should try to avoid mixing up national political Islamism with the totalitarian, terrorist, and deterritorialized discourse used by Wahhabism and Salafism.

All parties must feel responsible for the way the situation develops

- The Arab countries must become involved in the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, by proposing a strategic status quo to reassure Israel and by giving up the principle of the refugees' right of return in exchange for a Palestinian State created in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Agreement.
- The Western countries should review their policy of intervention that is too often community-and ethnic-based: in Iraq, it is preventing the emergence of democracy; in the rest of the region, it is holding back the reform of Islam by the Moslems themselves; it is making change more difficult in countries in which societies are becoming more and more secularized whereas religion is increasingly invading the political field.

- As far as NATO is concerned, it must adapt its forces to the complexity and versatility of the region's strategic landscape and develop the ability to employ an appropriate mix of coercion and prevention and deterrence (the high/low mix concept).
- The Mediterranean Dialogue (and the ICI?¹) must stop propping up the region's authoritarian regimes, to the detriment of their overall objective of democratization.

In 2003, the situation in the Maghreb and the Middle East should be quite different. In addition to the geopolitical uncertainties, much will depend on changes within NATO and the European Union as defense and security institutions.

By 2030, the Maghreb might have developed genuinely common security interests with the Northern countries

Despite the worrying changes in the balance in both demographics and the environment, tensions may subside. The possibility of anchoring the Maghreb to Europe, in ways that have yet to be defined, seems to be a plausible prospect. Common security interests between the Maghreb countries and between the Northern and Southern countries are fairly easy to identify but depend upon the fulfillment of the following conditions:

- Sustained efforts by the Maghreb countries to achieve their current policy of transition towards political, social, and economic modernization;
- The launching of a vigorous regional integration policy by these countries, perhaps by coming up with a new relationship with Egypt;
- The injecting of enthusiasm into the EU's "Neighborhood Policy" by the European countries and the revitalization of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in support of political, economic, and social change.

¹ Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

As one of a number of actors, NATO must play the role of supporter and facilitator within a transformed Maghreb

Above all, the Maghreb countries expect NATO to support them in ensuring the success of the necessary changes during what they consider to be a crucial transition phase. They reject any kind of intrusion. The form of support to be provided by NATO should, therefore, be decided by sector and on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, each of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries has different expectations with respect to both the nature and the intensity of the cooperation in which they are interested. NATO will have to avoid doing anything that might exacerbate regional imbalances.

In 2030, the Middle East will still be a region beset by acute tension

First of all, much will depend on the degree of progress achieved with respect to the following three issues:

- The security requirements of the two neighboring States of Israel and Palestine;
- The need to manage the new regional balance resulting from the emergence of new nuclear actors such as Iran;
- The rebuilding and stabilization of Iraq.

If these three issues are not settled, they will continue to create fault lines in both the South and the North and prevent the development of common security interests among all the actors.

In addition, the tension surrounding access to natural resources, demography, and the central role played by oil could destabilize the region as well as trigger the emergence of new actors, such as China and India, and the re-appearance of Russia.

What might the security responses be?

There are two possible security responses: on the one hand, the classical response, that is difficult to identify clearly today, but which involves the formation of regional alliances (for example, Iran, Israel,

Russia and the Caucasian countries: Azerbaijan and Armenia); and, on the other, a long-term effort to encourage political, economic, and social liberalism in the countries of the region. Without being contradictory, are these two developments compatible? Can we envisage some kind of burden sharing? For instance, assigning political and economic tasks to the European Union, the OSCE, and the G-8, and the task of dealing with new military alliances with Asia to the United States?

NATO should have a reactive and secondary role within this new Middle East

NATO will not be a player in the Middle East unless it improves its regional image. The NATO member countries and the Southern civil societies do not so much need a revised communications policy as joint cooperative programs designed to develop common security interests by improving their knowledge of each other and accepting each other's similarities and differences.

In addition, NATO will not be able to intervene effectively unless its members' Western policies can promote acceptable solutions to the three above-mentioned issues.

In any event, NATO would then only be a minor actor applying policies that had been decided elsewhere (by the UN and the OSCE), but which could contribute added value at the following three levels:


- Supporting the modernization of defense tools: military cooperation, especially defense reform, could contribute to regimes opening up for democracy, provided that this supplements other efforts;
- Building up force interoperability, both for common operations if necessary and as a way of developing common interests;
- Intervening to guarantee the upholding of peace agreements between Israel and Palestine, which was the only area of operational intervention envisaged by the participants.

Conclusion

In both the Maghreb and the Middle East, security will be a common challenge for both the North and the South in 2030. Maritime transport safety in the Mediterranean will continue to be a shared and necessary asset.

Developing wider common security interests will require creativity, generosity, courage, and determination by all parties.

Does NATO, which is a reactive organization par excellence, have a role to play here as part of this proactive approach? This is the challenge facing it.



La Méditerranée et le Moyen-Orient
The Mediterranean and the Middle East

